C
OUR DES
C
OMPTES
The Jussieu campus:
The damaging results of a poorly
managed renovation project
November 2011
Disclaimer
Summary
of the
Public Thematic Report
T
his summary is designed to aid the understanding and use of
the Cour des Comptes report.
Only the report is legally binding on the Cour des Comptes.
The responses of government departments, councils and other
organisations concerned are appended to the report.
Contents
3
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Presentation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
1
A complex operation characterised by constant
delays and spiralling costs
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
2
The reasons the operation spiralled out of control . .
11
Conclusion
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
Recommendations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
Presentation
5
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
T
he Jussieu campus, situated in the north of Paris’ fifth arrondissement, is home to two
prestigious scientific universities, the Pierre and Marie Curie University and the Paris-
Diderot University, as well as the prestigious establishment “lnstitut de physique du globe de Paris”
(IPGP), housed in buildings made fire-proof with an asbestos coating.
In 1996, awareness of the dangers of asbestos to public health and pressure from the users of
the buildings led the ministry to undertake an asbestos removal operation on the site. This was sup-
posed to last three years and be carried out for an overall cost of €183 m.
An investigation by the Cour des Comptes in 2003 revealed weaknesses in the general conduct
of the operation the timescale and costs of which were already significant. The Office particularly
underlined the need to put in place strict monitoring and management systems for such a large scale
operation.
In the course of the new investigation carried out in 2010-2011, the Cour des Comptes exam-
ined the main work done by the EPJC (Etablissement Public du Campus de Jussieu) who have
been responsible for the work and project management since the previous intervention by the Cour
des Comptes.
Costs have spiralled considerably: the total cost of the operation is today estimated at
€1.8 billion, that is to say almost triple the cost estimated in 2001. With regard to deadlines, the
institution has not respected its regulatory obligation to complete the removal of asbestos by
31 December 2010. The removal of asbestos will not be completed before the end of 2011, and
the renovation of the buildings will be not completed until 2015 at the earliest.
An understanding of why the project spiralled out of control in such a way is indispensable in
order to avoid a similar situation being created in university building and investment projects in the
future.
7
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Cour des Comptes
1
A complex operation
characterised by constant
delays and spiralling costs
From the outset, this exceptional
operation proved to be complex
because of the size of the site from
which asbestos had to be removed and
the difficulties incurred in carrying out
work on an occupied site, necessitating
the temporary move of numerous hous-
ing and laboratory facilities.
All these initial difficulties were
compounded by a lack of understanding
of the workings of the site in terms of
occupation and construction methods
and the very specific needs of research
laboratories.
Respecting the regulatory timescales
for the removal of asbestos also proved
a complicating factor.
Furthermore, work being carried
out simultaneously on the new ZAC
campus, Paris Rive Gauche, in the 13th
arrondissement, three kilometres fur-
ther upstream on the left bank of the
Seine, to which the Paris-Diderot
University should have moved, coupled
with a lack of co-ordination between
these two operations, disturbed the
smooth running of renovations on the
Jussieu campus on several occasions.
Weaknesses
in the organisation
of the five principal
operations
During the period between 2003
and 2010 five large works operations
were carried out on the Jussieu campus.
Each one of them was characterised by
spiralling costs and delays.
1)
The construction of the new
ATRIUM building
with an net overall
surface area of 16,750 m
2
was one year
behind schedule and the final cost of
the work (€29.7billion) underwent an
increase of 38.6 %. The estimation of
the budget needed for the work was re-
evaluated as the work progressed and
also, it should be noted, as early on as
the competition stage for the project
management (+11.6 %), hus illustrating
how difficult the public works body
found it to estimate construction costs
correctly.
2)
Renovation
work,
after
asbestos removal, on the Jussieu
campus’s landmark building
, the
central tower, was also delayed by a year.
This was as a result of poor co-ordina-
tion between the four contractors, an
A complex operation
characterised by constant
delays and spiralling costs
initial underestimation of the safety
issues and the need to carry out work
unforeseen in the first poor diagnosis.
The renovation of the central tower
estimated at a cost of €26.8 million in
2004 finally cost €43.2 million (+ 61%).
It was completed in 2009.
3)
The “îlot Cuvier” operation
was a project destined for a plot of land
on the other side of the rue Cuvier
where existing buildings would be
demolished to make way for a new
building designed to house the “Institut
de physique du globe de Paris” and the
university’s science library, then situated
on the west of the campus. Initially
planned for 1999 work only began in
2007 after all the units in the buildings
to be demolished were re-housed.
The impossibility of finding some-
where to relocate one of the Paris-
Diderot laboratories held up work for
several years.
This operation is currently in its sec-
ond phase because of a complete revi-
sion of the programme made necessary
by a disagreement between the two uni-
versity establishments: it has led to a
change of location for the library, even
though work had already started, so that
a physics laboratory can be put there
instead.
4)
The “secteur ouest” operation
concerns the renovation of around
110.000 m
2
Net overall surface area
within the “gril d’Albert”. It has experi-
enced numerous difficulties and it is the
cause of a major part of the overspend-
ing and delays.
The preliminary outline phase was
delayed by a year and after arbitration by
ministers an increase in the budget of
€29 million before tax (+ 25%) was
agreed.
Weaknesses in the pre-works prepa-
ration phases caused difficulties when
the construction contract was to be
drawn up. This contract was hampered
in the early stages because of a dispute
with the constructor in charge over the
subject of further studies which needed
to be carried out, studies deemed neces-
sary because of poor preparation in the
initial phases. This dispute was settled
six months later with the payment of
€8.3 million in compensation for the
delay, to the company involved.
Subsequently, discoveries made on
site as a result of poor diagnosis in the
early phases, led to a further delay of a
year and enormous extra costs.
The number of modifications need-
ed to equip the buildings and the need
to draw up a completion contract fur-
ther ate into the budget for the opera-
tion.
Finally, the need to split the renova-
tion project in the west-centre sector
(34,700 m
2
) and to delay it until after the
completion of the west north and south
sector in 2010 means that works will not
be finished until 2015 and the final cost
of the west sector will again rise (esti-
mated at 270 million in 2005 and at
€459 million at the end of 2010)
5)
The “secteur est” operation
(68,000 m
2
) was late starting because of
setbacks in preceding operations and
9
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
delays in moving the units from Paris-
Diderot to ZAC Paris Rive Gauche.
It is also prone to the constant
incertitude about the final use of the
university buildings. This lack of deci-
sion making meant that studies were
undertaken even though the exact
extent of the work had not been
finalised.
Several additional costs incurred by
the revision of the programmes were
already identified during the detailed
pre-project phase. Having taken into
account the recently identified risks
there is no further room for manoeuvre
in the timelinefor the completion of the
project in 2015 or in the estimated
budget of €274.5 million.
Shifting dates and
their impact on the
cost of temporary
accommodation
The Jussieu project is such that there
must be a link between sites, as the
occupants from one building need to be
housed in another as soon as it is reno-
vated and this has meant that the
timetable for the operation has con-
stantly been affected by huge delays on
each site.
The acceleration plan decreed on
14 2001 envisaged the evacuation of all
premises containing asbestos before
2006 and the renovation of buildings
before 2009. In 2005 the establishment
anticipated an end to the work in 2012
or 2013.
The evacuation of all premises con-
taining asbestos was not completed until
December 2010 and the end of renova-
tions is now set for 2015.
During the course of the building
work the research teams and the admin-
istrative services were housed in rented
accommodation, sometimes after com-
plex removal operations due to the spe-
cific needs of research laboratories.
Between 1997 and 2010 the rented sur-
face area went from 6, 848 m
2
to
77, 561 m
2
, reaching a high of 81, 900
m
2
in2006. The money spent yearly on
rent went up accordingly, going from
€1.3 million i to €41.6 million in 2010
with a high of €45.7 million in 2008.
The delay in the renovation of the
buildings engendered enormous extra
costs due not only to extensions of the
rental period but to penalties imposed
on the public establishment by landlords
because the premises could not be
vacated, penalties which were some-
times very weighty.
On the site of the former Boucicaut
hospital, in the 15th arrondissement of
Paris the research team stayed 28
months longer than the date agreed on
the lease for the vacation of the premis-
es, this meant an extra cost of
€21.8 million, €7 million of which was
merely for the late penalties incurred.
In total, the costs associated with
accommodation in temporary premises
works out at €569 million, i.e. 33 % of
A complex operation
characterised by constant
delays and spiralling costs
A complex operation
characterised by constant
delays and spiralling costs
10
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
the estimated final cost of the Jussieu
operation.
The spiralling costs
of the operation
The cost of the Jussieu operation
has not stopped spiralling since its
launch. In 2005, after a general inspec-
tion (an inspection involving inspectors
from the Departments of Finance,
Administration, National Education and
Research and Road Works), the cost was
estimated at €1.03 billion. At the end of
2008 it was re-evaluated at €1.77 billion
as a result of the many difficulties
encountered in the west sector.
Since the end of 2009, the overall
cost has risen to €1.85 billion. This cost
is not subject to formal control: it is reg-
ularly re-evaluated during preparation
meetings held by the public establish-
ment’s administrative council and actu-
ally includes a reserve of €143 million
for renovation work (barres de Cassan)
which should be financed from else-
where.
Given the extent of the risks which
have so far been identified completion
dates may once more have to be put
back which would mean further extra
costs.
11
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Cour des Comptes
2
The reasons the operation
spiralled out of control
All parties involved are in some way
responsible for the operation spiralling
out of control. The EPCJ did not play
the role of project management given it
by the State, correctly. The recipient
institutions were not made sufficiently
aware of their responsibilities. The State
did not manage and steer the project in
the way it should have.
A public
establishment with
insufficient support
The EPCJ was created in 1996. In
the course of its early years it was
deemed that it did not have sufficient
staff to deal with the amount of work it
had to manage. In 2007 a series of man-
agement crises lead to the departure of
a third of its personnel. The numbers
employed by the organisation can only
really be considered sufficient from
2008 onwards.
The establishment’s Administrative
Council did not fulfill all its responsibil-
ities. The role it played in steering the
operation, particularly its financial
aspects, was largely insufficient.
An analysis of the works carried out
by the EPCJ throws light on the many
faults to be found in the establishment’s
project management.
The inability of the public establish-
ment to estimate the cost of operations,
always systematically undervalued, is
manifest.
The
establishment
was
unaware of the cost management
process in which the clients and the fin-
anciers agree objectives for each opera-
tion from the outset.
The preparatory phases for the
work did not establish proper parame-
ters within which the work should be
executed, which then meant that new
work needed to be done as the project
progressed. Every project was affected
by the need to carry out complementary
work, contracts were awarded without
having been put out to tender and in
several instances irregular practices were
adopted.
University
establishments
unaware of their
responsibilities
The various works operations have
all been affected by numerous changes
in the programme during the course of
their execution.
The establishment and the universi-
ties cite structural difficulties: given the
delay between the assessment of need
and the delivery of the buildings it is
very
difficult
to
make
correct
The reasons the operation
spiralled out of control
12
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
specifications years in advance, while at
the same time, research is evolving and
research laboratories need new, costly
re-equipment.
However, another explanation could
be that the constantly changing needs of
the universities are linked to questions
of governance and strategy. On several
occasions the EPCJ was presented with
a ‘fait accompli’ and had to cope with
the
consequences
of
the
change
imposed by the university establish-
ments who had no regard for the
budget.
The conflicts over the research lab-
oratories which continued throughout
the works, also played a role in steering
the project off-course. On several occa-
sions extra costs were incurred because
it proved impossible to move certain
laboratories.
Deficiencies in the
State’s handling of
the project
The State deliberately took no part
in the handling of the project which was
handed over entirely to the public estab-
lishment under the auspices of the
Public Building Procurement law (the
Loi MOP). The EPCJ was never capable
of managing the entire project, having
neither the legal status, nor the authori-
ty to make decisions as to the universi-
ties’ requests with regard to changes in
curricula.
One reason for the delay in the
operation is due to lack of overall con-
trol and co-ordination between work
being carried out simultaneously on the
Jussieu campus and the new ZAC cam-
pus, Paris Rive Gauche, whose progress
had a knock on effect on the evacuation
of buildings on the site at Jussieu.
The last minute realisation that it
would be impossible to move certain
elements, the delays in progress on the
site at Paris Rive Gauche, then having to
rent new temporary premises, all added
to the delays and the rise in costs.
Once the Paris-Diderot University
had vacated its premises, the ministry
showed a lack of vision and direction
with regard to the use to which these
vacant areas was going to be put.
After having abandoned a succes-
sion of proposals concerning the re-
allocation of the area to outside estab-
lishments, (a study which had been
ongoing since 2006), it was not until
2010 that the Minister handed over use
of the whole campus to the Pierre and
Marie Curie University. Throughoutthis
period, the EPCJ was preparing to
launch one of the most important reno-
vations of the campus although the
decision about its use had not been
finalised.
In 2005 the Cour des Comptes and
the General Inspection authorities had
identified the need for a proper control-
ling body to be appointed. The inspec-
tion committee recommended that the
entire project management of this oper-
ation be handed to the Education
The reasons the operation
spiralled out of control
13
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Authority in Paris who would contract it
out to the EPCJ. The body also recom-
mended that a joint project management
structure be put in place to include the
ZAC Paris Rive Gauche operation.
In spite of these warnings and an
already spiralling budget these recom-
mendations were not acted on and the
project management structure was not
reviewed, principally because of the
opposition to the recommendations
shown by some of the major players.
Control of the operation was not
undertaken by the Rector of Paris, the
universities’ Chancellor, in spite of the
instructions that were issued to him by
the Minister’s Cabinet. The Rector cited
the fact that he had insufficient funds
for such a task and indicated that at his
level it was difficult to arbitrate between
large university establishments. He invit-
ed the Minister of Further Education to
assume the role.
Shortcomings in the control of the
operation played a crucial role in steer-
ing it off-course. They made it easier for
people to lapse into inertia when things
were not moving forward, no-one
played the role of arbitrator when the
project was underway and decisions
were arrived at in critical phases of the
project when no other solutions seemed
really satisfactory.
Conclusion
15
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
T
he complexity of the operation to remove asbestos from the Jussieu campus had been
largely underestimated when it was launched in 1996. Fifteen years later the result of
this operation, which has been transformed into a vast university re-building project, is very
negative.
As far as the timetable is concerned, the statutory time limit for the removal of asbestos,
even though it was twice deferred has not been adhered to. As far as finance is concerned, the
final cost of the project is today estimated at €1.8 billion although there are five years of work
still to complete.
There is no doubt that the Pierre and Marie Curie University needs to be provided with
the facilities fitting its scientific status but this objective should have been attainable with a far
less damaging impact on the public purse.
Lack of accountability on behalf of the financing body, the universities who were to ben-
efit and the project management group is one of the elements which has characterised the man-
agement of this project and can be seen as one explanation for it spiralling out of control.
No organisational plan or procedural framework – indispensable elements for managing a
complex operation such as this which involves so many different players – were ever put in place.
The State was very slow to decide on the final use to which the renovated areas of the uni-
versities should be put. In spite of the recommendations included in the inspection report of
2004, the State did not take on the role of arbitrator, manager or controller of the budget.
Nor did it put in place any sort of co-ordination structure between works on the sites at Jussieu
and ZAC Paris Rive Gauche, even though this was indispensable.
The university establishments were not made aware of their responsibilities in terms of the
necessity of keeping to the programme and remaining within budget.
The EPCJ was given the entire responsibility for project management without having either
the means or the legal status necessary to exercise control over the university establishments.
In this difficult context, the EPCJ managed operations by prioritising the wishes of the
various institutions, in terms of timescale and satisfaction, to the detriment of good practice
and budgetary management.
In August 2010, the EPCJ became the EPAURIF, enlarging its field of operations and
taking responsibility for university property management in the Ile-de-France region. At the
same time, the ministry reassessed strategical planning for the way in which university proper-
ty should be managed, emphasising the need for universities to be made responsible, in fact to
be the new project directors.
Faced with the enormous shortcomings revealed as a result of the inspection, the Cour des
Comptes decided to refer to facts to the Budget and Finance Disciplinary Office and to this end
the matter has been referred to the Office of Public Prosecutions.
Conclusion
16
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Having taken lessons from the asbestos removal operation and renovation of Jussieu, the
Cour des Comptes is drafting recommendations designed to secure the termination of the works
financially and is putting in place a framework for any future university renovation work the
State may wish to undertake.
These general recommendations are aimed to respond to the principle shortcomings revealed
in the Jussieu operation:
- the lack of proper project management, particularly in terms of preparation and follow-
up of the operations;
the lack of any sense of responsibility on behalf of the university establishments as clients;
- the shortcomings shown by the State in terms of the regulation of the main players.
Recommendations
17
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
First objective: improve the ’s
project
management
skills
of
EPAURIF
1. create an organisation plan
and procedural framework outlining
the ways in which the operations man-
aged by the EPAURIF will be carried
out and how it will interact with the
various internal and external agencies
involved;
For each operation the EPAURIF
should, in particular:
2. create a file for the pro-
gramme’s launch detailing the extent of
the works, the way they will be
financed, the timescales, and the way
interaction with other agencies will be
managed;
3. regularly up-date the launch
file by including a monitoring file;
4. provide the establishment
with full and comprehensive internal
legal control.
Second objective: create a sense
of responsibility within the univer-
sity establishments
5. empower
the
universities
responsible
for
defining
the
programme;
6. give the universities free rein
to manage temporary accommodation
within a limited budget.
Third objective: allow the State
to develop a strategic plan for man-
aging
university
property
programmes
7.
before the start of any opera-
tion, take formal decisions about which
premises are to be built or renovated
and the use to which they will be put;
8. operations should only be
launched when thorough preparations
have been carried out;
9. create a master plan for the
provision of further education and
research establishments in Ile-de-France;
10. draw up a performance con-
tract for the EPAURIF;
11. draw up a contract for each
operation handed over to the EPAU-
RIF at the same time as the official
contract of delegation is drawn up in
accordance with the Public Buildings
Procurement Loi MOP;
12. set up a steering committee
for each operation managed by the
EPAURIF which brings together the
operation’s main players.
To enable the trustees to manage
the project efficiently and to provide
real decision making tools, it is impera-
tive that the EPAURIF:
13. present the administrative
council with a reliable means of moni-
toring the operational aspects of the
projects along with the means of mon-
itoring the multi-annual financial
aspects of the establishment, validated
by the trustees, and allowing the finan-
cial department to verify the sustain-
ability of the operation’s budget in the
medium term;
14. outline the multiannual finan-
cial provisions of the establishment
(multiannual commitment authorisa-
tions and appropriation payments) as an
appendix to the annual budget and have
it validated by the administrative council.