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OUR DES

OMPTES

Lessons from the

2010 floods on the

Atlantic coast (Xynthia)

and in the Var

July 2012



Disclaimer

Summary

of the

Public Thematic Report

his summary is intended to help the reader under-

stand and make use of the Cour des Comptes

report.

The Cour des Comptes is responsible only for the con-

tent of the report.

Responses by government departments, councils and

other organisations are appended to the report.

Contents

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Overview

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Increased and forgotten risks

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early warning and emergency response systems:

further progress needed

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prevention: persistent deficiencies in urban

planning

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Protecting built-up areas: a lack of consistency

. .

Compensation: very comprehensive, but with some

inconsistencies

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overview

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

wo natural disasters that occurred in 2010 are etched into our memories because of their

dramatic consequences.

Storm Xynthia reached the French coast during the night of 27-28 February 2010,

causing sudden and extensive marine flooding. The human toll was very heavy: 29 deaths con-

centrated in La Faute-sur-Mer in the Vendée and 12 deaths in Charente-Maritime.

On 15 June 2010, the Var was hit by extraordinary floods triggered by overflowing

rivers and run-off, in turn caused by exceptional rainfall. The Draguignan area and the

Nartuby and Argens valleys were particularly hard hit. The death toll was 23, with nine peo-

ple losing their lives in Draguignan; another two people were reported missing.

Hundreds of people also suffered both physical and psychological trauma, losing their

homes and all their belongings.

As well as their tragic human cost, both these disasters resulted in considerable financial

costs to local authorities. Total public expenditure (by central government, local authorities and

Europe) amounted to

€

467 million for Xynthia and

€

201 million for the Var floods.

Insurance payouts came to

€

690 million for the Xynthia floods and

€

615 million for the Var

floods, making a total of more than

€

1.3 billion,

€

640 million of which was covered by the

“natural disaster” government guarantee scheme. Public expenditure is funded by taxes paid

by all taxpayers, while the cost of insurance claims is funded by insurance premiums and the

natural disaster contribution paid by virtually everyone in the country.

These consequences have raised questions over the government’s response, in terms of its

ability to prevent and manage these kinds of disasters.

It is for this reason that the Cour des Comptes and three Chambres Régionales des

Comptes covering the Pays de Loire, Poitou-Charentes and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

regions carried out a series of audits in 2011, through an interjurisdictional structure, to learn

lessons from these terrible floods.



Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Increased and

forgotten risks

Increased risks

The disasters affected vulnerable

areas in which urban development

increased the level of risk to the popula-

tion.

Until the mid-20th century, these

areas mainly consisted of farmland

where the principal threat was the risk

of marine flooding along the Atlantic

coast and overflowing rivers in the Var.

Since then, urban development has

changed the nature of the risks. As a

result of demographic pressure, which

is particularly high in coastal areas and

in the southernmost part of the country,

as well as the considerable inflow of

people during the tourist season, and in

spite of limited capacity, there is a real

“thirst” to build in these areas, fuelled

by owners and developers and support-

ed by local elected officials.

The southern Vendée area includes

the

towns

Faute-sur-Mer,

L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer and La Tranche-

sur-Mer. Its population, which is boost-

ed by 150,000 summer holidaymakers,

has grown by 22% in little more than a

quarter of a century.

Since 1982, the population of

Charente-Maritime has grown by 21%

and that of the Var by 43%. These fig-

ures almost double in the summer, with

the population of Charente-Maritime ris-

ing to almost one million and that of the

Var exceeding two million.

Forgotten risks, in

spite of warnings

There were other disasters before

2010, but they were forgotten. And yet,

some of them left clearly visible traces:

for example, a marble plaque on the wall

of the chemist’s shop opposite the town

hall in Trans-en-Provence is a reminder

of the high water line reached by the

1827 flood and the damage it caused.

Above all, warnings had been given.

For example, a 2008 report emphasised

a serious risk in La Faute-sur-Mer and

L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer posed by “the com-

bination of two phenomena: rising

water levels in the Lay estuary and

marine flooding”, and pointed out that

“ the Lay estuary region is the most dan-

gerous part of the coast…”. While this

report undoubtedly failed to arouse

enough interest, a brochure on the Lay

estuary flood prevention plan, circulated

more widely in July 2007, continued to

describe this alarming state in similar

terms.

Increased and forgotten risks

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

In the final analysis, a serious lack of

risk awareness led populations and pub-

lic authorities not to take full measure of

the threats hanging over some areas in

the three

départements

in question.

Steps taken since

these events

As well as generating a large amount

of feedback, the two disasters have been

the subject of parliamentary reports and

inspections.

As a result, the government has

adopted various initiatives grouped

together into a “rapid submersion plan”

(sometimes known as the “plan digues”

or “flood defence plan”), published on

17 February 2011. The plan aims to

deliver a more effective response to

marine flooding, flash floods and

breached flood defences.

It points forward to the national

flood risk management plan, the frame-

work for which was laid down in the

12 July 2010 Act on the national com-

mitment to the environment, known as

“Grenelle 2” , transposing the Euro-

pean Directive of 23 October 2007,

known as the “Floods Directive”. The

purpose of the Directive is to establish

a strategic view of flood risks by 2015.

Certain systems put in place, partic-

ularly in connection with forecasting

and warning, proved their effectiveness

when the Var once again experienced

exceptional rainfall in November 2011.

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Early warning and

emergency response

systems: further progress

needed

Early

warning

and

emergency

response systems can save human lives.

They also have a limited cost relative to

their impact in the event of a crisis. To

achieve their purpose, however, they

must be comprehensive, consistent and

rational.

Early warning

systems

Significant improvements

in weather and flood fore-

casting

While Météo France correctly fore-

cast rising water levels, they underesti-

mated the extent of this phenomenon

in the La Rochelle area, with forecasts

putting the flood surge at between

0.80 metres and 1 metre, compared with

an actual high water line of 1.5 metres.

There were known deficiencies in the

forecasting system, such as a lack of

automated tide gauges and observation

stations belonging to the Naval Hydro-

graphical and Oceanographic Depart-

ment (SHOM) around the edge of the

bay of Bourgneuf and the cove of

L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer. These shortcom-

ings, which affected virtually all coastal

areas subject to a high risk of significant

flooding, are regrettable, even if cor-

recting them would only have had an

impact if substantial progress had also

been made on coastal oceanographic

models.

Since Xynthia, work has begun to

improve tools designed to incorporate

coastal developments into forecasting.

However, this work will take time and in

the meantime gaps still remain. Further-

more, the number of parties involved

suggests a need to formally coordinate

the forecasting of marine flooding.

In the Var, rain devastated a relative-

ly small area of 40-50 km

around

Draguignan – something Météo France’s

operational forecasting tools were not

able to forecast with a sufficient degree

of precision. Moreover, monitoring of

the Argens and Nartuby rivers – both of

which are classed as high risk – by the

flood prevention service (SPC) was

woefully inadequate. The SPC comes

under the ministry with responsibility

for the environment, which had cut its

investment expenditure.

After the disaster, a substantial

effort was made to improve equipment.

Early warning and emergency response

systems: further progress needed

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

This effort needs to be strengthened

and continued.

Further room for

improvement in

early warning

mechanisms

In interpreting early warning mes-

sages in connection with Xynthia, wind-

related danger outweighed the risk of

flooding, with the 1999 storm acting as

the benchmark in collective memory.

There were, however, deficiencies that

need to be highlighted: for example,

Météo France’s failure to include its very

high wave warning procedure (ATFV)

in its weather vigilance procedures, thus

reducing the visibility of these warnings.

This defect has since been corrected.

In the Var, Météo France discussed

whether or not to increase the alert level

to red; in the end, no red alert was

issued, since it was deemed to be too

long after the event. This policy has

since been revised.

For Xynthia, a red alert was issued

to local mayors via automatic telephone

calls and fax messages sent by prefec-

tures. In Charente-Maritime, representa-

tives of the State administration con-

tacted

local

mayors

personally.

Conversely, mayors in the southern

Vendée, where towns were being flood-

ed, did not ensure that an emergency

warning was issued to the prefect, as laid

down in the French General Local

Authorities Code.

In the Var, the impact of warning mes-

sages sent to mayors was reduced by the

fact that no red alert was issued and by

communication difficulties experienced

during the crisis.

Alerts to local populations fell far

short of what was needed. While may-

ors in Charente-Maritime visited the

most vulnerable individuals to warn

them personally, there was no real oper-

ational warning system in place in either

of the two Atlantic

départements

or the

Var. Steps have since been taken: for

example, the three affected towns in the

Vendée are developing warning systems

using sirens, telephone alerts and vehi-

cles equipped with loudspeakers. This

action would nonetheless be more effec-

tive if it was coordinated.

At the national level, Météo France

and the central service for hydrometeo-

rology and flood warning support

(SCHAPI) are developing new informa-

tion systems covering rainfall and river

flooding. The 2008 White Paper on

defence and national security provided

for a new system to warn and inform

local populations. Its implementation,

however, is falling behind, with no con-

crete plans in place at present other than

the cataloguing of sirens and other local

warning mechanisms. Furthermore,

ambiguities over the sharing of respon-

sibility between central government and

local authorities need to be clarified.

Early warning and emergency response

systems: further progress needed

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Organising the

emergency

response

Plans need to be

supplemented and

updated

There were shortfalls in emergency

plans prior to the crisis.

Central government’s “ORSEC”

plans organising the civil security

response had not been updated, and

flood response exercises were non-exis-

tent. While the Var risk analysis and pro-

tection plan (SDACR) considered flood

risk, the plans covering the two

départe-

ments

on the Atlantic coast did not really

address the risk of flooding. This defi-

ciency has since been only partly cor-

rected.

Meanwhile, very few towns had met

the requirement to draw up a local

emergency action plan. Efforts made

since the crisis remain to be completed:

at the end of 2011, of the 55 towns in

Charente-Maritime that were required to

have such a plan, only 25 did; the equiv-

alent figures were 33 out of 69 towns in

the Vendée and 27 out of 47 in the Var.

Furthermore, these plans do not con-

tain a sufficient level of operational detail,

while intermunicipal plans are too scarce

or even non-existent, as is the case in

La Faute-sur-Mer and L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer,

where there is every reason to justify the

need for such plans.

Emergency services: room

for improvement in both

their use and their coordi-

nation

Feedback has underscored the effi-

ciency and dedication of emergency

services, and steps have been taken to

further

improve

their

capability.

However, some questions still remain

unanswered.

Air assets – which are especially

important during crises of this kind –

were used inconsistently from

départe-

ment

département

. For example, signifi-

cant use was made of helicopters as

soon as emergency operations began in

the Var and in Charente-Maritime, while

they were used less and later in the

Vendée. Similarly, the degree of coordi-

nation was variable; in the Var, the abil-

ity to coordinate air assets was simpli-

fied by the fact that the département is

home to military schools. Finally, there

were gaps in air-to-ground communica-

tions.

A national air asset plan, to be

implemented locally through defence

and security zones, has yet to be drawn

up.

Unsuitable facilities

Several fire stations were flooded

when the disasters struck: three emer-

gency services centres in Charente-

Maritime; the L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer fire

station in the southern Vendée; and in

the Var, as well as the emergency servic-

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

es centre in Les Arcs-sur-Argens, the

local fire and emergency services

department (DDSIS), the main emer-

gency services centre and the

départe-

ment

’s storage facility in Draguignan.

The local operational fire and emer-

gency response centre (CODIS) was

thus taken out of service, and 87 vehi-

cles were lost out of a total of 160 that

were damaged by the disaster in the Var.

Emergency services facilities located

in flood-prone areas need to be closed

or relocated.

Early warning and emergency response

systems: further progress needed

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Prevention:

persistent deficiencies in

urban planning

Building

authorisations

with serious

consequences

Of particular note in this regard is

the “Les Voiliers” housing development

in La Faute-sur-Mer. Conversely, after

much hesitation by the State’s represen-

tative, the planned property develop-

ment in the Valescure area of Fréjus was

refused planning permission. These

examples illustrate promoters’ and local

authorities’ desire to develop sites,

ignoring natural risks, as well as the

weakness of the State’s representative in

the face of this desire. Neither verifica-

tions of legality nor the Water Act

appear to have been applied sufficiently

rigorously in such cases.

Beyond having tragic consequences

for human life, the granting of planning

permission in high-risk areas can end up

costing central government dearly, as

shown by the example of the “solidarity

zone” in Aytré, Charente-Maritime.

Failure in

communicating risk

information

The French Environmental Code

affirms citizens’ right to be informed

about major risks. Before the crises,

however, there were numerous short-

comings in this type of information, not

all of which have been remedied.

Risk information

documents

The

departement’s

major risk docu-

ment (DDRM) is drawn up by the pre-

fect. The documents for the three

départements

in question were too general

in nature and had not been updated

within the maximum time allowed by

regulations (five years). Actions initiated

since 2010 to update these documents

and ensure that they address more spe-

cific risks have yet to be completed.

The municipal major risk informa-

tion document (DICRIM) is drawn up

by the mayor. Before the disasters, only

a tiny minority of towns had such doc-

uments, and those that did exist were

Prevention: persistent deficiencies

in urban planning

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

barely operational. Since the crises, pre-

fectures have made help available to

towns to draw up these documents.

However, efforts have been hampered

by staff shortages on the ground. In the

Var, two years on from the disaster, only

32 municipal major risk information

documents have been submitted to the

prefecture; virtually all of the

départe-

ment

’s 153 towns should have submitted

such a document.

Flood hazard atlases (AZI), pro-

duced by the State administration, map

out the risks. In the absence of other

more specific or binding documents,

they can also be used to prevent con-

struction in dangerous areas. However,

they first have to be known about and

distributed. While they had been satis-

factorily distributed in the two Atlantic

départements

, the same was not true of

the Var, where the prefect failed to send

out the new generation atlases to mayors

before the disaster struck. It turns out

that these atlases could have been used

to predict the impact of the disaster

quite effectively.

Conversely, the risks mapped out in

atlases distributed on the Atlantic coast

fell well short of the marine flooding

that took place in February 2010. In any

event, local councils had received the

atlases without enthusiasm and they had

hardly been used in reviewing applica-

tions for building permits.

Since 2010, the relevant ministers

have asked prefects to ensure that risk

mapping documents are fully distrib-

uted. Under the European “Floods

Directive” of 2007, risk mapping activi-

ties will have to be stepped up. Such

activities will need to be carefully coor-

dinated by government ministries.

Information for buyers

and tenants

Information for buyers and tenants

(IAL) on the risks affecting a property,

required under the 30 July 2003 Act and

applicable since June 2006, is subject to

serious shortcomings: not all at-risk

areas are covered; information is gener-

ally incomplete and does not take into

account the full extent of risks; prefec-

toral orders and information on govern-

ment websites dedicated to informing

buyers and tenants is not updated; and

there is a lack of precision in the “state-

ment of risks”, which is required by

ministerial order and is appended by

notaries to agreements to sell and deeds

of sale.

While information for buyers and

tenants in the Var was updated by the

central authorities in 2011 following the

audit by the Cour des Comptes, the

same is far from true for the country as

a whole. A specific review of the exist-

ing situation should be drawn up and

the information scheme should be

relaunched.

Flood risk

prevention plans

The flood risk prevention plan

(PPRI) is ordered and adopted by the

Prevention: persistent deficiencies

in urban planning

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

prefect following a public inquiry and, in

particular, opinions from the relevant

local councils. In particular, the plan

defines at-risk areas and is binding in

nature, thus serving to control urban

development.

Some situations, however, raise

questions: the way in which the Saint-

Hermentaire area, where the town’s

main emergency services centre was

flooded without warning, was covered

in the Draguignan flood risk prevention

plan; the excessively long and arduous

progress of the Lay estuary flood risk

prevention plan in the Vendée, which

only entered into the pre-implementa-

tion phase some six years after it had

been ordered and, in the end, had not

been adopted by the time storm Xynthia

struck; and the content of the provi-

sions in this plan, which raises questions

in connection with the area located

behind the eastern flood defences in

La Faute-sur-Mer, where the level of

risk appears to have been reduced.

The examples analysed show that

before the crises:

- flood risk prevention plans had not

been ordered for all at-risk areas;

- where such plans had been

ordered, the procedure was often inter-

rupted, as in the Var, or became bogged

down in interminable discussions;

- the vast majority of mayors

opposed the adoption of such plans or

delayed it as long as possible, feeling

that it would hinder their desire to con-

tinue urban development in their towns;

- the State administration – through

its representatives, the prefects – did not

always stand up to pressure from local

elected officials and often acquiesced to

an excessive lengthening of procedures.

In the meantime, the content of

such plans was subject to consultation,

and even negotiation, to ensure that it

would not place too many restrictions

upon the potential for urban develop-

ment, at the expense of the safety of

people and property. Local elected offi-

cials sought to reduce restrictions as far

as possible, and State representatives

often agreed to compromise solutions.

Steps taken since 2010 point to a

renewed desire on the part of central

government to improve the coverage of

at-risk areas – some of which have been

designated as high priority – within a

short timescale. However, local opposi-

tion from both inhabitants and elected

officials has not disappeared altogether.

If the objectives are to be achieved, pre-

fects must adopt a firmer stance in sup-

port of government.

A new policy taking into account cli-

mate change has been laid down for

coastal risk prevention plans. Further-

more, the European “Floods Directive”

is set to introduce substantial changes to

France’s preventive arrangements. This

transitional phase must not be allowed

to result in a slowdown in the efforts

made to map risks and put in place risk

prevention plans.

Prevention: persistent

deficiencies in urban planning

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Urban planning

documents

Many of the areas affected by the

2010 floods were covered by obsolete

urban planning documents that did little

to constrain extended urban develop-

ment. For example, 12 of the 13 affect-

ed towns in the Var had land use plans

that dated back to before 1995, and

seven of these were drawn up earlier

than 1990.

Since the disasters struck, local

authorities have not made any real effort

to replace these plans with new genera-

tion documents aimed at ensuring bal-

anced and sustainable land develop-

ment.

Meanwhile, the relevant ministries

have not taken action to require local

authorities to begin drawing up “territo-

rial consistency plans” or produce local

urban development plans to replace

obsolete land use plans. It would be

advisable for central government to

enact legislation or regulations requiring

local councils to update their urban

planning documents.

Verification of

legality

Prior to 2010, national guidelines

issued to prefects clearly pointed out the

need to ensure that the verification of

legality included, as a priority, checking

urban planning documents and deci-

sions in at-risk areas. At an operational

level, however, checks conducted on

urban planning activities proved very

lax.

Prefectures often blame this state of

affairs on administrative jurisprudence

or staff shortages. While these argu-

ments partly reflect reality, an examina-

tion of sensitive cases reveals that laxity

in checking documents is mainly

explained by a lack of determination at

prefectoral level.

Following the disaster, the prefects

of the affected

départements

showed ini-

tiative in working towards more rigor-

ous verifications, and were issued with

guidelines containing a greater level of

operational detail. However, if there is

to be a lasting improvement in the effec-

tiveness of verifications of legality, the

necessary qualified staff will be needed,

as will, in particular, a clear willingness

at prefectoral level. Prefectoral authority

in this area will be reinforced by backing

from central government.

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Protecting built-up areas:

a lack of consistency

Unsuitable public

facilities located on

the sea front or

riverside

Various examples point to the cost

to taxpayers of establishing public facil-

ities in areas subject to flood risk – a risk

which, though well known, was not

taken into account.

In all three

départements

, numerous

camp sites were affected by the disas-

ters; some were in grave danger, like the

“Côte de Lumière” municipal camp site

at La Faute-sur-Mer in the Vendée,

which was also in contravention of the

law, and the three camps sites at Aytré in

Charente-Maritime. In this

département

32 camp sites were flooded, with ten of

these submerged to a depth of at least

one metre. In the Var, nine camp sites

had to be closed in summer 2010.

Although the crises forced the

authorities to face up to the need to

strictly apply camping regulations, the

results to date still leave room for

improvement.

High-risk areas:

buying up built

property

In areas exposed to a particularly

high risk, decisions to carry out amica-

ble purchases of homes by the govern-

ment, as practised in “solidarity zones”,

could have formed part of a policy of

“strategic withdrawal” –

i.e. a policy of

not trying to protect areas where it was

not realistically possible to provide ade-

quate protection. However, a lack of

consistency in the application of this

approach limited its effectiveness.

Different methods

followed post-Xynthia and

in the Var

After Xynthia, it is reasonable to say

that central government rushed to

define “solidarity zones” without ade-

quate consultation, leading to large

numbers of protests.

Following further work by expert

assessors and a more in-depth consulta-

tion, it subsequently defined compulsory

Protecting built-up areas:

a lack of consistency

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

purchase areas (involving expropriation

of property owners). These compulsory

purchase areas were often smaller than

the previously defined solidarity zones.

Central government’s decision to

purchase homes on an amicable basis

was based on twin objectives of protec-

tion and national solidarity, giving rise to

a high degree of ambiguity. The high

cost of buying homes located outside

compulsory purchase areas (totalling

almost

€

50 million in the Vendée and

€

34 million in Charente-Maritime) illus-

trates the hurried nature of the deci-

sions that were made.

If the aim was to protect the popu-

lation living in high-risk areas, amicable

purchases should have been completed

in the more tightly defined compulsory

purchase areas. If, on the other hand,

the principle to be applied was that of

showing national solidarity for victims,

including in cases where compulsory

purchase was not justified in the absence

of a very high level of risk or where less

expensive protection solutions were

available, other methods would have

been more economical.

The example of the Boucholeurs

district (Châtelaillon, Yves) is revealing

of a chaotic process and contradictory

decisions that were unnecessarily costly

for the public purse.

A radically different method was

followed in the Var – rather than imme-

diately defining amicable purchase areas,

the problem was approached in two

phases: the first phase covered 20

homes that had been designated as dan-

gerous structures; the second phase will

include a survey of the most exposed

areas, with properties to be purchased

only in these areas, in consultation with

local elected officials. More than a year

after the events in question, no reliable

estimate of the number of homes con-

cerned was available, though an initial

diagnosis had identified a further 18

homes. Although this procedure avoids

unnecessary purchases, it leads to long

delays to allow for rulings on dangerous

structures, and can make it more diffi-

cult for owners to agree to a sale when

the time comes.

While a slower process has disad-

vantages, the legitimate need for speedy

action does not justify hasty govern-

ment action in the immediate aftermath

of Xynthia.

Funding of property

purchases

Expenditure on buying homes,

which totalled

€

316 million at end June

2012 in the two Atlantic

départements

, is

funded by the major natural risk preven-

tion fund, commonly referred to as the

“Barnier fund”. This amount accounts

for almost all fund expenditure in the

four-year period from 2006 to 2009

(

€

331 million). To ensure that the fund

was adequately financed in 2011, the

government had to allocate in advance

the dividend from the Caisse Centrale

de Réassurance (the French state-owned

reinsurance company), as well as agree-

ing another advance to bolster the

Protecting built-up areas:

a lack of consistency

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

fund’s cash reserves, which had been

more or less used up by the end of

2010.

The need to define a

policy for properties

exposed to serious danger

There is a risk that the need to pro-

hibit future construction in all or part of

the affected areas might be gradually

forgotten; to avoid this risk, the ultimate

status of properties purchased by gov-

ernment remains to be determined. It is

also essential that dangerous areas else-

where on the coast be identified and

that appropriate action be taken, either

by purchasing relevant properties or by

making them less vulnerable.

Finally, it would be advisable that

local authorities, who share some

responsibility for existing urban devel-

opment, contribute to the cost of pur-

chasing properties at extreme risk, as

this would give them an incentive to take

more care when issuing building per-

mits.

Ultimately, a consistent, overarching

policy covering all at-risk situations still

remains to be defined.

Flood defences

and protection

works

People rely on sea flood defences to

be effective and on their local elected

representatives to effectively manage the

risks associated with rivers. However,

the 2010 disasters highlighted the inade-

quacy of existing arrangements.

Difficulties in identifying

responsible parties

Before the disaster, central govern-

ment took action to identify and classify

sea flood defences in the two Atlantic

departments. This work encountered

serious limitations.

Identifying the parties responsible

for flood defences turned out to be a

very complicated task. In many cases, it

is not known who owns each flood

defence. Where this information is

known, the owners are often found to

be incapable of maintaining flood

defences due to a lack of resources and

willingness. It is also difficult to identify

who is responsible for managing flood

defences. For example, it has not been

possible to identify the parties responsi-

ble for 95% of the total length of sea

flood defences in Charente-Maritime.

Finally, the large number of poten-

tial operators linked to a given stretch of

flood defences creates confusion, mak-

ing it difficult if not impossible to prop-

erly maintain defences.

In the Var, all four of the rivers that

gave rise to the floods are non-govern-

ment owned; this means that the

riverbed belongs to the owners of the

riverbanks, who are, in principle,

responsible for regular maintenance of

the river. Local authorities and groups

of local authorities have the option, but

Protecting built-up areas:

a lack of consistency

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

not the obligation, of acting in place of

riverside landowners where a declara-

tion of public interest (DIG) is issued

following a public inquiry.

In reality, the rivers were not main-

tained by riverside landowners, and

intervention by local authorities proved

greatly lacking.

Poorly maintained flood

defences and rivers

In spite of a limited effort following

the 1999 storm, funding for the mainte-

nance of flood defences on the Atlantic

coast was far from sufficient before the

disaster.

Between 2001 and 2009, average

annual expenditure on flood defences in

the three affected towns in the southern

Vendée was

€

0.54 million; in reality,

three to four times this amount was

needed. Between 2000 and 2009, central

government allocated

€

8.7 million to sea

flood defence works in Charente-

Maritime; after Xynthia, it committed

€

19.5 million – 2.2 times more in one

year than the total for the previous ten

years.

Over and above the issue of fund-

ing, the examples of the flood defences

in La Faute-sur-Mer (Vendée) and

Charron (Charente-Maritime) highlight

the difficulty of successfully investing in

flood defences when no one is really

responsible for them. They illustrate the

“vagueness of collective irresponsibili-

ty”, which government failed to remedy.

In the Var, while the Nartuby was

covered by a river contract, the intermu-

nicipal union for the development of

the Nartuby (SIAN), which was respon-

sible for implementing the contract, had

completed very few of the planned

flood protection actions.

Action undertaken since

the disasters

Government-instigated

flood

defence works undertaken post-Xynthia

– including both phase 1 emergency

works and phase 2 upgrading and rein-

forcement works – bore no relation in

financial terms to what had gone before.

Under the “rapid submersion plan”, this

financial effort is set to increase sub-

stantially over the next few years.

Furthermore,

draft “flood

defences” decree is being drawn up. In

particular, this decree will be accompa-

nied by an order defining key principles

for the design, construction, mainte-

nance

and

monitoring

flood

defences. The process of defining these

technical standards appears to be some-

what belated, and should be completed

without delay.

Under the “rapid submersion plan”,

prefects are tasked with identifying pri-

ority high-risk diked areas and seeking

out project owners for the relevant

flood defences.

The prefects of the two

départements

on the Atlantic coast have been actively

involved, alongside local authorities, in

drawing up flood prevention action pro-

Protecting built-up areas:

a lack of consistency

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

grammes (PAPI). However, this process,

while seeking to be rigorous in identify-

ing those responsible for managing

flood defences, is taking time, while

there is a high level of demand for

effective protective measures in exposed

areas. Government authorities must

work with their partners to manage this

difficulty, avoiding protective measures

that would only serve to encourage fur-

ther dangerous urban development.

In the Var, a new desire to ensure

that rivers are properly managed is

reflected in the production of a flood

prevention action programme. Here

again, this process, while positive, will

require time, and interim solutions will

need to be found. Moreover, govern-

ment should initiate discussions on the

subject of legislation and regulations

governing

non-government

owned

rivers to identify which authority can

genuinely take responsibility for their

maintenance.

The unresolved issue of

flood defence governance

In their feedback, government

inspectors considered “three scenarios

to meet the challenge of managing

flood defences”: adjustments to the sta-

tus quo; the transfer of responsibility to

local authorities, intermunicipal bodies

départements

; and the creation of a

national managing body.

The “rapid submersion plan” relies

on prefects taking action to identify a

responsible authority, encouraging local

stakeholders to take on the management

of flood defences not owned by them.

While this approach is pragmatic, it is

uncertain whether the funding available

under the plan will be sufficient to con-

vince local authorities to assume a

responsibility that will prove very signif-

icant.

A review of action taken by prefects

should therefore be drawn up, within a

reasonable time frame, so that this

action can be taken into account when

making the (probably legislative) deci-

sions needed to settle the issue of gov-

ernance. The current legal framework is

still governed by the provisions of the

16 September 1807 Act on “drying out

marshland”. The Act, under which resi-

dents are asked to protect themselves

against flooding, bears little resem-

blance to the current environment,

which is characterised by increased

urban development. The focus is no

longer on individuals protecting their

property; it has shifted to the need for a

genuine public service at local or inter-

municipal level.

The fundamental issue of gover-

nance thus remains to be resolved.

Furthermore, the role played by the

natural disaster insurance scheme in

encouraging protective and preventive

action should be affirmed.

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Compensation: very

comprehensive, but with

some inconsistencies

Aid and

compensation

Insurance payouts

Although insurers worked hard to

quickly pay compensation to private

individuals, they made little in the way of

specific effort for businesses, while cen-

tral government made aid available to

help businesses get through this difficult

period.

While the average cost per claim in

the Var was slightly lower than that aris-

ing from the Xynthia floods (

€

16,788

versus

€

20,909), the cost of compensa-

tion paid to businesses and local author-

ities was higher in the Var (

€

266.3 mil-

lion versus

€

208.9 million).

Donations and aid for

private individuals

Total donations received amounted

€

5.65 million for Xynthia and

€

1.14 million for the Var. Taking into

account 66% tax relief, this represented

a cost to government of

€

4.4 million.

Local authority procedures for

channelling aid directly to victims, and

the speed with which aid payments were

made, were highly variable, with signifi-

cant differences even between neigh-

bouring towns like La Faute-sur-Mer

and L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer. While not

unusual, differences in the methods

used to redistribute donations can give

rise to misunderstandings, and even

feelings of unfair treatment. It would be

worthwhile for central government to

put together a guide recommending

rules for local authorities to follow

when channelling aid directly to the vic-

tims of these types of disasters.

Furthermore, donations were not

managed in a consistent way. The prob-

lems that occurred – potential for the

duplication of aid, insufficient coordi-

nation, failure to allocate amounts for

their intended purpose and the scatter-

ing of aid – need to be corrected.

Tax deductions and

exemptions

The cost of tax deductions granted

to private individuals was four and a half

times higher in the Var than in the

Vendée, while the cost of compensation

for homes under the natural disasters

scheme was only slightly higher in the

Compensation: very comprehensive,

but with some inconsistencies

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Var than in the Vendée. Furthermore, it

is surprising that the number of

requests was so high, and that all such

requests were accepted. The total direct

cost of tax measures was

€

1.73 million

for Xynthia and

€

4.09 million for the

Var.

Property purchase

expenditure

Properties affected

“Solidarity zones” covered 840 prop-

erties in the Vendée (including 11 business-

es) and 788 properties in Charente-

Maritime (including 70 businesses).

In the Vendée, 701 homes, situated

in La Faute-sur-Mer and L’Aiguillon-

sur-Mer, were covered by sale agree-

ments; at end 2011, 699 purchases had

been completed for a total value of

€

151.5 million. Thirty-three homes, situ-

ated in La Faute-sur-Mer, 17 of which

were secondary residences, had an

assessed

market

value

excess

€

500,000, representing a total cost to

central government of

€

19.3 million.

The highest single purchase cost was

€

831,000 for a secondary residence.

In Charente-Maritime, 458 proper-

ties in 13 towns were covered by sale

agreements at end 2011, for a total value

€

141.8 million. Eleven homes, eight

of which were main residences, had an

assessed

market

value

excess

€

1 million, representing a total pur-

chase cost of

€

16.65 million.

Problems encountered

Two different procedures were used

for amicable purchases, each of which

had similar aims and terms, thus compli-

cating the task of managers for no gen-

uinely convincing reason.

Tax exemption was granted for cap-

ital gains on secondary residences in the

two Atlantic

départements

, leading to

questions being raised in some cases.

For example, a property situated in

La Faute-sur-Mer was bought for

€

602,776 after deducting insurance pay-

outs of

€

173,224, while it had been

bought in December 2007 at a reported

price of

€

300,000. Work had since been

completed on the property costing

around

€

90,000. In contrast to what

would have happened in a normal sale,

the purchase of the property by govern-

ment enabled the owner to secure a

completely tax-free capital gain of more

than

€

300,000.

Most amicable purchases by govern-

ment were based on an article in the

French Environmental Code, which

authorises such transactions provided

that the price “proves less expensive

than the cost of safeguarding and pro-

tecting the population”. While a com-

parison with the cost of other safe-

guarding measures was carried out in

the Var, no such comparison was made

for the Xynthia disaster. No analysis was

undertaken of the situation of each

individual home and, in particular, no

case-by-case checks were carried out to

Compensation: very comprehensive,

but with some inconsistencies

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

establish whether other safeguarding

measures would have been less costly.

For those properties that were pur-

chased, checks were not systematically

carried out to establish whether a build-

ing permit had been issued (or whether

retrospective planning permission had

subsequently been granted), depriving

government of a means of dissuading

illegal construction, particularly in areas

at serious risk.

Two properties purchased under

amicable purchase agreements in the

Vendée and one in the Var appeared to

be uninsured. Another property pur-

chased in the Var was only insured after

the event. These were dangerous prece-

dents and were unfair to other home-

owners whose properties were not pur-

chased on the grounds that they were

uninsured.

Insufficient checks were carried out

on insurance payouts, while a basic plau-

sibility check could quite easily have

been conducted. This is all the more

regrettable since the amount of such

payouts is deducted from the amount

paid out by government.

Aid for economic

agents

This type of aid related to farms and

businesses.

It is worth highlighting the

effectiveness of aid provided through

part-time working arrangements.

Government purchases of business

premises, while few in number, raised

difficulties. Blockages and confusion led

to the use of ad hoc solutions based on

procedures that varied from case to

case, thus giving rise to unfair treatment.

The purchase of two restaurants in

L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer, which has been

reviewed in detail, provides an example

of the difficulties and questions raised.

It is advisable that, in the future, the

rules to be applied in this type of situa-

tion be clear and consistent.

Conclusion

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Storm Xynthia and the 2010 Var floods were disasters.

Faced with shortcomings in vigilance, early warning and emergency response procedures, the

progress made since these crises remains to be completed, in particular to create an effective early

warning network. As regards the emergency services, unsatisfactory situations remain, such as fire

stations located in flood-prone areas and a lack of planning covering air assets. Compensation

arrangements, although comprehensive, sometimes proved inconsistent or poorly coordinated.

The post-Xynthia government purchase of many homes in the most dangerous areas gives rise

to numerous comments. The hastiness with which the first decisions were made had serious conse-

quences, based as they were on approximations, compromises, and even regulatory transgressions,

and ultimately led to redundant or unnecessary expenditure. Moreover, the scale of the expenditure

incurred highlighted the cost of negligence and irregularities observed in relation to urban planning.

The wisest approach to protecting human life – and the least costly – is to prevent construction

in undeveloped high-risk areas. In the face of local populations’ desire to build – a desire that is

supported and even encouraged by local elected officials and property developers – State representa-

tives have often proven weak in their preventive response. The burgeoning new determination in this

area needs to be supported by a nationally managed approach to ensure that it is strengthened and

sustained over time.

A strategy for existing built property remains to be defined. Emergency efforts have been made

to repair and consolidate sea flood defences in coastal areas, and the “rapid submersion plan” will

lead to new and more ambitious work in this area. However, priorities need to be made consistent,

with the emphasis on the most dangerous coastal areas and selecting the most effective methods. The

maintenance and reliability of flood defences will only be guaranteed if clearly identified parties take

responsibility for them. However, the issue of their governance is yet to be resolved.

In the Var, there are also glaring shortcomings in governance in relation to rivers; according to

legislation, these rivers, being non-government owned, belong to riverside landowners who have nei-

ther the financial nor the physical means to maintain them. While it is critical than an overarch-

ing strategy be implemented via a flood prevention action programme, this does not obviate the need

for more urgent action in the interim.

In line with the 2007 European framework directive, a national flood risk strategy needs to

be defined, particularly in high-risk areas. The way forward is to map out a consistent strategy, with

measures, an organisational structure and resources appropriate to each at-risk area.

Recommendations

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Early warning

Central government should:



bring overall consistency to

steps taken by towns in relation to

early warning procedures, in coordina-

tion with the future information and

early warning system (SAIP);



ensure that the forecasting of

marine flooding is formally coordinat-

ed;



immediately update risk protec-

tion plans (SDACR) and emergency

response plans (ORSEC) in the most

high-risk

départements

;



put in place an in principle plan

covering the use of national air assets.

Departmental councils and departmental

fire and emergency services in affected areas

should:



close or relocate emergency

services centres situated in flood-

prone areas as quickly as possible.

Towns in affected areas should:



refine and regularly update their

local emergency action plans;



strengthen their early warning

procedures, on an intermunicipal basis

where necessary.

Prevention in relation to urban

planning

Central government should:



lay down a national flood risk

strategy as required by the “Grenelle

2” Act and implement the European

directive on floods, within the stipulat-

ed timescales;



ensure, in implementing the

European directive, that the need to

make changes to existing instruments

does not delay the urgent implementa-

tion of mechanisms agreed upon fol-

lowing the 2010 disasters;



ensure that risk maps are fully

distributed and relaunch the “informa-

tion for buyers and tenants” scheme;



ensure that priority risk preven-

tion plans are implemented within the

stipulated timescales;



ensure that towns have up-to-

date urban planning documents, if

necessary by passing legislation to

require them to do so;



support the prefectoral adminis-

tration in carrying out effective verifi-

cations of legality on urban planning

decisions made by local authorities;



introduce national management,

including targets and regular feedback

from prefects, for the most sensitive

procedures, such as the drawing up and

distribution of risk maps, the imple-

mentation of prevention plans and the

updating of the “information for buy-

ers and tenants” scheme.

Recommendations

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Towns and intermunicipal bodies should:



produce municipal major risk

information documents (DICRIM)

and properly inform the local popula-

tion of risks, in accordance with legis-

lation;



work proactively with the prefec-

toral authority to ensure that preven-

tion plans are rapidly adopted;



replace obsolete land use plans

(POS), particularly in at-risk areas,

with new generation urban planning

documents and implement “territorial

consistency plans” (SCOT).

Protecting built-up areas:

Local authorities and central government

should:



move public service premises

located in flood-prone areas or, where

possible, adapt such premises as

appropriate;



ensure that camping regulations

are strictly enforced.

Central government should:



accurately identify all dangerous

coastal areas and quickly address them;



ensure that local authorities con-

tribute to the cost of purchasing prop-

erties at extreme risk;



after reviewing prefectoral

action in relation to the gover-

nance of flood defences and rivers,

initiate the required legislative changes.

Ensure that funding is made available

and that efforts are sustained;



ensure that the reform of the

“Cat-Nat” natural disaster scheme is

completed as soon as possible, partic-

ularly in relation to premium adjust-

ments for businesses and the exclusion

of properties constructed in breach of

regulations.

The compensation system:

Central government should:



put together a guide defining

procedures for channelling aid directly

to victims;



determine in advance how com-

pensation is to be managed and paid,

including the identification of a coor-

dinating local authority;



merge the two existing proce-

dures governing amicable purchases of

properties at extreme risk, clarifying

their terms and ensuring that they are

strictly enforced, particularly in rela-

tion to building permits;



ensure that central government

aid allocated to towns after this type of

crisis is more closely aligned with actu-

al local budgetary reality.

Recommendations

Summary

of the Public Thematic Report by the

Cour des Comptes

Local authorities and central government

should:



organise a joint discussion

process on increasing insurance cover

for properties owned by local authori-

ties;



improve the clarity and efficien-

cy of the help scheme for farmers by

reducing the number of different pro-

cedures and access points used.