C
OUR DES
C
OMPTES
Mid-term review of the
Military Planning Act
July 2012
Notice
Summary
of
the Public Thematic Report
T
his summary is designed to make the Cour des
Comptes report easier to read and use.
The Cour des Comptes is responsible only for the
content of the report.
The
responses
of
government
departments,
councils and other organisations concerned are
appended to the report.
Introduction
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
1
A “virtuous process” for drawing up the Military
Planning Act
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
2
A review with two constraints
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
3
Discrepancies with the Military Planning
Act budget trajectory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
4
Operational success but an inability to achieve the
maximum objectives of operational contracts
. . . .15
5
Opportunities for savings, even without downsizing
operational capabilities
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Conclusion
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
Recommendations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Appendices: Opportunites for savings
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
3
Contents
2012 is an important year in terms of decisions for France’s defence policy. Against
a backdrop of a crisis in public finance, decisions must be made in the summer of
2012 regarding public finance planning; these will probably affect the amount of
resources allocated to defence. Furthermore, in a strategic environment characterised by
strong growth in military spending elsewhere in the world, the government has launched
a strategic review named the French White Paper on defence and national security. This
should result in a new Military Planning Act in the first half of 2013.
The Cour des Comptes was of the opinion that the time had come to review the
mid-term performance of the Military Planning Act (loi de programmation militaire,
LPM) covering the period from 2009 to 2014, in order to enlighten decision-makers
and fuel public debate ahead of the impending deadlines.
The report starts by describing the state of play. It appraises the method leading to
the adoption of the Military Planning Act in 2009 and the context of its review in
2012. It also presents a review of budget performance for 2009, 2010 and 2011 and
outlooks for budget forecasts based on the decisions already taken at the beginning of
2012. Lastly, it assesses the ministry’s ability to achieve the operational objectives set
for it by the Planning Act, in particular in the field of the armed forces’ capability to
meet their operational objectives.
The role of the Cour des Comptes is not to take a view on the overall amount of
budget funds necessary for the “Defence” mission, since this is essentially a political
decision. However, it is of the opinion that these funds should be used specifically with
a view to meeting the operational objectives set by the 2008 French White Paper on
defence and national security, or the replacement version once the work in progress has
been completed.
With this in mind, the last part of the report examines opportunities
for savings, which, in the Cour des Comptes’ opinion, are worth further investigation
as a priority, in order to provide maximum protection of the operational capability of
the armed forces. These relate to: equipment, the availability of equipment and forces
training.
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Introduction
5
Strategic thinking
has preceded the
definition of aims and
resources, this
promoting a coherent
military system
Prior to the development of the
Military Planning Act covering the peri-
od from 2009 to 2014, the French White
Paper on defence and national security
was drawn up in 2008. This exercise, fol-
lowing on from the 1972 and 1994
White Papers, defined the threats and
objectives for France in terms of
defence, and then went on to deduce the
operational contracts and size of the
armed forces, as well as the budget and
the equipment and human resources
required.
This method allowed allocated
resources to be tailored to the opera-
tional objectives set for the armed
forces. In order to have some leeway, the
Planning Act planned major downsizing
in the armed forces, with 54,000 job
cuts between 2008 and 2015, and thus
an equivalent level of savings, in partic-
ular for funding equipment for the
forces. These cuts involved cutting
operational contracts: the army’s maxi-
mum intervention contract was reduced
from 50,000 to 30,000 soldiers, while
that of the air force was reduced from
one hundred or so engaged fighter air-
craft to 70.
The Military Planning
Act was established
in coordination with
multi-year
budgetplanning
The Military Planning Act was also
prepared in line with the multi-year
Public Finance Planning Act covering
the 2009-2011 period. This had a wider
scope than formerly. In addition to
equipment expenditure, it included pay-
roll expenditure and overheads, enabling
analysis of the “defence” budget line to
be based on performance data. Lastly, it
was planned to review this Act after
four years, in 2012, once the budget per-
formance data for the 2009-2011 period
was available.
1
A “virtuous process”
for drawing up the Act
Cour des Comptes
7
2
A review with two
constraints
No increase in the
defence budget was
possible from 2012
onwards due to the
public finance crisis
The Military Planning Act was
established on the basis of the 2009
budget scenarios. These were based on a
return to balanced public finances in
2012. This in turn would have allowed
growth of 1 percent per year in the size
of the defence budget from 2012
onwards. This scenario cannot be
achieved, due to the public finance cri-
sis. The 2011-2013 multi-year Public
Finance Planning Act corrected the tra-
jectory by requiring a “zero volume”
change in the defence budget.
The 2012 review took place under
considerable constraints. In 2009, the
armed forces equipment plan resulted in
significant, firm orders. Their size and
schedule were the result of the Military
Planning Act trajectory, together with
the objectives of the French White
Paper. There is therefore very little lee-
way for placing new orders; at the same
time, the financial resources must be
found to honour the orders in progress.
Military expenditure
has increased by
50 percent worldwide
since 2001
Military expenditure has increased
by over 50 percent worldwide since
2001. This entails a risk of technological
hiatus and changes in the strategic bal-
ance of power. This growth is primarily
in the United States, whose budget has
increased by over 80 percent since 2001.
This is over ten times higher than the
British and French budgets, enabling
major development in research efforts.
There is also growth in China, Russia,
India and Brazil, and more generally in
all the regions of the world with the
exception of Western Europe.
In Europe, the difference between
British and French defence spending
has widened: the British budget remains
significantly higher, even after the
British strategic review of 2010. As to
Cour des Comptes
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
9
A review with two constraints
10
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Germany, the trend is for its defence
budgets to be higher than the French
budget, excluding the latter’s nuclear
component.
11
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des Comptes
3
Discrepancies with the
Military Planning Act
budget trajectory
Overoptimistic budget
planning
The Cour des Comptes has noted
that certain budget planning scenarios
are not sufficiently realistic.
The exceptional income expected
from disposals of radio frequencies and
property sales was to have brought in
€2.49bn between 2009 and 2011. In
actual fact the figure was only €0.98bn.
This illustrates the risk of counting on
unsecured resources whose fulfilment is
beyond the control of the Ministry of
Defence. Late disposals of radio fre-
quencies completed in the first quarter
of 2012 brought in €2.27bn, but the way
in which this resource is to be used by
the Ministry of Defence in 2012 and
2013 is unclear. There are still risks for
property disposals; the main risks
should not come into play before 2013.
Exports of the Rafale aircraft
should enable annual French orders to
be kept below eleven aircraft per year
whilst guaranteeing a sufficient work-
load for the manufacturer. As these
exports have not yet been finalised, the
Air Force had to purchase five more air-
craft than planned between 2009 and
2011.
Foreseeable
expenditure,
for
instance in relation to France’s full par-
ticipation
in
NATO
structures
(although this has not yet been officially
announced) and the opening of the Abu
Dhabi base, has not been taken into
account in budget planning.
Planning for additional costs for
external
operations
has
increased
(€630m in 2011 as opposed to €460m in
2008), but remains insufficient to cover
the recurring external operations, the
additional cost of which over the last
few years has amounted to approximate-
ly €870m per year.
The difference
between planning and the actual situa-
tion is greater when an unexpected
operation occurs, as was the case with
the intervention in Libya in 2011: this
led to additional costs of €370m.
Inadequate
reforms monitoring
The balance of the Military
Planning Act was based on the underly-
ing hypothesis that the expected savings
from the Ministry’s reforms would be
allocated to equipping the armed forces
and improvements in personnel bene-
fits. In this scenario, the Ministry of
Defence was counting on total net sav-
ings of €6.68bn between 2008 and 2015,
mainly through 54,000 job cuts, i.e. 17
percent of the Ministry’s workforce.
For staff costs, total net savings of
€1.1bn were expected between 2008 and
2011. It would appear however that
while the Ministry has so far kept to its
objectives in terms of downsizing, with
over 29,000 job cuts as of the end of
2011, personnel costs are continuing to
increase, rising by €1bn between 2008
and 2011, leading to doubts as to sav-
ings actually being made and their allo-
cation to equipping the armed forces.
The identification of the last jobs to be
cut to reach the 54,000 target has not
been completed.
In general, the
reforms are not monitored sufficiently
closely to provide decision-makers with
reliable elements to help them in this
task, despite the implementation of the
Aramis
project
to
reinforce
the
Ministry’s finance processes.
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Discrepancies with the
Military Planning Act
budget trajectory
12
13
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Discrepancies with the
Military Planning Act
budget trajectory
Ashortfall in financial
resources of €1.89bn
at the end of 2011
compared to the
Planning Act
trajectory
The table below compares the budg-
et resources established in the Military
Planning Act between 2009 and 2011
with actual expenditure. It shows a dis-
crepancy of €1.89bn at the end of the
2011 financial year. The use of carry-
overs, additional funds allocated by the
revised budget acts and lower inflation
than expected were not sufficient to off-
set the effects of delays in recovering
the exceptional income and decisions
forming part of the 2011-2013 Public
Finance Planning Act.
2009-2011 budget implementation of the Military Planning Act
Payment appro-
priations
(current euros, billion)
2009
2010
2011
Total,
2009-2011
Military Planning
Act funds (1)
Budget funds
29.82
30.35
30.94
91.11
Exceptional revenue
1.64
1.26
0.57
3.47
Economic Recovery Plan
0.99
0.77
1.76
Total planned resources
32.45
32.38
31.51
96.34
Actual expendi-
ture (2)
Budget funds
31.43
30.27
30.01
91.71
Exceptional revenue
0.56
0.20
0.22
0.98
Economic Recovery Plan
0.99
0.77
0.00
1.76
Total actual expenditure
32.98
31.24
30.23
94.45
Discrepancies
(2)-(1)
Budget funds
1.61
- 0.08
- 0.93
0.60
Exceptional revenue
- 1.08
- 1.06
- 0.35
- 2.49
Economic Recovery Plan
0
0
0
0
Total discrepancies
0.53
- 1.14
- 1.28
- 1.89
Discrepancy as a percentage
- 2 %
Source: Ministry of Defence General Administration Secretariat
14
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
A discrepancy of at
least €4.10bn at the
end of 2013 on the
sole
basis
of
the
decisions taken prior
to mid-2012
The decisions taken during votes on
the 2011-2013 multi-year Public Finance
Planning Act, the 2012 Initial Budget
Act and the February 2012 Revised
Budget Act show that the discrepancy
could be at least €4.10bn at the end of
2013, solely as a result of the decisions
already taken. More generally, maintain-
ing a trajectory of budget stabilisation in
constant euros creates a discrepancy of
around €15bn
2008
by 2020 compared
to the targets of the White Paper.
Switching to a trajectory of stabilisation
in current euros would take this discrep-
ancy to around €30bn
2008
.
Discrepancies with the Military
Planning Act budget trajectory
Payment
appropriations
(current euros, billion)
2009
and 2010
2011
2012
2013
Total,
2009-2013
Military
Planning Act
funds
Budget funds
60.17
30.94
32.14
33.08
156.33
Exceptional revenue
2.9
0.57
0.22
0.11
3.80
Economic Recovery Plan
1.76
1.76
Total planned resources
64.83
31.51
32.36
33.19
161.89
Resources
revised
downwards
by the 2011-
2013 three-
year plan
Budget funds
61.7
30.16
30.52
31.02
153.4
Exceptional revenue
0.76
1.02
1.17
1.07
4.02
Economic Recovery Plan
1.76
1,76
Total planned resources
64.22
31.18
31.69
32.09
159.18
Actual
expenditure
(2012 Initial
Finance Act
(LFI), three-
year plan for
2013)
Budget funds
61.7
30.01
30.03
31.02
152.76
Exceptional revenue
0.76
0.22
1.22
1.07
3.27
Economic Recovery Plan
1.76
0
0
0
1.76
Total actual expenditure
64.22
30.23
31.25
32.09
157.79
Discrepancies
Budget funds
1.53
- 0.93
- 2.11
- 2.06
- 2.7
Exceptional revenue
- 2.14
- 0.35
1
0.96
- 0.53
Economic Recovery Plan
0
0
0
0
0
Total discrepancies
- 0.61
- 1.28
- 1.12
- 1.10
- 4.10
Change in trajectory for the 2011-2013 period
Source: Ministry of Defence General Administration Secretariat
15
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des Comptes
4
Operational successes but
an inability to achieve the
maximum objectives of
operational contracts
Major items of equip-
ment were delivered
between 2009 and
2011 although some
gaps remain
Major items of equipment were
delivered to the armed forces between
2009 and 2011, thus implementing the
priority given to equipping the armed
forces established in the Military
Planning Act. The two components of
nuclear force were modernised. At the
end of 2011, the army had 5,776 items
of FELIN individual infantry combat
equipment, 18 TIGRE attack helicop-
ters and 345 VBCI armoured vehicles.
The French navy now has two HORI-
ZON air defence frigates, 33 Rafale air-
craft and three BPC-type projection and
command vessels. It has placed firm
orders for eleven FREMM frigates and
three of the six planned BARRACUDA
nuclear-powered attack submarines. The
air force received 68 Rafale aircraft
before the end of 2011.
There are however a certain number
of outstanding delays and inconsisten-
cies. The air force’s in-flight refuelling
and transport capabilities remain insuf-
ficient. This is due to an ageing fleet
resulting from the delays in the A400M
programme and the MRTT air-to-air
refuelling aircraft programme, which
has not been launched. The navy cannot
maintain the naval air force patrol at sea
with a single aircraft carrier, while delays
in the FREMM programme are causing
delays in the achievement of the 18-
frigate target. The army has not yet ben-
efitted from the launch of the SCORPI-
ON programme. In particular, this is
designed notably to renew the VAB
armoured vehicles that form the back-
bone of its regiments. Its deep-strike
capabilities have not been reinforced.
Lastly, the priority given to space has
not resulted in doubling the funds for
this as originally envisaged.
16
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
The armed forces
have intervened
decisively in Côte
d’Ivoire and Libya
2011 demonstrated the armed
forces’ operational capabilities. At the
same time as maintaining a high level of
engagement
in
several
operations
(notably Afghanistan and Lebanon), the
armed forces intervened decisively at
short notice in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.
The higher objectives
of conventional
operational contracts
are however out of
reach
The Military Planning Act set the
army the following objective: having an
operational force of 88,000 soldiers
capable of conducting an intervention
with 30,000 soldiers for one year at a
distance of 7,000 - 8,000 km
with six
months’ notice; conducting a support
operation for the civilian authorities in
France using 10,000 soldiers, and having
a response force of 5,000 soldiers capa-
ble of intervening rapidly. It appears
that although these objectives were
scaled back in 2008, it would not be pos-
sible to meet the hypothesis of 30,000
soldiers due to foreseeable logistical dif-
ficulties in supporting the armed force
for a long period.
The navy is expected to be able to
deploy the naval air force at a distance of
7,000 - 8,000 km and engage one or two
amphibious or protective forces.
In
addition to having only one aircraft car-
rier, the low availability of nuclear-pow-
ered attack submarines and the number
of available frigates prevents these
objectives from being met on a
permanent basis.
The objective of the air force is to
be able to deploy 70 fighter aircraft,
establish two air bases and be able to
send a force of 1,500 equipped men a
distance of 7,000 - 8,000km within 5
days. The weaknesses noted in the field
of transport and in-flight refuelling
mean that the most demanding aspects
of force transportation contracts cannot
be met.
Inadequate
availability of
equipment and
training for forces
All too frequently, the decisions
taken have led to sacrificing expenditure
on training the forces and keeping
equipment in working order. The situa-
tion falls particularly short of the army’s
objective concerning training, with 117
days of activity in 2011 and 111 in 2012
compared to the 150-day target in the
Operational success but an inability
to achieve the maximum objectives
of operational contracts
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Operational success but an inability
to achieve the maximum objectives
of operational contracts
17
Military Planning Act. Units engaged in
operations do however receive adequate
training.
The situation is also critical for
air force transport pilots, who complete
287 hours’ flying time per year whereas
the objective is 400 hours. The Cour des
Comptes has also noted that the level of
availability is very low for certain items
of front-line equipment: VAB armoured
vehicles and LECLERC tanks in the
army, patrol aircraft and nuclear-pow-
ered attack submarines in the navy and
helicopters in the air force.
19
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des Comptes
5
Opportunities for savings,
even without downsizing
operational capabilities
Cost-cutting efforts
must be redoubled
Personnel expenses must
be cut, in particular by
downsizing the top man-
agement of the Ministry
Senior staffing levels at the Ministry
of Defence rose between 2008 and
2011, with an increase during this period
in the number of general officers and
senior officers, as well as category A and
A+ civilian staff, whilst at the same time
Ministry did away with over 29,000 jobs
elsewhere.
The Cour des Comptes is of the
opinion that it is essential for the
Ministry of Defence to control its staff
costs in order to achieve the savings
expected from the reforms. This
involves pro-active cuts in the Ministry’s
senior management, in particular central
administration and regional bodies, by
pursuing the reforms in order to meet
the objective of 54,000 job cuts by 2015,
and by reviewing certain aspects of
human resources policy, particularly
with respect to training and job
turnover.
The streamlining reforms
undertaken must be
completed, particularly in
the field of procurement
The Ministry of Defence has
engaged a policy to review all of its sup-
port processes in order to reduce its
overheads. Some of these reforms are
beginning to bear fruit. One example is
the reform of the armed forces health
department, launched in 2011. It is
therefore important that these be
completed.
The Cour des Comptes is of the
opinion that potential gains may be
achieved, in particular in procurement,
by making full use of the provisions
under which the Ministry of Defence
can make enquiries about suppliers’
margins for non-competitive contracts.
The work on the processes relating to
catering, apparel and infrastructures also
deserves a full examination: opportuni-
ties for outsourcing these aspects should
be studied.
Opportunities for savings, even
without downsizing operational
capabilities
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
20
The Ministry’s real estate
policy must be scaled back
In 2011, the Ministry of Defence
devoted some €1bn to its real estate pol-
icy, representing a major proportion of
its procurements. Although a large part
of these funds are directly linked to the
infrastructures required for accommo-
dating new equipment, it would be
appropriate to examine the opportunity
of making savings in this area, in partic-
ular with respect to housing and accom-
modation, and the renovation of office
buildings.
Expenditure with the least
link to the operational
capabilities of the forces
must be reviewed
A review of the Ministry of
Defence’s expenditure shows a certain
amount of expenses that are only tan-
gentially related to the operational capa-
bilities of the forces and which could be
cut. Such expenditure concerns items
such as late interest payments to suppli-
ers, the Ministry’s cultural policy, com-
munication costs, the link between the
Nation and its armed forces, social poli-
cy and regional development. These
items account for a total of approxi-
mately €500m per year.
Attempts to pool
resources with
European allies must
be pursued, although
their effects will be
felt only in the
medium term
While pooling is possible with
France’s
main
European
partners,
notably those which devote the most
financial resources to defence (the
United Kingdom and Germany) any
savings from such projects are likely to
be realised only in the medium and long
term, and are therefore not a solution to
the Ministry of Defence’s short-term
budget challenges.
There is little leeway
on equipment. Any
such leeway depends
on the review of the
White Paper being
completed beforehand
Spending on equipment for the
armed forces has often constituted a
line easy to cut when the Ministry of
Defence has been confronted with
budget difficulties. The Cour des
Comptes is of the opinion that doing
this has negative impacts in both opera-
tional and financial areas and should not
21
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Opportunites for savings, even
without downsizing operational
capabilities
be decided prior to completion of the
strategic review exercise and revision of
the Military Planning Act, in order to
preserve the overall consistency of the
military system.
From a financial point of view, the
Cour des Comptes has noted that the
major negotiations conducted in 2009
have led to many firm orders being
placed, giving the State less room for
negotiation. There has also been a con-
siderable increase in the unit cost of
equipment, offsetting the fall in quantity
(dispensing with two units enables
average savings of less than the cost of
one unit) and creating significant pay-
ment deadlines in the medium term, due
to the effect of negotiated delivery
postponements.
The Cour des Comptes also notes
that resources for new investments are
very limited, as shown by the payment
needs schedule resulting from the com-
mitments made prior to the end of
2011.
Payment schedules for the commitments made prior to 2012
Budget
programmes
(current euros,
millions)
Firm
commitments
as of end
2011
Payment schedule
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Post
2016
Prog. 146 “armed
forces hardware”
37,997
9,815
6,530
5,218
3,995
2,720
9,659
Prog. 178 “prepara-
tion and use of the
armed
forces”
7,245
3,646
1,685
689
1,042
86
97
Total
45,182
13,461
8,215
5,907
5,037
2,806
9,756
Source: Ministry of Defence financial affairs department
Renegotiations of equipment con-
tracts also have a significant impact on
the defence industry, which is still insuf-
ficiently concentrated and faces poor
performance in exports. This sector of
industry is a major job provider in cer-
tain regions of France.
22
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Conclusion
T
he first three years of the Military Planning Act, through to the end of 2011,
have enabled virtual compliance with the financial trajectory of the 2008
White Paper, as well as enabling a major effort in favour of equipping the forces and
implementing extensive reforms. However, in 2012, as the review of the Military
Planning Act approaches, the Ministry of Defence is confronted with major challenges
arising from the public finance crisis in France and the robust growth in military spend-
ing elsewhere in the world.
While it may not have been possible to honour the budget ambitions of the White
Paper in the short and medium term, it is important that the forthcoming revisions pre-
serve the consistency of the capabilities of the military system. This would involve tak-
ing a few months to complete the work of defining France’s threats and objectives before
the operational contracts and size of the armed forces are deduced, along with the
resulting requirements in terms of equipment, staffing and budgets.
In order to organise the time necessary for this exercise, whilst achieving the savings
required due to the public finance crisis in the short term, the Cour des Comptes rec-
ommends that the cost-cutting opportunites suggested in the fourth part of this report
should be examined without delay. A return to the senior staffing levels of 2008, sav-
ings on real estate policy, pursuing the streamlining of procurement, in particular in
the area of in-service support for equipment, continuing the streamlining of support
functions started in 2008 and a review of the expenditure the furthest removed from
operational needs should produce a recurrent margin for manoeuvre in excess of €1bn
per year.
At the same time, all elements relating to equipment, the availability of equipment
and forces training should be maintained wherever possible, until the exercise of revis-
ing the White Paper and the military planning act has been completed. If this revision
were to lead to new cuts in quantities for the major equiment items already ordered,
alternative avenues to contract revisions, which are always very costly from a financial
point of view, must be explored: in particular, these include the State reselling surplus
equipment from current contracts and “off the shelf” purchases for equipment not
already under contract and in areas that do not directly affect France’s strategic inde-
pendence.
23
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Recommendations
The Cour des Comptes expresses a
set of detailed recommendations at the
end of each chapter of the report:
1. update the strategic review as
soon as possible, in order to reassess
the nature and level of threats and
objectives for France, and deduce from
this a size for the armed forces and the
related
equipment
and
human
resources, as part of an iterative
process incorporating budget data;
2. at the same time, from summer
2012 onwards, prepare different sce-
narios enabling decision-makers to
make an overall appraisal of the level
of resources to be allocated to
defence, according to the different lev-
els of operational objectives and the
constraints of public finances;
3. adopt conservative, realistic
hypotheses for putting together the
budget, avoiding any recourse to unse-
cured resources whose realisation is
beyond the sole control of the
Ministry of Defence;
4. focus budgetary resources on
the operational capabilities of the
defence system, which should be con-
sistent with the priorities emerging
from the new White Paper: preserve
the equipment of the forces, the avail-
ability of equipment and forces train-
ing as far as possible;
5. if it ultimately transpires that the
amount of equipment for the armed
forces must be reduced, study alterna-
tive solutions other than the renegotia-
tion of contracts, such as the resale of
surplus equipment through exports.
For new programmes, favour off-the-
shelf purchases for equipment that
does not affect France’s strategic inde-
pendence;
6. in the meantime, adopt an inter-
im budget for 2013 which already
includes immediate savings, in particu-
lar on staff expenses, real estate expen-
diture and costs that are the least
directly connected to operational
aspects;
7.
help find alternative employ-
ment for staff from the Ministry and
“flatten” the structure by greatly
reducing the number of general offi-
cers and senior officers, on the basis of
a multi-year quota order, as well as the
number of category A and A+ civilian
managers;
8. improve procurement methods,
in particular for maintenance, based on
studies analysing the margins of the
main suppliers; explore outsourcing
possibilities, in particular for catering
and apparel;
9. conduct a review of the activity
of
the
Defence
Real
Estate
Department (Service d’infrastructure
de la défense, SID), in order to identi-
fy opportunities for redirecting it
towards a project management role
and know-how relating to defence
infrastructures.
24
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the
Cour des Comptes
Appendices: Opportunites for
savings
Actions
Schedule
Occurrence
Costing
Cutting staff costs:
- cutting the level of senior
civilian and military staffing
- maintaining the target of
54,000
job cuts
- cutting training costs
- reducing turnover
- removing tax benefits for
certain staff members
Short term
Recurrent savings
each year
Approxi-
mately
€
300m
Cutting expenditure on prop-
erty and infrastructure
investments
- cutting the investments
which are the least related to
operational requirements
Short term
Recurrent savings
each year
Approxi-
mately
€
200m
Continuing streamlining
- review of procurement
methods to make purchases
at the best price
- review of apparel and
catering functions
- review of the activity of the
Defence Real Estate
Department
- pursuing the reform plan
for the Defence health
department.
Medium and long
term
Recurrent savings
each year
Not cost-
ed but
potentially
over
€
350m
Actions with little impact on the operational capability of the forces,
suggested by the Cour des Comptes in the fourth part of the report.
25
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report by the Cour des Comptes
Appendices: Opportunites for
savings
Measures
Schedule
Occurrence
Costing
Cutting expenditure with the
least direct link to opera-
tions:
- delay interest for supplies
- cultural policy
- social expenses
- Defence Restructuring
Funds
- link between Armed Forces
and the Nation
- communication
Short and long
term
Recurrent savings
each year
Approxi-
mately
€
150m
Resource pooling as part of
European cooperation:
- sharing capabilities
- equipment programmes
Long term
Non-recurrent
savings
Not
costed
because
uncertain
Measures
Schedule
Occurrence
Costing
Renegotiation of equipment
programmes
- cutting quantities
- staggering deliveries
- cancelling programmes
Very long term,
unless a costly
revision of the
schedules is
obtained in order to
achieve short-term
effects
Non-recurrent
savings
Not costed,
risk of high
additional
costs and
expendi-
ture to be
carried
over
Downsizing of the forces
- headcount cuts
- overhead cuts
Medium and long
term
Recurrent savings
Not
costed
Measures with high impact on the operational capabilities of the forces,
advised against by the Cour des Comptes, until the strategic review and
Military Planning Act processes have been completed.