PUBLIC ENTITIES AND POLICIES
THE FRENCH MILITARY
PROGRAMMING LAW (LPM) 2019-
2025 AND THE CAPACITIES OF
THE ARMED FORCES
Thématic public report
May 2022
2
Executive summary
Budget execution in line with the programming for the first time in two
decades
After a series of reductions in the size of the armed forces and structural reforms leading
to the elimination of more than 60,000 jobs over the last decade, the law of 13 July 2018
relating to military programming (LPM) for the years 2019 to 2025 provided for an increase in
the resources allocated to defence. For this period, it provides for an increase in the budget
which is foreseen to reach 2% of GDP in 2025 and create 6,000 jobs. Initially, until 2025, the
troops need to be regenerated and certain skills gaps filled before continuing to work to reach,
by 2030, a
“complete
and
balanced”
army model in order to respond to all threats. This effort
is part of an international context marked by increased strategic competition between the main
powers and a rise in the threats as described in the
National Defence and Security Strategic
Review
published on 13 October 2017.
Main global military budgets in 2020
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
In the first few years of the LPM appropriations rose from €35.9
billio
n in 2019 to €40.9
b
in 2022, in accordance with the programme. The planned resources actually benefited the
Ministry of the Armed Forces, including for equipping the forces, an area which had not
received all the appropriations stipulated in the previous LPMs. The Ministry of the Armed
Forces has managed to avoid certain shortcomings previously noted by the Court of Accounts:
chronic under-budgeting of external operations and renegotiation of firm weapons orders;
overestimating exceptional revenue from divestments, assumptions of arms exports and
savings expected from reforms. The annual adjustments to military programming for the 2019-
2021 period were carried out flexibly; they made it possible to finance, without additional
appropriations, needs not provided for by law, such as those for the space defence strategy,
3
the response to the health crisis and the aeronautical stimulus plan, by pushing back some
expenses, but without cancelling any at this stage.
LPM resources 2019-2025 (excluding pensions)
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Total
2024
2025
General
total
Appropriations (in
€bn current)
35.9
37.6
39.3
41.0
44.0
197.8
Target 2% of GDP in 2025
Staff increase
+450
+300
+300
+450
+1,500
+3,000
+1,500
+1,500
+6,000
Realised
+391
+416
+221
-
-
-
-
-
-
Source: Articles 3 and 5 of the LPM 2019-2025
Nevertheless, several issues are worth looking at. The estimate of commitment
authorisations remaining to be covered by cash-
limit appropriations rose sharply to reach €54
bn at the end of 2021 and €72 bn at the end of 2025. There is a risk that variation
of weapons
production costs, for a time slowed down by the health crisis, could rise again, while there are
clear inflationary trends in the economy. The cost of replacing
Rafale
aircraft taken from the
air force for second-hand export sales was not included in the initial programming.
Coverage of the additional cost of external operations in €m
Note: OPEX: external operations
–
MISSINT: internal security missions
Source: Court of Accounts using budget execution data
4
All of these factors lead to a risk of losses on the investments programmed by the LPM
and still to be made. In particular, the fact that since design of the LPM most of the budget
increase and the jobs created were scheduled for the end of the period, beyond 2023,
constitutes a significant risk for realisation of the capacities specified by law.
Military capacities heavily used but still presenting weaknesses
The 2019-2021 period was marked by a high level of operational activity under the armed
forces' so-called permanent missions, in particular those related to nuclear deterrence and the
protection of land, airspace and maritime approaches. The same applied to deployments in
the context of conflict prevention and external operations, in particular
Barkhane
in the Sahel
and
Chammal
(France
’
s contribution to
Operation Inherent Resolve
) in the Middle East. The
armed forces also contribute to various public service missions, such as the
Sentinelle
mission
for combating terrorism, the
Resilience
operation during the health crisis and
Apagan
for the
evacuation of Kabul in the summer of 2021, and navy missions. Finally, they participate in
supporting arms exports.
Variation in dividends paid by non-financial companies
Source: key defence figures (2021)
5
Although they carried out all the missions that were asked of them, the forces were only
able to achieve this high level of commitment to the detriment of the “regeneration
1
” provided
for by the programming law, which is still far from being completed. The level of training and
the rate of availability of equipment remain below the targets set, despite significant resources
allocated to maintenance. The rise in staff numbers also highlights the difficulties of
attractiveness, retention and skills management.
Variation in dividends paid by non-financial companies
LPM standard
2018
2019
2020
2021
Target
2023
Operational Readiness Training
(Army)
90 days
81
82
79
81
83
Helicopter Pilot (Army) *
200 flight hours
154
173
163
142
158
Fighter Pilot (Air Force)
180 flight hours
161
159
152
164
170
Transport Pilot (Air Force)
320 flight hours
201
185
176
219
245
Ships (
Navy-submarines excluded
)*
110 days at sea
101
109
102
95
110
Source: key defence figures (2021)
Filling skills gaps and responding to new threats are part of a long term strategy. Finally,
the objective of participating alongside our allies in a traditional major coercion operation
against a state adversary constitutes a sizeable challenge for an army which no longer has the
necessary size, nor the level of preparation required for such a prospect.
Towards necessary choices
The major changes that have taken place since 2019 are likely to call into question the
terms of the LPM 2019-2025; its resources have not been determined by law beyond 2023 as
no update was carried out in 2021, although this had been set in the LPMs. Firstly, the health
crisis impacted public finances, leading the Government to adopt a new budgetary trajectory
aimed at reducing the public deficit to 3% of GDP in 2027, at the cost of a major effort to control
public spending. It also gave rise to new budget priorities. Secondly, the 2021
Strategic Update
highlighted an acceleration in the rise of threats as the number crisis areas increased and
France's main competitors rearmed. A risk of escalation between rival powers leading to a
high-intensity confrontation thus seems less unlikely.
It is therefore necessary for the Ministry of the Armed Forces to make greater use of the
leeway available to it and identify new possibilities, particularly in the field of European
cooperation and with regard to defining the scope of the missions of the armed forces, in order
to lighten their burden. However, this leeway is limited. A review of the army model is therefore
likely to be necessary in order to ensure consistency between ambitions and the resources
allocated to the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
1
The report annexed to the LPM defines “regeneration” as folllows: “
First of all [from the perspective of ‘the 2030
ambition’] it is an immediate imperative
aimed at regenerating the operating capital of the armed forces, subject to
accelerated wear and tear resulting from the use of already old equipment and the intensity of the forces' recent
commitments beyond the operational contracts defined in the 2013 White Paper.
”
6
Confirming the orientations of the LPM 2019-
2025 and moving towards the “complete
army model” by 2030 would mean continuing to increase the budgetary effort for defence, with
an acceleration at the end of the programming period which will probably have to be continued
until 2030, after reaching €50 billion in 2025. Attempting to preserve the complete
set of
capacities by reducing all of them in an equal way, as happened in the strategic reviews of
2008 and 2013, could now undermine the coherence of the armed forces. Otherwise, a choice
may be made to significantly rebalance between capacities, as was carried out by the United
Kingdom as a result of its last strategic review in 2021. However, such a choice would risk
irreversible eliminations, without necessarily leading to significant budgetary savings in the
short term, as shown by the case of the United Kingdom.
To prepare for the reflection that will lead to the decisions to be taken by end of the
current LPM, the Ministry of the Armed Forces should adopt a more reactive decision-making
process, allowing it to adapt more quickly to changes by carrying out more frequent strategic
reviews. In terms of weapons programmes, this should result in better capture of innovations
and a greater capacity for development of equipment.
This process must be accompanied by increasing medium- and long-term anticipatory
capacities, essential in a rapidly changing strategic context; this requires a close association
between the anticipatory capacities of the Directorate General for Armaments and those of the
armed forces. Finally, better information must be provided to the public authorities and it is
necessary to work more closely with the competent parliamentary committees on the current
capacities of the armed forces and any future developments.
7
Summary of recommendations
1.
Calculate the budgetary appropriations for 2024 and 2025 corresponding to the needs
resulting from the LPM ambitions, taking into account the last annual military programming
adjustment, and establish a budgetary trajectory until the stabilisation of the public deficit
planned for 2027
(Ministry of the Armed Forces)
.
2.
Identify and exploit any budget leeway, particularly in the field of European cooperation
and with regard to defining the scope of the missions entrusted to the armed forces
(Ministry of the Armed Forces)
.
3.
Adopt a more responsive and more transparent strategic update and military programming
process based on a greater anticipatory capacity (
Ministry of the Armed Forces
)