The prison administration and

judicial youth protection

2022 Annual Public Report

2

__________________________________

PRESENTATION

_______________________________

The health crisis linked to the covid 19 epidemic was an unprecedented event, in terms

of both its scale and its duration. Combined with the generalised lockdown of the population,

the limitation of the activity of public services to priority missions had a strong impact on the

functioning of the ministry of justice, the courts, and the services of the prison administration

department (DAP) and the Directorate for Judicial Youth Protection (DPJJ).

In line with the observations already made by the Court regarding the business continuity

plan (BCP) of the judicial courts

1

, this chapter analyses the conditions under which the DAP

and the DPJJ faced this unprecedented crisis and assesses its effects on the level of activity

and the functioning of services up to the summer of 2021.

These two administrations were ill-prepared for the onset of the health crisis but despite

everything, they managed to adapt

to the circumstances (I). Staff and offenders were therefore

protected, without any budgetary slippage (II). However, certain lessons must now be learned

from the crisis (III).

1

Court of Accounts,

The business continuity plan of the law courts during the health crisis related to the COVID-19

epidemic

,

communication to the Finance Committee of the National Assembly, May 2021.

3

I - Prepared administrations that nonetheless managed to

adapt to the circumstances

Even though the DAP and DPJJ were ill-prepared for a crisis as profound and long-

lasting as the covid 19 epidemic, they were able to adapt to the circumstances at the cost of a

sharp reduction in their activity.

A - The DAP and DPJJ were poorly prepared for a serious and lasting

crisis

1 - An insufficiently developed risk management culture

The ministry of Justice only very recently set up a risk and crisis management

mechanism. The judicial sphere

–

considered in the broad sense

–

occupies a special place in

the defence and security policy defined in the French Defence Code. The main missions

carried out by the “

vitally important business sector

of judicial activities

” (SAIVAJ) inst

ituted by

the Prime Minister are presented in a ministerial defence and security policy (PMDS)

document. It states that “

the Minister of Justice shall in all circumstances ensure the continuity

of penal activity as well as the execution of sentences. He shall contribute, through the

implementation of public action and international mutual legal assistance, to fighting for the

fundamental interests of the Nation

”.

The emergence of the function of preparedness for major crises, assumed by the

General Secretary, Senior Defence and Security Official (HFDS), should also be placed in the

context of the continuous strengthening of the General Secretariat since it was reformed in

2017. The aim was to reinforce expertise and management functions for the General

Secre

tariat’s legislative reforms and facilitate coordination between the

m

inistry’s various

services. Even so, the division of roles between the General Secretariat and the major

“business” departments remains insufficiently clear, particularly in terms of ris

k management.

Furthermore, the ministry of Justice had not fully anticipated the possibility of such a

long-lasting and large-scale health crisis. The ministerial risk prevention strategy remains silent

with regard to health risks and the means available to protect staff and the public. It is true that

a “smallpox” exercise was carried out in November 2019 under the aegis of the General

Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), but it did not really involve the

territorial services of the DAP and DPJJ.

Within the DAP, although the possibility of a pandemic had not been considered, safety

risks were covered by precise protocols and careful planning. In addition, the main penal

institutions in France’s overseas

départements

and territories have cyclone plans whose form

and content are similar to those of a business continuity plan (BCP). Lastly, the DAP

experienced a social crisis in 2018 that gave it experience dealing with operations that were

limited on a long-term basis. As of March 2020, it provided a very large share of its penal

institutions and Prison Rehabilitation and Probation Services (SPIPs) with BCPs.

Regarding the DPJJ, the situation was more contrasted before March 2020 since, unlike

the interregional directorates which had BCPs, the housing facilities and the services of open

environments under its jurisdiction did not.

4

2 - Poorly organised crisis management

The management of the health crisis is structured around a dual architecture made up,

on the one hand, of the Interministerial Crisis Centre (CIC), responsible for the interministerial

management of the crisis, and on the other, of the Situation & Anticipation Unit (CSA) of the

m

inistry of Justice, which was “armed” on 6 March 2020. This body is placed under the

responsibility of the General Secretary, HFDS, and is run on a daily basis by the Deputy HFDS.

The ministerial crisis unit was mainly an interface helping the m

inistry of Justice’s service

take ownership of the health doctrine implemented by the Government. However, its operation

was marked by several shortcomings, some of which were still observed after a year of crisis

management.

Thus, the “business” departments did not fully participate in the unit’s operations, due

either to a lack of available resources at the start of the crisis or to a desire to maintain control

over the strategy put into place to ensure service continuity. Faced with strong operational

constraints, the DAP and DPJJ thus favoured a “silo” approach to their crisis management in

order to ensure the functioning of their services. The crisis management organised by the

m

inistry of Justice’s CSA therefore endeavoured to structure a doctrine for the protection of

staff and the public and organise the distribution of protective equipment.

The defence zone courts of appeal should have acted as the transmission belt of the

ministerial crisis unit. However, while this territorial level should have enabled the various

judicial stakeholders to be better coordinated, the actual functioning of this network during a

year of crisis was unsatisfactory. Indeed, the positioning of the dedicated representatives,

within the defence zone courts of appeal, led them to deal mainly with issues relating to the

functioning of the judicial courts. Their interactions with the interregional directorates of the

DAP and DPJJ were essentially limited to collecting data relating to the health situation in terms

of human resources and the protective equipment required by these services.

On a day-to-day basis, the crisis management methods implemented revealed high

coordination costs for the decentralised services of the DAP and DPJJ. They reported on their

work to their management in the central government and to the ministerial crisis unit led by the

Deputy Senior Defence and Security Official (HFDSA), and ultimately also to the General

Directorate for Civil Service; the feedback requested was neither homogeneous nor shared.

B - Activity that was adapted in closed environments and greatly

reduced in open environments

1 - Prison environments and the DPJ

J’s housing facilities

were priority focuses of attention

The closed environments of the DAP and DPJJ were covered by exceptional measures

aimed at preserving their functioning in the context of an acute crisis. In both cases, the

decrease in the population improved the acceptability of the lockdown measures.

Based on Article 11 of French Act No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020 establishing a state

of health emergency, French Order No. 2020-303 of 25 March 2020 adapting the rules of

criminal procedure opened the way to measures to reduce the prison population through the

early release, under certain strict conditions, of prisoners nearing the end of their sentence. In

addition to simplification measures increasing the number of releases, two exceptional

5

measures were created: sentence reduction and house arrest

2

. Based on Article 28 of this

Order, the public prosecutor may decide that persons sentenced to less than or equal to five

years’ imprisonment whose sentence remaining to be served is less than or equal to t

wo

months will serve the end of their sentence by being placed under house arrest.

In addition, the ministry of Justice encouraged the prosecutors of the courts to use the

provisions arising from French Act No. 2019-222 of 23 March 2019 on justice reform (known

as the “sentence block” reform) which enable alternatives to incarceration to be implemented.

The “sentence block” reform

In its criminal section, French Act No. 2019-222 of 23 March 2019 on justice reform sets the

objectives of restoring meaning and effectiveness to sentences, strengthening the role of debate in

sentencing, and putting an end to short-term imprisonment.

To achieve these objectives, several provisions of the Act aimed firstly to facilitate the use of

sanctions via alternatives to appearing before the Criminal Court and secondly to limit prison

sentences. The scope of criminal offences likely to give rise to the imposition of a fixed fine or a

settlement measure was extended, as were the possibilities for appearance with prior admission of

guilt.

Other penalties were developed, such as house arrest under electronic surveillance (for a

period of between 15 days and six months). The Act also created probationary suspension, which

merged suspended sentence, suspension-TIG

3

and penal constraint.

In parallel, the reform promoted the use of the community service sentence, by broadening the

conditions for its delivery, and standardised the sentence to attend citizenship classes, in order to

encourage its use.

In addition to the creation or development of alternatives to incarceration, the Act of 23 March

2019 removed the ability of the judge to deliver a firm sentence of less than or equal to one month.

Lastly, the Act laid down the principle that when the Criminal Court decides, in view of the

seriousness of the facts and the personality of the perpetrator, to pronounce a firm prison sentence

of between one and six months, this sentence shall be executed, in principle, outside of prison, in the

form of house arrest under electronic surveillance, placement in an open prison or external placement

in a host facility.

All of these measures, as well as the decline in court activity and crime in general,

significantly reduced the prison population. During the first lockdown, the population in

detention decreased by 12,016 people, dropping from 70,739 in January 2020 to 58,723 in

July 2020 (a decrease of almost 17%). At the start of 2021, it was still 8,066 people lower than

it had been before the epidemic. This decrease only concerned the prison population with light

sentences and that with the best chances of reintegration; it excluded persons convicted of

crimes or acts of terrorism and violence.

As a result, the occupancy rate of penal institutions dropped from 116% before the health

crisis to 97% on 1 July 2020. The decline was especially significant in remand prisons, which

housed persons likely to benefit from exceptional measures. Sentencing institutions were not

very affected. Since the first half of 2021, there has been an obvious reversal of this trend: the

occupancy rate has been increasing steadily; it reached 108% on 1 May 2021.

2

Article 27 of the Order thus provides for the ability of the sentence enforcement judge to grant sentenced and

imprisoned persons, depending on their behaviour during the health crisis, sentence reductions linked to the

exceptional circumstances in order to offer them a release under the terms of house arrest.

3

Community service (

).

6

While always respecting sensitive missions in terms of security, such as the monitoring

of radicalised detainees, these measures have enabled, in most penal institutions, detainees

to be provided with a minimum level of care in a context of reduced contact with the outside

world and a decrease in the activities offered, as part of efforts to set up a real “

cordon

sanitaire

”.

Like the measures taken at the national level, interactions between facilities and the

outside world were drastically limited. The most significant impact was the suspension of

visiting rooms and visits from relatives. These decisions gave rise to compensatory measures

(telephone plans, organisation of videoconferences, etc.). Combined with major efforts to

communicate with detainees, they helped ensure that the prison lockdown did not lead to major

disturbances or a significant increase in incidents. In terms of violence against prison staff or

between prisoners, indicators even showed a slight decrease compared to the two previous

years.

Priorities were also established for the reception of minors in the DPJJ’s housing facilities

of the public sector and the authorised associations sector (SAH). In juvenile detention centres

and reinforced educational centres, only collective activities outside the facility were reduced

or suspended.

In addition, children’s judges made decisions extending visitation and accommodation

rights (DVHs) for minors placed in centres, allowing them to return to their families for longer

periods. In general, the DPJJ’s services did not organise the systematic return of minors to

their family environment. There were few judicial release decisions and only 545 minors

returned home (mainly as part of DVHs) during the first lockdown (out of 6,680 minors covered

by a placement decision).

2 - Monitoring and integration activities were significantly reduced

The health crisis posed a challenge for the SPIP officers who had to ensure continuity of

service without being able to easily work remotely, due to a lack of equipment or failure to

quickly adapt their professional practices.

The SPIPs

The Prison Rehabilitation and Probation Services (SPIPs) are decentralised services of the

ministry of Justice that ensure the monitoring and control of offenders in closed or open environments.

Rehabilitation and Probation Counsellors (CPIPs) work with convicted persons in order to

prevent recidivism and promote their socio-professional reintegration, in conjunction with institutional

and association partners.

Priority was given to monitoring those considered the most dangerous or vulnerable.

Regarding day parole and external placement measures, the judicial authorities examined the

possibility of conditional release or suspension of sentence. Arrangements were also made to

postpone the installation of electronic monitoring devices during the first part of the health

crisis. Methods for monitoring house arrests were also affected by the reduction in physical

contact: the collection of information by telephone or e-mail was massively developed.

Within the DPJJ, open environment activities also fell sharply throughout the period.

These activities involved educational monitoring and integration work carried out by educators

as well as the investigation and decision-making work of judges, conducted when collecting

socio-educational information and also as part of judicial educational investigation measures

(MJIEs). The implementation of the redr

ess measures ordered by children’s judges was also

affected.

7

The average time taken to apply the new measures, which had increased between 2018

and 2019 in open environments, due to the combination of a slight increase in the volume of

ongoing measures and the extension of their duration (from 9.9 months to 10 months), became

even longer in 2020 (12 months). This trend was combined with a drop in the number of

ongoing measures (-9% compared to 2019). Investigative measures, like other open

environment measures, require contact with minors and their families and constitute activities

that can hardly be carried out remotely. The BCPs initially drawn up by the DPJJ required that

almost all of these activities be suspended. As it was not possible to interrupt contact with

these persons for several months, new methods for the remote monitoring of minors had to be

developed quickly.

3 - Very similar methods of managing the health crisis implemented by

European prison administrations

During the covid 19 pandemic, Europe

’s Member States implemented several

exceptional measures, which converged to a large extent. Except in Italy, where the local

lockdowns put in place at the beginning of March 2020 in the northern part of the country

sparked several riots, no major incidents were observed in European institutions during this

period.

General efforts were made to regulate and even reduce the prison population. Early

release measures were thus adopted massively by 22 governments during the first lockdown

to prevent detainees from becoming infected. 143,000 people were thus freed. In Cyprus,

France and Portugal, this accounted for between 17 and 23% of the total prison population.

Between 1 January and 15 April 2020, the number of people incarcerated decreased by 7.6%

in France, 9.6% in Scotland, 9.4% in Italy, 8.9% in the Netherlands, 8% in Portugal, and 1.8%

in England and Wales

4

.

Electronic monitoring and, in general, alternatives to imprisonment were also used by

Member States. During the first weeks of the health crisis in France, the prison administration

recommended postponing electronic tagging (in order to reduce physical contact between staff

and prisoners). This instruction was gradually relaxed, in particular with regard to the possibility

of home travel. Other Member States had less restrictive policies in this area and relied heavily

on remote monitoring techniques from the start of the crisis. In Poland, in order to relieve prison

congestion, many prison sentences were converted into house arrest under electronic

surveillance. In Italy, for all remaining sentences of up to 18 months, the sentence could be

executed at home, and if the planned period of detention was longer than six months, the

electronic tagging measure was applied. The same trend was observed in Spain.

The health measures put in place in Europe were very similar. In addition to creating a

lockdown sector, from the start of the crisis, most European institutions organised specific

quarantine wings for newly imprisoned individuals. Systematic testing policies were also

developed, to varying degrees depending on the country and the logistical and health

resources available. These measures helped reduce the duration of isolation of new prisoners

entering facilities and remove suspected cases of internal contamination more quickly.

Maintaining family and outside ties and social activities was a varying priority depending

on the Member State. The policies implemented in terms of expanding access to telephone

and video calls often went further than those deployed by France. For example, experiments

involving the distribution of tablets in cells were carried out in Sweden, in order to allow

detainees to communicate with their children. Other Member States also organised the

distribution of smartphones within facilities.

4

Source: Council of Europe, Annual Penal Statistics.

8

As in France, the Polish prison administration granted monetary aid to indigent

detainees. The development of videoconferencing was strongly encouraged, but mainly in the

context of legal proceedings.

Lastly, several Member States stood out in terms of the attention paid to the morale of

detainees. The United Kingdom had an “exceptional regime management plan” for prisons,

which focused on preventing the effects of the lockdown on the prison population and made

maintaining relations with families a top priority. This approach was also supported by

significant communication with prisoners and their families. Lastly, in several countries, the

resumption of collective activities was organised more quickly than in France (in particular in

the United Kingdom and in Denmark).

Spain had a regional approach to crisis management within its penal institutions, which

limited the harmful effects on the morale of prisoners: in areas where the virus was circulating

at a lower level, possibilities for visits and activities were offered to prisoners more widely.

II - Officers and the public were protected, without any

budgetary slippage

An analysis of the data available as of 31 June 2021 shows that the crisis management

measures taken by the DAP and the DPJJ helped prevent the spread of the epidemic, without

any budgetary slippage.

A - The health of officers and detainees was protected

Health protection measures in prisons, targeting detainees and prison officers, were

taken from the end of February (note from the General Secretary of 26 February 2020) and

were regularly updated by the DAP and the SG. At the start of the crisis, heads of facilities and

interregional directors took local initiatives to manage the epidemic before any national

guidelines were issued.

1 - The health guidelines were effective in terms of protecting officers

The national health guidelines, concerning preventive measures, disinfection-ventilation

procedures, the treatment of symptomatic agents, etc. were transposed by the prison

administration and judicial youth protection. They ensured that their officers were protected.

9

Graphique n° 1 : Trends in covid 19 cases among prison administration staff

Source: Court of Accounts based on ministry of Justice data

As shown in Graph 1, the number of covid infections remained modest among DAP staff,

at around 200 cases (500 cases at the height of the second wave for a total of 38,000 officers).

Seven-day quarantine measures were taken by the administration during the three waves of

contamination to protect the officers.

The contamination figures for DPJJ professionals show a steady increase in the number

of confirmed cases after September 2020 and an even sharper increase in March-April 2021

(for example, 40 cases were identified on 8 April alone). 1,010 cases were identified over the

entire period.

2 - The epidemic was contained among offenders

The monitoring of covid 19 infections among offenders (PPSMJs) was not entirely

reliable, especially at the start of the health crisis when tests were not always available and

were not systematic. Similarly, people placed in open environments were not always detected

in the event of infection, not to mention those who were asymptomatic. However, centralised

monitoring was carried out by the ministry.

10

Graph 2: Trends in covid 19 cases among offenders

Source: Court of Accounts, based on data provided by the HFDSA. Between March and June: cases marked as in isolation

were non-tested symptomatic cases

The number of covid cases recorded in the population of offenders remained limited to

less than 200 people simultaneously, except in the months of April and May 2021, when a

peak of 400 infected people was reached; the number then dropped sharply at the end of May.

Despite the concerns expressed and the initial context of prison overcrowding and very

close living conditions, the toll in the summer of 2021 was three inmate deaths (which occurred

in March 2020, December 2020 and May 2021) and three officer deaths. The reduction in the

number of detainees in closed environments enabled individual cells to be provided, which

facilitated lockdown measures and the management of clusters. Similarly, restrictions on

activities and visits in visiting rooms limited interactions between prisoners and between

prisoners and outsiders. This observation was shared by the Inspector of Places of Deprivation

of Liberty who, in her

report on the management of the health crisis, noted that “

prevention

[had] been effective and the number of contagions [had] been low: the major risk of an

epidemic developing in crowded closed environments and in a population whose state of health

often makes them particularly vulnerable was avoided

”

5

.

The people managed by the DPJJ were also not very affected by the epidemic, for

several reasons. On the one hand, minors are not very affected by symptomatic or serious

forms of the disease, and on the other, people placed in housing facilities were subject to

lockdown measures, like the rest of the population. A total of 293 young people were infected

over the period from 2 March 2020 to 15 June 2021

6

, especially in Île-de-France, overseas

France, and the Nord and Grand Est regions. However, these figures should be considered

with caution given that the systematic testing campaigns in the event of a cluster being

5

CGLPL-

The fundamental rights of persons deprived of liberty put to the test by the health crisis

, Official Gazette

of 19 June 2020.

6

Out of a population of approximately 9,000 minors subject to judicial placement measures in 2020 who were

11

suspected in a facility, set up locally in collaboration with the Regional Health Agencies and

the Primary Health Insurance Funds, did not begin to be developed until the summer of 2020.

It is likely that the number of asymptomatic cases was higher during the period.

B - The management of the health crisis did not lead to budgetary

slippage

The health crisis significantly modified the budget forecasts of the DAP and DPJJ for the

2020 financial year. Unforeseen expenditure had to be decided on to meet needs, and savings

were made due to the slowdown in service activity. Overall, however, based on the data

available as of 31 June 2021, the health crisis did not lead to any budgetary slippage, with the

additional expenditure having been offset by savings.

1 -

Additional expenditure of €68.3 million in 2020

Unforeseen expenditures were mainly related to health protection measures for officers

and the public (purchasing of hand sanitiser, masks, cleaning products, etc.), measures to

compensate for activity restrictions in closed environments, and the acquisition of the

necessary equipment to develop telework. The exceptional expenditures generated by health

protocols reached €7.6 million for 2020 within the DAP and €4.7 million for the DPJJ.

In addition, in order to help detainees bear the consequences of the health crisis, in

particular the loss of all social ties, the DAP took steps to support them (telephone credit, free

television, social assistance, etc.). All of these measures cost €12.65 million in 2020.

When the lockdown was ordered, both the DAP and the DPJJ found themselves obliged,

in order to pursue their priority missions, to deploy teleworking, by buying laptops, smartphones

and miscellaneous digital equipment. All of this expenditure reached €16.6 million in 2020 and

2021 for the two administrations.

Lastly, the covid bonus granted to officers of the DAP,DPJJ and authorised associations

sector represented a total of €26.7 million.

2 -

Estimated savings of €45.3 million in 2020

These additional expenditures, totalling €68.3 million in 2020 for the two administrations,

were partly offset by savings, esti

mated at €45.3 million (€30.3 million for the DAP and €15

million for the DPJJ). For the DAP, this lower expenditure resulted in particular from savings

on prisoner transport (-

€14.7 million), reintegration activities (

-

€4.9 million) and external

placement and day parole measures (-

€0.6 million). The sharp decrease in the prison

population also enabled certain expenditures to be reduced (food service and water

consumption in particular).

12

The €15 million in savings recorded within the DPJJ in 2020 was mainly

due to the drop

in activity during the lockdown, for €9 million, including €3 million related to the reduction in

travel expenses and €2 million related to intervention expenses

7

. Several real estate

operations (creation of juvenile detention centres in the public sector) and the upgrading of the

building stock had to be postponed, generating savings of €2.2 million for the 2020 financial

year.

III - Lessons to be learned from the crisis

Even though the impact of the epidemic was contained and the DAP and DPJJ adapted

to the exceptional circumstances, the crisis highlighted the structural weaknesses of the

m

inistry of Justice’s organisation, in particular the insufficient coordination between its

stakeholders and with their partners. It also showed regrettable shortcomings in the health

prevention (or preventive medicine) policy with regard to public officials assigned to a specific

professional environment.

A - Better coordinate judicial stakeholders

1 - Local crisis management to be redefined

Relations between judicial stakeholders were not smooth. Thus, the doctrine of the

“

cordon sanitaire

” adopted early on by the DAP to protect its facilities from contamination

hampered the performance of priority missions for the DPJJ. Indeed, the intervention of DPJJ

educators in penal institutions often came up against, during the first lockdown, the restrictions

put into place by DAP officials on the entry of external personnel. The maintenance of activities

in the minors’ wings of penal institutions and in prisons for minors (EPMs

) was nevertheless

one of the DPJJ’s priority missions.

Similarly, the impact of teleworking on the General Secretary’s services responsible for

payroll in particular forced the DAP to implement exceptional procedures with a view to directly

ensuring the p

ayment of some of its officers’ compensation elements.

These examples show that no procedure providing for the creation of a crisis unit, at

departmental or interregional level, had been devised prior to the crisis. The system relied

entirely on the role of the representatives of the defence zone courts of appeal, whose

leadership capacity was weak and whose geographical area of intervention was unsuited to

the DAP and DPJJ networks.

2 -

“Business” coordination bodies to be developed

More generally, the crisis revealed the absence of integrated judicial policies and

reflection on the “production of justice”. The BCPs of the judicial courts were thus activated

without any consultation with the other “business” departments, which nevertheless execute

their decisions. In the same way, in certain inter-regions and jurisdictions of courts of appeal,

judicial activity was resumed in autumn of 2020 without consideration for the capacities of the

prison administration’s judicial extraction services (PREJs). Without any c

onsultation between

judicial stakeholders, criminal trials using high amounts of resources were scheduled

13

simultaneously in the same jurisdictions of the courts of appeal, even though the extraction

capacities of the prison services were diminished by health constraints.

These findings highlight the need for broader consultation between stakeholders, which

could be inspired by the collaboration model promoted by the DPJJ. At the end of the first

lockdown, it institutionalised the creation of quadripartite consultation bodies involving the

départements

(child welfare services), public prosecutor offices for minors, juvenile courts and

its territorial services, making up for the lack of an identified leader for child protection.

Lastly, when the crisis was being managed, judges used legal mechanisms to regulate

the prison population. Combined with the drop in crime and court activity, this helped prevent

an epidemic “outbreak”. The gradual increase in the occupancy rate of penal institutions at the

end of 2020 and especially in the first half of 2021, in particular in remand prisons, should

encourage the ministry of Justice to continue its efforts to identify the respective role of the

various factors contributing to these trends. In particular, the impact of th

e “sentence block”

measures should continue to be assessed with a view to learning lessons. The approach that

involves organising meetings bringing together, under the aegis of the General Secretariat, all

of the m

inistry’s “business” departments, heads of

court and the DAP’s decentralised services

is a first step in the partnership work that should be carried out between all of the m

inistry’s

stakeholders.

B - Prevent the DAP and DPJJ from becoming isolated

in the event of a crisis

For more than a year, the services and facilities of the DAP and DPJJ were forced to rely

on their own means to continue their activity. This situation resulted from a deliberate choice,

consisting of limiting interactions between closed environments and the outside world.

However, in a large number of cases, the stakeholders who usually contribute to the

exercise of these administrations’ missions withdrew from the integration and educational

systems in place.

Contacts between the DPJJ and National Education were thus interrupted from March

2020 and gradually resumed in September. Educational institutions were mostly unreachable

during the first lockdown and the education authorities did not develop any specific approach

aimed at ensuring service continuity within the DPJJ’s services.

The people monitored by the

DPJJ, like those managed by the prison administration, were treated like the rest of the

population. It was only after the first lockdown that steps were taken through protocols that

were in the process of being signed

8

.

Training and professional integration facilities were also affected by the health crisis.

Links with the local authorities working in these fields were broken over a long period.

Internships for workplace integration were also suspended, complicating the establishment of

exit plans for young people.

The same situation was observed in the prison administration, with regard to the

partnerships set up by the SPIPs with integration facilities and those receiving people with

community service sentences.

In the future, the decentralised services of the DAP and DPJJ would benefit from

securing external resources and interventions, within closed as well as open environments, by

8

A circular on bridging programmes was drawn up by the DPJJ and the General Directorate of School Education

(DGESCO) of the ministry of National Education. It was published on 19 February 2021.

14

means of protocols signed with institutional partners, in order to allow these activities to be

managed over a long crisis period.

C - Strengthen the health prevention policy with regard to officers

Even though the covid 19 epidemic was contained within penal institutions and the

DPJJ’s services, the crisis revealed how much the professional specificiti

es of the officers

concerned remain poorly taken into consideration in terms of health prevention policy.

First of all, the preventive medicine network failed to provide real support to decentralised

officials during the first lockdown in the spring of 2020. In the DAP, facility directors mainly

called on internal health units, attached to hospitals. Responsible for taking care of detainees,

these helped facilities define protocols and measures relating to officers whereas theoretically,

this is not one of

their missions. Similarly, in the DPJJ’s network, managers were able to rely

on health advisers to put into place a strategy for staff to prevent risks of contamination.

The difficulties of coordination with preventive medicine encountered during the crisis

more profoundly revealed insufficient consideration of the DAP and DPJJ’s “business” issues.

The ministry of Justice should work to strengthen its preventive medicine services, in

conjunction with the ministry of Health, while ensuring they are better coordinated with the DAP

and DPJJ’s services.

Then, the protection of the staff of these two administrations gave rise to the definition of

varying local health doctrines, which sometimes generated tension between the various

stakeholders. For example, the definitions adopted by several Regional Health Agencies

(ARSs) for contamination outbreaks (clusters) and “close contacts” within closed environments

would have resulted in decisions to exclude staff from work, if they had been strictly followed,

and would have disrupted the functioning of the facilities

9

. The decentralised services of the

DPJJ and DAP nevertheless managed to establish close contact with the ARSs’ territorial

delegations for the implementation of screening campaigns, from the second half of 2020.

Lastly, the officers of the DAP and DPJJ were not granted, at the beginning of the crisis,

any priority for the care of their children in nurseries or schools, which singularly complicated

the organisation of service and contributed to the increase in special absence authorisations

(ASAs). The vaccination strategy put in place by the Government on 27 December 2020 also

did not identify prison environments as priority targets.

Initiatives were certainly taken by the SG to enter into agreements with common-law

vaccination centres, and vaccination points were opened near four penal institutions

10

.

However, prisoners, like staff, were only made eligible for vaccination at the same rate as the

rest of the population, by age group and comorbidity. It is understandable that the minors

hosted in the DPJJ’s housing facilities, who were less exposed to serious forms of the disease,

were not considered as needing priority protection. Nevertheless, the characteristics of closed

environments, combining deprivation of liberty and difficulty implementing preventive

measures, should have led to these people being prioritised, in particular at the beginning of

spring 2021, when the vaccination target was widened.

As of 27 October 2021, the vaccination rate among prisoners (46.14%) was 30 points

lower than that in the general population (76.29%). The prison administration was unable to

provide vaccination figures for staff. As in the general population, the vaccination strategy is

voluntary. It is regrettable that a strategy aimed at increasing the vaccination coverage of all

9

The services referred to the less restrictive statement of the High Council on Public Health relating to the steps to

be taken for professionals working in healthcare facilities and in social and medico-social facilities according to their

SARS-CoV-2 status, 28 May 2020.

10

Réau prison, Villepinte remand prison, Fresnes and Osny prisons.