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C
OuRt OF
A
CCOuntS
Summaries
Part I
Observations
Public Finances
Public Policies
Public Management
S
ummaries are intended to facilitate the understanding
and use of the report produced by the Court of
Accounts.
Solely the original report is legally binding on the Court of
Accounts.
The responses of the administrations and other bodies
concerned are included in the report.
g
Disclaimer:
Annual Public Report
2013
Introduction
The 2013 annual public report
produced by the Court of Accounts
comprises three parts, only the first two of which have corresponding
summaries :
-
Part I
which comprises two volumes (I-1 and I-2), outlines the obser-
vations and recommendations drawn from a selection of audits, surveys
and evaluations carried out in 2012 by the Court, regional and territorial
courts of accounts, or the Court in conjunction with regional and territo-
rial courts of accounts;
-
Part II
focuses exclusively on the action taken by authorities, admi-
nistrations and other audited bodies following the observations and
recommendations made in previous years;
-
Part III
provides an overview of the activities of the Court and the
regional and territorial courts of accounts over the course of 2012.
The annual report produced by the Court
de Discipline Budgétaire et
Financière
(French ‘Budget and Finance Disciplinary Court’) is attached
as an appendix to these three parts of the report.
The present instalment comprises a series of summaries of the 27 texts
that make up Part I, ‘Observations’.
These 27 texts are divided into three parts:
-
first part: public finances (2)
:
. the overall situation of public finances at the end of January 2013
. financial situation and prospects of departments
-
second part: public policies (12)
:
. chapter I
: health and social cohesion (4)
. chapter II:
research and higher education (2)
. chapter III
: transport and land planning (4)
.
chapter IV
: two sectorial assistance plans (2)
-
third part: public management (13):
. chapter I
: State administrations (3);
. chapter II
: local authorities (4);
.
chapter III
: State operators (1);
.
chapter IV
: state-owned companies (4);
.
chapter V
: a para-governmental foundation (1).
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
3
I - Public Finances
1
The overall situation of public finances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
2
The financial situation and prospects of departments . . . . . . . . . . .10
II - Public Policy
3
The combat against Alzheimer’s disease: a public health policy
to be consolidated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
4
Hospital restructuring: three illustrations of difficulties
encountered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
5
The attending physician and the coordinated care pathway:
an unfulfilled reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
6
The “in activity” RSA : a seldom solicited benefit, limited
impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
7
Inserm and the life sciences: new challenges in a
strategic sector
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
8
Graduate business and management schools:
a development to be regulated
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
9
The Joint Transport union of the Toulouse Agglomeration:
a necessary adaptation of network growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
10
The Artois-Gohelle (Pas de Calais) tramway: an inadequately
thought out project
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
11
Participation of local authorities in financing of the
Ligne à Grande Vitesse Est (LGV Est): costly counterparts,
one station too many
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
12
Fishing ports in Brittany: regional management to be
strengthened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
Summaries of Part I
Observations
5
Table of Contents
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report of the Court of Accounts
13
State support of tobacconists: unjustified aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
14
The 2009-2011 printed press assistance plan: a missed
opportunity for reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
III - Public Management
15
Maintenance purchases for the Ministry of Defense: high potential
for savings
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
16
Visa issuance and residence permits: modernization to be
accelerated and simplification to continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
17
General administration of civil aviation: generous and
costly social action
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
18
Electricity distribution concessions:
organization to be simplified, investments to be financed . . . . . . .51
19
Wastewater treatment for the Corbeil-Essones and Évry region : for-
getting the general interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
20
Reestablishment of the maritime character of Mont-Saint-Michel:
a poorly managed project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56
21
Property of local authorities: towards more dynamic
management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
22
The National Water and Aquatic Environment Agency:
poorly planned transformation, failing management
. . . . . . . . . . .62
23
Payments to EDF SA: rapid growth, accumulation of benefits, little
link with performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
24
SNCF communication expenses: expensive operations,
irregular markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
25
SONACOTRA at Adoma: drift corrected late . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
26
Monnaie de Paris: change moving forward,
challenges to overcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
27
Heritage Foundation: a unique model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
Table of Contents
6
1
the overall situation of public
finances
(at end of January 2013)
the situation in 2012
The public deficit, after reaching an
exceptionally high level in 2009 and
2010 (7.5% and 7.1% of GDP respecti-
vely) fell to 5.2% of GDP in 2011 and
the Government expect a further
decline in 2012 to 4.5% of GDP.
The Court’s report in July 2012 on
the situation and outlook for public
finances had pointed up the risk of
deviating from this goal, but remedial
measures were taken during the sum-
mer.
By including measures taken from
previous finance laws, the structural
effort to reduce the deficit in 2012 was
very significant (1.4  percentage points
of GDP). It was particularly based on
an increase in compulsory levies (1.1
percent of GDP), much less on control-
ling expenses (0.3 percent of GDP).
The
information
available
in
January 2013 does not lead to questio-
ning the deficit target of 4.5% of GDP
for 2012, but the risk of a higher deficit
is not negligible, especially since the
deterioration of conditions may have
led to a lower revenue growth than
expected. The public debt may have
exceeded 90% of GDP by the end of
December 2012.
Other European countries have
made similar efforts and the situation in
France in 2012 would remain lower than
that of the average for the European
Union or the Eurozone. Germany in
particular would have been close to
balancing its public accounts.
Outlook for 2013
The Government’s revenue projec-
tions for 2013 are probably too favoura-
ble, especially since they are based on a
fragile macroeconomic scenario and a
growth of compulsory levies which,
with an unchanged legislation, is too
high relative to economic activity. In
addition, the cost of community tax dis-
putes is still uncertain and the difficul-
ties in estimating numerous new tax
measures introduce a significant hazard.
The Government’s goal for 2013 is
stabilizing the State’s expenses, exclu-
ding interest and pensions (scope of the
standard value), relative to the Loi de
finances initiale (LFI -
Initial Budget
Act
) for 2012.
Compliance assumes that savings
will be generated to offset the new mea-
sures (
1 billion) and the growth trend
for expenses. Due to differing estimates
for this, for which measurement is partly
conventional, the savings required are
Court of Accounts
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
7
estimated
at
10 
billion
by
the
Government and
7  billion by the
Court.
A significant proportion of
these savings will result from the
delayed effect of measures taken under
the previous legislature, including the
impact of workforce reductions inclu-
ded in the Initial Budget Act for 2012
on the 2013 payroll. The new measures
identified in the LFI for 2013 are quite
limited and compliance with the stan-
dard for expenses, if possible, will be
difficult.
Even if the Government’s objective
for 2013 is met, given that the supple-
mentary budget acts for 2012 reduced
credits by
1.2 billion compared to the
LFI 2012, the State’s expenses within
the scope of the standard value would
increase by
1.2  billion over in 2013
while they fell in 2012. Health insurance
and pension expenses would increase as
well, faster in 2013 than in 2012.
The total growth of primary public
expenses would nonetheless be almost
equal in 2012 and 2013, according to the
Government. This continued restraint
of expenses incurred in 2011 is the
result of assumptions made by the
Ministry of Finance in regards to the
changes of expenses least directly under
the State’s control (unemployment insu-
rance, local authorities, various central
administration bodies, etc.). Some of
these assumptions, including those rela-
ting to unemployment benefits, are fra-
gile.
Subject to these reservations, the
structural effort planned for 2013 is
significant, nearly 2  percent of GDP,
and the reduction of the structural defi-
cit, which is at the heart of the new
European treaty, will comply with the
commitments of France.
However, achieving the actual defi-
cit objective (3% of GDP) could be
compromised, both in France and other
European countries, if the economic
situation does not improve quickly
enough. This view, if confirmed, is
likely to call for a review at the
European level of the respective
weights given to the actual deficit crite-
ria, very hard to achieve in a deteriora-
ting situation, and to the structural defi-
cit and effort criteria, more easily
controllable by a government.
the need to control expenses
The absolute priority is now to
intensify the effort to control expenses
in all government bodies. Indeed, the
structural effort planned for 2013 is
unbalanced: it relies less than 25% on
controlling expenses and over 75% on
increases in compulsory levies. In addi-
tion, the expected savings are partly due
to low interest rates, which cannot be
regarded as durable, and the impact of
measures taken under the previous legis-
lature.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
the overall situation of public finances
(at end of January 2013)
8
A rebalancing is provided for in the
Budget Planning Act, beyond 2013, bet-
ween the efforts for revenues and
expenditures, mainly from financing of
the tax credit for competitiveness and
employment through additional savings.
The necessary measures for the
entire government, to move closer to
stabilisation in the level of expenditures
from 2014 as it is planned in the
Planning Act, must be taken quickly.
Modernisation of public action announ-
ced by the Government must explicitly
aim for both restraining expenses and
improving the quality of public services.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
the overall situation of public finances
(at end of January 2013)
9
Court of Accounts
10
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
2
the financial situation and
prospects of departments
Over the last decade, the financial
organization of departments has been
profoundly changed. In parallel, the
adjustment of revenues to the growth
trend of expenses has become more dif-
ficult.
the growing weight of social
and personnel expenses
Since the 2000s, the departments
have
provided
payment
of
the
RMI/RSA, the personal autonomy allo-
wance (APA) and the disability compen-
sation benefit (PCH). The share of
these social expenses in department
budgets rose significantly between 2003
and 2011. Intervention expenses,
consisting mainly of social benefits,
thus rose from 58.7% to 65% of opera-
ting expenses.
Over the same period, the payroll
increased 115%. This growth is largely
explained by the transfer of State staff
(about 80,000 jobs), in connection with
the decentralisation of powers following
the Decentralisation Act  II (2004).
These transfers do not alone explain the
increase in staff. Excluding the effect of
decentralisation, workforces increased
by 12% in the period.
A change in revenue structure
The structure of department reve-
nues has changed significantly. Transfers
of powers to the departments have
essentially been financed through indi-
rect tax transfers. Local tax reform has
reversed the relationship between direct
and indirect taxation in their resources
and reduced the ability of departments
to adjust tax rates.
A more difficult to achieve
balance between revenue and
expenses
In light of jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Council, compensation
for transfers and the extension of
powers, which is assessed at the time
when the transfer or extension takes
place, was not done in contravention of
the provisions of Article  72.2 of the
Constitution. However, financially a lag
occurs between the revenues allocated
and the increasing costs borne by the
departments, especially for the APA,
RMI/RSA and PCH. For these three
benefits, the gap between the cost borne
and the funding received from the State
rose to
5 billion in 2011.
The pinch effect noted in 2009 due
to the growth in expenses and the fall in
transfer
duties
on
real
property
11
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
(DMTO) has highlighted the fragility of
departments’ financial balance equili-
brium. In 2011, the departments were
able to rebuild room to manoeuvre, lar-
gely due to high DMTO levels. They
nonetheless severely limited their invest-
ments and borrowings.
However, this improvement is cycli-
cal while the growth in social expenses
continues in a less favourable economic
and social context. Departments’ social
expenses have risen sharply in recent
years. They increased by an annual ave-
rage of 7.1% over the 2005/2011
period.
taking the variety of
situations into account
Although the infrastructure situa-
tion of departments has deteriorated,
the response cannot be comprehensive
and uniform. Transfer of a new
resource benefits a community in finan-
cial difficulty the same as one in relative
ease. Similarly, any undifferentiated
increase in the rates of existing
resources only amplifies existing inequa-
lities.
In addition, wide disparities exist
between communities. If we compare
departments that combine both higher
social expenses and lower transfer
duties, it is possible to identify 11 com-
munities that have a potentially fragile
budget structure. Of these, five are also
marked by a high debt ratio.
Avoiding inappropriate solu-
tions
The use of an emergency fund does
not constitute a sustainable solution to
eliminate imbalances of structural ori-
gin. A strictly cyclical intervention
should be targeted in its purpose and
follow precise and objective criteria.
Transfer of the RMI/RSA, APA
and PCH to the departments made
sense given their other powers. Transfer
to another public administration hardly
seems feasible. It also would not resolve
the question of balance between
resources allocated and expenses.
In the current context of public
finance crisis, any reallocation of
resources to the departments would lead
de facto
to an effect of removing
resources available for the other public
administrations. Under these conditions,
transfer by the State of new tax
resources to the local authorities would
not be preferable.
Generating financial and fiscal
leeway
Leeway could be generated through
management efforts. Strengthening of
department responsibility in manage-
ment of various solidarity mechanisms
which have been entrusted to them
could promote seeking of management
savings. Independently of these efforts,
incentives at refocusing investments on
department priorities could be adopted.
Financial situation and prospects
of departments
For better control of expenses:
consider strengthening responsi-
bilities of departments in managing
various mechanisms of social inter-
vention;
avoid co-financing of regional
department investments and introduce
a subsidy ceiling for investment pro-
jects undertaken by other communi-
ties ;
limit the ability of departments
to intervene in addition to the State in
financing of public investments;
For security and better allocation
of resources:
establish a more ambitious equa-
lisation by volume (DMTO and
CVAE) and with criteria that should be
redefined (including by taking the
weight
of
social
expenses
into
account) with the goal of gradually
reducing gaps by 30% compared to the
current situation ;
for the DMTO, establish a
perennial mechanism for “smoothing”
fluctuations, whose criteria could be
modelled on the “set aside” mecha-
nism decided in 2012. A smoothing on
the last five years should avoid econo-
mic uncertainties;
consider reallocation of taxation,
neutral for the State, between the
departments and communal block, in
order to give the departments greater
leeway; to this end, reallocate a portion
of the tax on developed land to the
departments and a portion of DMTO
to the communal block, thus allowing
in particular increasing the flexible
share of department taxation and sta-
bilising a greater portion of their
resources.
Recommendations
A greater ability to adjust revenues
to expenses could be given to depart-
ments by transferring a share of taxes
on developed land in return for a share
of DMTO. This rearrangement should
be complemented by the strengthening
of equalisation and establishment of a
perennial “smoothing” mechanism over
five years of DMTO proceeds.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Financial situation and prospects
of departments
12
Court of Accounts
3
the fight against Alzheimer’s
disease:
a public health policy to be
consolidated
INSERM
estimates
that
860,000  people are currently afflicted
with Alzheimer’s disease or a related
disease. This condition, which develops
over several years and for which there is
no cure, affects 13% of men and 20.5%
of women beyond 75 years of age. It is
a major public health issue which has
been the subject of three successive
plans prepared and implemented bet-
ween 2001 and 2012. the Court has exa-
mined contributions in terms of medi-
cal management of this pathology.
Continuity in the implemented
policy and increasingly streng-
thened direction
Since 2001, the first Alzheimer’s
plan defined the main objectives of this
fight against the disease which then was
taken up and deepened in a consistent
manner in the subsequent plans. The
second plan (2004-2007) especially
enabled 100% support by health insu-
rance. The third (2008-2012 plan) has
focused in particular on research and on
organisation of the continuity of medi-
cal care through innovative mechanisms
intended to strengthen involvement of
municipal doctors and strengthen the
possibilities of specialised care facilities.
The first two plans were very poorly
structured in terms of management and
tracking. However, for the third, the
direct management mission placed
directly under the President of the
Republic allows all players to be mobili-
sed and avoided any disintegration of
the plan’s implementation.
A hard to measure financial
effort
This is especially true for the first
two plans, for lack of budget estimates
and accurate assessment. The projected
budget for the third plan (
1.6  billion
over five years including
226  million
for the health component), presented as
financed by medical deductions then
created, proved to be approximate and a
close monitoring of expenses actually
disbursed was not possible.
The esti-
mate made shows however an underper-
formance of the forecast financial enve-
lope, with the rate of overall achieve-
ment only being 31.54% by the end of
2011. This result is explained by the
slow deployment of new mechanisms,
delays in their design and underestima-
ted implementation: in September 2012
the various measures of the plan were
on average implemented at 83% of the
final objective.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
13
14
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
Gradual organisation of a care
pathway that is still unfinished
A diagnosis offer that is now acces-
sible throughout the territory. It is based
on 469 local memory consultations arti-
culated with 28 memory resource and
research centres, with practices that are
very heterogeneous, however. A natio-
nal Alzheimer’s Bank was created in
2009 to enable epidemiological monito-
ring of the disease, but all the memory
consultations do not supply it.
Home medical monitoring is still in
the process of being organized. Specific
consultations by the GP for the patient
and the caregiver, experiments with new
methods of remunerations of health
professionals and creation of Alzheimer
specialist staff grouping several health
professions have however begun to
reposition the treating physician to the
centre of patient care for the disease.
However, only 273 Alzheimer places out
of 500 planned were operational by
June 2012.
Deployment of dedicated hospitals
created by the third plan has had delays:
only 55 reinforced accommodation
units (out of 109 planned) and 77 cog-
nitive-behavioural units (out of 120
planned) were actually opened by
December 2012.
An essential assessment of drug
management and the research
strategy
Initiatives have been undertaken to
best monitor the undesirable effects of
drugs used by Alzheimer’s patients and
to reduce the inappropriate use of neu-
roleptics. However, the downward reas-
sessment by the High Health Authority
in October 2011 of the medical service
rendered by four drugs used calls for a
quick performance of a strict medico-
economic assessment of the contribu-
tion of these products in terms of their
costs
for
the
community
(about
380 million in 2012).
The third plan has driven a real
dynamic for research by devoting
192 million and by creating a specialist
operator: the Alzheimer’s Scientific
Cooperation Foundation. The results,
especially in terms of developing new
tools for diagnosis as well as preventive
and curative treatments should be care-
fully assessed according to a calendar to
be determined.
the fight against Alzheimer’s disease
proceed with methodical assess-
ment of new mechanisms for care
before planning their renewal and sus-
tainability;
make a rigorous medico-econo-
mic assessment of drugs used for trea-
ting Alzheimer’s disease;
strictly enforce for all memory
consultations the obligation to docu-
ment the national Alzheimer’s Bank;
if a new Alzheimer’s plan is laun-
ched, organise accurate financial moni-
toring using a methodology that is
common to all the various administra-
tions concerned.
Recommendations
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
the fight against Alzheimer’s disease
15
Court of Accounts
16
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
4
Hospital restructuring:
three illustrations of
difficulties encountered
The reconstruction of the hospital
landscape undertaken over fifteen years
remains unfinished today and only
imperfectly meets the needs of the
population, as already noted by the
Court in its annual report on application
of the laws for financing social security
for 2008.
the Court and Regional Chambers
of Accounts examined, in 2012, three
examples
of
restructuring:
the
Perpignan hospitals in the Eastern
Pyrenees (1,151 beds), the Nord-Deux-
Sèvres in Deux-Sèvres (316  beds) and
the Albertville-Moutiers in Savoie
(544 beds).
Long project lead times
In spite of uneven financial chal-
lenges, the three projects have each had
a lot of trouble to get underway: it took
between ten and twenty years to make
the necessary decisions.
In Perpignan, reconstruction of the
old hospital, the decision of which was
made in 1993, was completed in 2012,
but with completion of only two sec-
tions out of the originally planned four.
The Nord-Deux-Sevres hospital has
not yet seen concrete completion, des-
pite three successive projects.
In the Tarentaise Valley, after the
difficult agreement on merging only two
entities (Albertville and Moutiers) out of
the originally planned three (with
Bourg-Saint-Maurice), and after five
successive projects, the new health care
facility is still not built.
Ambiguous roles of administra-
tive supervision
At Perpignan, several projects for
reconstruction of the old hospital were
successively rejected by the regional
hospital board then by the regional
health board without a global reflection
being carried out on the new hospital’s
activity.
The Nord-Deux-Sèvres hospital,
resulting from the merger of three hos-
pitals, experienced a deteriorating situa-
tion, especially due to the lack of admi-
nistrative supervision on the selection of
the type of organisation to be establi-
shed and the level of financing to plan
for.
In Tarentaise, the Ministry of
Health and the regional health board has
long insisted on the urgency of a mer-
ger, but the various players, institution,
medical community, elected representa-
tives and ministry, have not succeeded in
agreeing on an efficient and economical
grouping.
17
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
Hospital restructuring
Financially damaging delays
Successive projects for reconstruc-
tion of the Perpignan hospital have
incurred, since 1993, numerous useless
expenses and the financial scope of the
project has increase by 63% in constant
Euros, with the consequence of mort-
gaging the hospital’s financial situation
for a long time.
Similarly, for the Nord-Deux-Sèvres
hospital, the sustainability of the new
project, valued at
106 million, remains
uncertain.
The
financing
plan
for
the
Albertville-Moutiers hospital (CHAM)
also seems to be unrealistic in terms of
its activity and ability to ensure the
balance of the resulting operations.
A still inadequate health care
offer
At Perpignan, the new hospital was
built on its former site, which does not
allow for an extension. The architectural
choice is unsatisfactory and completion
of two additional sections planned
seems very hypothetical.
For the two other projects studied,
but not yet finally decided or financed,
these only very imperfectly meet the
needs of the population.
Consequently, the Court believes
that there is still time to reconsider them
and credibly define future activity of the
institutions within the framework of a
consistent and global approach to provi-
ding local health care.
The Court persists in its 2008
recommendations
to
revive
and
streamline the restructuring plans. It
insists on the need for State services to
define national hospital restructuring
goals, strengthen the means for action
by regional health boards to support
their decisions, in an increasingly diffi-
cult context of fighting social deficits.
Regarding projects that do not cur-
rently appear satisfactory from the
point of view of the medical organisa-
tion in the territory concerned, the
Court and the regional court of
accounts make the following recom-
mendations:
redefine projects by integrating
them in a rigorous and consistent
approach taking into account the ove-
rall local supply and demand for care;
ensure that hospital restructuring
projects actually achieve all the opera-
ting savings for which they offer the
opportunity.
Recommendations
Court of Accounts
18
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
5
the attending physician
and coordinated care:
an unachieved reform
Since the law of August  13,  2004,
regarding
health
insurance,
every
socially insured person over 16 years old
is encouraged to designate an attending
physician. the Court sought to assess the
actual contribution of this innovation,
presented as a major structural reform
of health organisation.
An ambitious mechanism, redu-
ced to a complex rate pathway
for insured persons
The 2004 reform systematized the
practice of family physician by provi-
ding that any patient declares a doctor
of their choice, called attending physi-
cians, and then aside from exceptions
(psychiatrists, gynaecologists, ophthal-
mologists), only consults other doctors,
called corresponding physicians, upon
referral by the attending physician. To
preserve patient freedom of choice, des-
ignation of an attending physician, who
could be a general practitioner or a spe-
cialist, is not compulsory. If the insured
person abstains or directly consults ano-
ther practitioner without referral from
their attending physician and thereby
does not respect the coordinated care
pathway, they are penalised by a signifi-
cant increase in the share not covered by
health insurance (70% instead of 30%),
without the possibility of supplemen-
tary insurance covering the increase.
In this way, and despite various
administrative obstacles, the proportion
of insured persons who declared an
attending physician (95% being a GP),
already at 80% in May  2006, reached
90% by December  2011, the date on
which medical consultations conducted
under the care pathway represented
91% of the total (other than emergen-
cies and other excluded actions).
The reform thus instituted a France-
style
gatekeeper
loosely based on the
British scheme where going through a
general practitioner is compulsory.
Unlike the British system where eve-
ryone is required to register with a gene-
ral practitioner, who is paid on the basis
of the number of his patients, who
treats freely and directs patients if
necessary to a specialist or a hospital,
the French system preserves the funda-
mentals of liberal medicine such as free
choice of doctor by the patient and fee-
for-service.
Establishment of the attending phy-
sician primarily means for the insured
person a rate pathway that is considera-
bly complex, with its main objective
limiting the costs of health insurance
reimbursements.
Indeed,
concerns
about this and of liberal physicians
unions, to which operational implemen-
19
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
the attending physician and
the coordinated care pathway
tation of the mechanism has been dele-
gated, have largely taken over from the
medical content.
A determining factor for diversi-
fication of
physicians remuneration
In a context marked by the persis-
tence of high deficits and a desire for
financial recovery, health insurance was
based on establishment of the attending
physician to favour targeted increases,
according to the different methods bet-
ween general practitioners and specia-
lists. The financial effort (
600 million
per year) has been paradoxically more
favourable to the specialists than gene-
ralists, who are supposed to be the keys-
tone of the mechanism.
As a consequence of the legal rela-
tionship established between the atten-
ding physician and the insured person,
by a reciprocal and formal designation,
any general physician now sees himself
attached to a clearly defined population
of patients. Health insurance thus has
found the necessary tool for establish-
ment of progressive positive incentives
to control medical health expenses, by
complementing fee-for-service, which
remains primary, with a modulated per-
formance remuneration based on rea-
ching quantified objectives and plans
intended to respond to certain particular
missions.
In regard of these proven additional
costs, the savings expected from optimi-
sation of health care has never given rise
to assessment.
Reform still unattained
Eight years after creating the atten-
ding physician, the aging population,
development of chronic pathologies
and changes in the medical demography
makes the need to generalise the “medi-
cal
pathway”
even
more
acute.
Experiments
aimed
at
supporting
patients being linked and coordinated
between the various players of the care
system have certainly increased but in
the greatest disorder and doing little to
call on the attending physician.
The lack of formal relations bet-
ween attending and corresponding phy-
sicians, coupled with delays in personal
health record, has contributed to remo-
ving any medical content from the coor-
dinated care pathway idea, each player
tending to want coordination to be exer-
cised from their own sphere of respon-
sibility. The result is a landscape blurred
at the expense of efficient patient sup-
port.
clearly reaffirm the attending
physician as the care coordinator for
his patients in relation to all other
health system players;
promptly make available to him
the needed tools for his mission and
relationship with other care system
stakeholders, including:
- secure messaging;
- a personal health record for each
patient, fully including their operatio-
nal concerns and incorporating the
annual summary component provided
for
by
the
Convention
of
July 26, 2011;
putting in place a mechanism for
rigorous assessment of additional
compensation to be provided to physi-
cians and make any new changes
relying on documented evidence of
efficiency gains for the care system
and savings for health insurance;
facilitate the administrative-tariff
pathway for the insured person, inclu-
ding:
- by removing the obligation to
again declare the attending physician if
changing regime;
- by studying removal of “authori-
sed overruns” billable by a specialist at
conventional fees (sector  1) to a
patient outside the coordinated care
pathway;
- by ensuring that any patient can
be offered a coordinated care pathway
with binding tariffs.
Recommendations
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
the attending physician and
the coordinated care pathway
20
Court of Accounts
6
the “in activity” RSA:
a little sought benefit,
limited impact
The “in activity” RSA is an integral
part of a unique benefit, broader in
scope, the Revenu de solidarite active
(RSA -
earned income supplement
)
whose main feature is to both ensure a
guaranteed minimum income to unem-
ployed persons and to provide an
income supplement to those who work.
The “in activity” component of the
RSA is an ambitious and innovative pro-
jects: to make, regardless of the dura-
tion of work, employment always more
rewarding than inactivity and thereby to
contribute to combating employment
poverty.
Implemented despite the economic
crisis upsetting the labour market, this
benefit is struggling to meet the objec-
tives set for it by law.
two thirds of eligible house-
holds have not applied for the
“in activity” RSA.
Non-use of the “in activity” RSA,
considered too complex and stigmati-
sing by the public likely to benefit, is two
times higher than for other social bene-
fits: although the eligible populations
was estimated at about 1.7 million hou-
seholds, the number of beneficiaries has
been stagnant for two years at about
500,000.
This situation is the source of over-
funding of the measure and the use for
other purposes of extrabudgetary funds
allocated to the Fonds national des soli-
darités active (FNSA -
National earned
income funds
).
the “in activity” RSA suffers
from several major structural
defects
The “in activity” RSA pursues seve-
ral objectives that are hardly compatible
with each other, resulting in an unsatis-
factory
compromise
between
an
employment incentive measure, which
should be more individual, and a highly
family oriented measure aiming to sup-
plement household earnings.
The uniformity of treatment reser-
ved for different populations with
regard to their level of integration in
employment is a significant factor for
non-use of the benefit.
Finally, the methods for calculating
the benefit limit is impact on the reve-
nue of poor workers:
- the scale and method of calcula-
tion do not always allow recipient hou-
seholds to get out of poverty;
- the rules for taking family allo-
wances into account for calculation of
the allowance leads to excluding couples
with several children, for which the
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
21
employment premium (PPE) is more
attractive and easier to collect.
the lack of coordination with
other aid undermines its
effectiveness.
The structure is still inadequate with
certain social benefits (including hou-
sing benefits) and with the social aid
mechanisms set up by local authorities,
which can lead to significantly reducing
gains from returning to work.
In addition, the maintaining of a
measure of incentive allowing the com-
bination during the first three months
earnings revenue with the “base” RSA,
resulting in a reduction in revenue for
the beneficiary upon payment of the “in
activity” RSA.
Finally, coexistence with other
incentive measures and specifically with
the employment premium (PPE) whose
automatic receipt is much easier, works
against the “in activity” RSA.
With these faults, it seems that an
upturn of the labour market and better
information to the eligible public would
not be sufficient to significantly improve
the benefits performance if was not
accompanied by a system of work
incentives and organization around the
“in activity” RSA and the PPE.
the “in activity” RSA
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
22
immediately undertake a study
on the structure between the “in acti-
vity” RSA and the PPE, with the
objective of organizing the comple-
mentarity between a social benefit (the
RSA) encouraging inactive persons to
take up or retake an activity and tax
measure (the PPE) benefiting low
income workers with modest revenues
to encourage them to continue
employment;
eliminate the period of full
accumulation between the “base” RSA
and activity revenues;
make sure to avoid threshold
effects and situations of revenue loss
during the recovery of activity by
structuring more social benefits and
incentive mechanisms and by conti-
nuing the reform of related rights;
replace the social and professio-
nal support at the centre of the
mechanism and for this undertake a
reform of aide personnalisée de retour
à l’emploi (APRE -
personalized
return to work assistance
) on the basis
of the evaluation that must be under-
taken from 2013;
complete the study required by
the Law of December 1, 2008, on the
possible replacement of the allocation
de solidarité spécifique (ASS -
specific
solidarity allowance
) by the RSA ;
return to a more rigorous mana-
gement of the Fonds national des soli-
darités active (FNSA -
National earned
income funds
).
Recommendations
the “in activity” RSA
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
23
Court of Accounts
7
Inserm and the life sciences:
new challenges in a strategic
sector
Research in the life sciences, the pri-
mary research sector in France, is the
first priority under the stratégie natio-
nale de recherche et d’innovation (SNRI
-
National Research and Innovation
Strategy
) for the 2009-2012 period.
As a result of the Planning Act of
April 18, 2006, for research, the histori-
cal role of players has evolved and new
organizations dedicated to strategy,
planning, financing and assessment have
been created.
Declaration of Inserm’s place
Thanks to its staff’s success, Inserm
has benefited from the growth in finan-
cing of research by calls for projects: its
revenues have increased by 35% since
2006 and the share of external resources
represents close to 32% in 2011, compa-
red to 22% in 2006.
In parallel, the number of Inserm
publications and their share in French
publications has increased. The function
of valuation, entrusted to the Transfert
subsidiary of Inserm, has had encoura-
ging results.
Faced with the complexity of the
life sciences research organization (crea-
tion of new instruments for scientific
cooperation and autonomous funding
agencies), a role of steering and coordi-
nation was entrusted to Inserm in 2007.
The institute has played a major role in
creation of the Alliance pour les
Sciences de la vie et la Santé (AVIESAN
-
Alliance for Life Sciences and Health
)
in 2009. This constitutes a framework
for coordination of the main public
players.
Difficulties related to recent
reforms
Inserm’s dynamism in obtaining cre-
dits on projects has resulted in a signifi-
cant increase in staff recruited under
research contracts. These fixed term
contracts (CDD) create a social, legal
and financial risk, since 515 of these
contractors would be eligible for tenure.
The valuation borne by Inserm
Transfert risks being affected by the
establishment of companies for accele-
ration of technology transfer (SATT),
financed by the future investments pro-
gram.
The division of roles between
AVIESAN and the other players (State,
research operators, National Research
Agency (ANR)) is not sufficiently clear
concerning the definition of strategic
priorities, the consistency of financing
granted with these priorities, the plan-
ning of calls for projects or the opera-
tional coordination of different players.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
24
Structural problems persist des-
pite reforms
Steering joint research units, associa-
ting several institutions, has not signifi-
cantly progressed.
The diversity of public funding
sources and the absence of a consolida-
ted vision of credits always weigh down
the sectors abilities for strategic and
budget direction.
Finally, the increase in the budget
for the life sciences remains relative
compared to the United States, the
United Kingdom and Germany.
Inserm and the life sciences:
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
25
clarify the procedures involving
the different players for life science
and
health
research
(ministries,
alliance, national research agency,
research operators) to ensure:
- definition of strategic research
priorities;
- planning calls for projects and the
consistency of financing granted with
the strategic priorities;
- operational coordination of dif-
ferent players in research;
maintaining the positive dyna-
mics of valuation of biomedical
research
supported
by
Inserm
Transfert;
providing the State with a global
vision of public resources dedicated to
research in the life sciences;
defining and implementing the
common administrative management
processes and tools for joint units and
creating the indicators that permit
monitoring of human and financial
resources of units;
re-examining the rules attached
to recruitment and management of
staff financed by research contracts.
Recommendations
Court of Accounts
26
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
8
Graduate business and
management schools:
a development to be regulated
Graduate business and management
schools (ESCG -
écoles supérieures de
commerce et de gestion
), examined by
the Court and the regional court of
accounts,
are
training
institutions
dependent on a chamber of commerce
and industry, recognized by the State
and authorized to issue a master’s
degree under the Ministry of Higher
Education and Research.
These schools play an important
role
alongside
universities
in
the
Francophone landscape of higher
management education: numbering 29,
in 2011 they trained over 135,000  stu-
dents and represented one third of stu-
dent bodies in management at bachelors
levels +4 and +5.
A change made necessary by
globalization
To confront international competi-
tion, recruitment of high-level profes-
sors in these schools and building
foreign networks became necessary.
However, this policy increases the bur-
den on schools at a time when public
financial resources are becoming scarce.
The resulting pinch effect led the
ESCGs to increase their student enrol-
ments and tuition fees while reducing
the cost of their investments.
An enviable international posi-
tion
In a market for management trai-
ning dominated by Anglo-Saxon institu-
tions, French schools have been able to
occupy an enviable international posi-
tion that has emerged over the last
20 years. The international performance
of the French model of leading busi-
ness schools is confirmed by the 2012
Financial Times
ranking of the best
Masters in Management
worldwide : out
of the first one hundred training institu-
tions, nineteen ESCG schools ranked in
these including three among the first
five.
Some schools at the crossroads
The critical size of schools and
adaptation
of
their
organizations
remains a serious challenge for the
future of each school and in addition
for French consular higher education,
since they determine access to the mar-
ket for international education. The
ESCGs must make strategic choices for
closer ties with other schools if they
wish to compete in the elite or refocus
on their regional and national markets.
27
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
necessary regulation
Unlike the universities placed under
the sole authority of the Ministry of
Higher
Education
and
Research
(MESR), the ESCGs are under the dual
supervision of the Ministry of Industry,
for financial aspects through the
Chambers of Commerce and Industry
and through the MESR for awarding of
degrees.
The
Court
regrets
that
the
Chambers of Commerce and Industry
have not sought to analyse and have
more control over the relevance of the
fit between their schools, apparently lea-
ving it to the market to arbitrate in the
absence of regulatory mechanisms.
In 2012, to improve and consolidate
the role of ESCGs in higher manage-
ment education, some choices that are
the State’s responsibility must be made.
Graduate business and management schools:
undertake a reflection on the sta-
tus of ESCGs and the place of the
Chambers of Commerce and Industry
and the State in the mechanism, to
have the financial means to carry out
suitable strategies, while giving more
autonomy to the schools in their
governance;
ensure that the large increase in
tuition fees is offset by systems of
scholarships, loans or apprenticeship,
allowing each student to follow these
training programs based on their indi-
vidual merits, regardless of their
income or those of their family;
have better control of costs and
consistency of choices made regarding
making studies more academic and the
internationalization of curricula with
the size and positioning of schools in
the supply of management training ;
strengthen the audit activities of
the commission d’évaluation des for-
mations et diplômes de gestion
[National
Commission
for
the
Evaluation
of
Training
and
Qualifications in Management]
on the
quality of ESCG degrees, whether
issued in France or abroad, and on
schools’ obligations on informing stu-
dents on the name of diplomas.
Recommendations
Court of Accounts
28
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
9
the joint transport syndicate
of Greater toulouse:
a necessary adaptation to
network growth
Greater Toulouse has seen popula-
tion growth of over 20,000 inhabitants
per year on average and has over
1.2 million inhabitants. Saturation of the
road network and the constant increase
in public transport ridership makes the
issue of urban transport a major chal-
lenge.
The central player in urban trans-
port policy is the Greater Toulouse
Syndicat Mixte des Transports en
Commun
(SMTC
-
Joint
public
Transport Commission
), controlled by
the Midi-Pyrénées regional court of
accounts.
An inadequate
institutional organization
Institutional rules, including that of
unanimity, which govern the Joint
Commission
sometimes
cause
blockages in the decision-making pro-
cess. Adopting an urban mobility plan
has required nearly ten years of negotia-
tions. Finally, some structural projects
are delayed and coordination of urban
planning and transport policies remains
very imperfect.
An operation more financed by
taxpayers than users
The method of financing transport
operation is now showing its limits.
Although until now transport fares
ensured a steady growth in revenues,
this source of financing has tended to
stabilize since 2009. However, financing
of the Toulouse network is marked by
pricing that leaves ample room for free
travel since more than one third of tra-
vellers do not pay for their ticket. In
2010, free travel and the new “youth”
fare have therefore resulted in a cost of
close to
22  million per year for the
operator.
Financing of operations therefore
rests mainly on taxpayers, through pay-
ment for transport and participation of
communities in the Joint Commission,
including the Urban Community of
Greater Toulouse.
Yet despite the increase in the
contribution by Greater Toulouse,
which doubled its participation to
80 
million,
financial
equilibrium
remains
precarious.
The
Joint
Commission even had to use an accoun-
29
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
ting device, by neutralizing its deprecia-
tion, to balance its operating section.
This budgetary practice constitutes
a solution that is both precarious and
unorthodox. It reveals the lack of ove-
rall financial strategy of the Joint
Commission and member communities.
the issue of financing invest-
ment
Already heavily indebted by its pre-
vious
investments,
the
Joint
Commission today has limited financing
capacity. However, to meet growing
demand, it has set investment objectives
that are very ambitious but which, in
view of its financial constraints, seem
oversized, amounting to
30 million per
year.
It is therefore imperative for the
Joint Commission to redefine its finan-
cial pact and also to review the rule of
unanimity, to envisage an urban trans-
port policy which can be built over the
long term.
For the Joint Commission and all
local authorities concerned:
formalize the partnerships bet-
ween local urban planning partici-
pants, taking into account the develop-
ment of potential demand for trans-
port, including during the launch of
the urban expansion project;
re-examine the conditions for
free access to the service which cur-
rently greatly hinders the growth of
commercial revenues and does not
generate sufficient self-financing;
finance the investments, by pre-
ferring unhindered self-financing, par-
ticipation by member communities
and third party subsidies, taking into
account the current level of debt,
which has reached a critical threshold;
reconsider the rule of unanimity
to
improve
efficiency
of
the
Commission’s
internal
decision-
making process ;
define a new financial pact bet-
ween all the municipalities concerned
and
as
applicable
with
the
Departement de la Haute-Garonne, in
view of providing the Commission
with sustainable financial perspectives.
Recommendations
the Greater toulouse Joint urban
transport Commission
Court of Accounts
10
the Artois Gohelle (Pas-de-Calais)
tramway project: an insufficiently
thought out project
The Artois Gohelle Transport Joint
Commission decided in 2008 to create
public transport on dedicated corridor,
at a cost estimated in 2009 at
657 mil-
lion, excluding taxes. This project
involves the simultaneous construction
of two lines with no connection bet-
ween them over 37  kilometres, along
two axes: Liévin - Lens- Hénin-
Beaumont for one, and Beuvry -
Béthune- Bruay-la-Buissière - Houdain
for the other.
An ambiguous project
The public transport project also
includes a renovation and urban renewal
component.
This dual ambition feeds ambiguity
resulting from a lack of prior thought
and the absence of consensus on the
project’s
consistency.
The
Urban
Mobility Plan adopted in 2006 only
covers the territory of the founding
communities, those of Lens-Liévin and
Hénin-Carvin. It does not incorporate
the Greater Artois community and the
municipal communities of Noeux and
Environs, which became members of
the Joint Commission in 2006.
As for the urban development
dimension, it is completely outside the
jurisdiction of the Commission, which
is limited to transport.
Definition of the project is difficult.
The need to choose a technical option,
single track or double track, appeared
late. The route Line Nº 1 was only fro-
zen in April 2011; but at the same time
it was challenged by the possibility that
the project would be abandoned due to
lack of consensus.
uncertain funding
Based on initial summary studies,
the assessment of expenses appeared to
be underestimated.
The accumulation of delays com-
promised the State subsidy of
57.6 mil-
lion obtained under the “Grenelle
Environment Forum”. Financing of the
project is also based on an increase in
the transport contribution, which was
increased in July 2010 to 1.80% .
If the
work does not begin before July 1, 2013,
this rate will be reduced to 1.05% .
This
business tax is strictly reserved for
urban passenger transport. It cannot
finance, even partially, urban develop-
ment. However, the project’s financing
plan does not distinguish between finan-
cing of these developments and does
not provide for any participation of the
communities concerned in this regard.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
30
the Artois Gohelle tramway Project
(Pas-de-Calais)
Incompetent project
management
Insufficiently staffed with personnel
skilled
in
urban
transport,
the
Commission delegated project manage-
ment by entrusting project performance
to an agent, under the conditions provi-
ded in the Law of July 12, 1985, relating
to public project management.
At the end of a selection process,
the methods of which appear to be
questionable with regards to the princi-
ples of transparency and equality that
govern public procurement, the choice
was made for a regional Société d’Éco-
nomie Mixte (SEM -
Semi-Public
Company
), a specialist in development
and construction operations but incom-
petent in public transport.
Therefore, it has contracted a sub-
contractor specializing in this field,
under irregular conditions under the law
respecting public contracting. The
imprecise definition of the subcontrac-
ted services had the effect of establish
dual control of the operation, causing
confusion.
To date, this operation seems to be
at an impasse and could be totally or
partially called into question.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
31
the Artois Gohelle tramway Project
(Pas-de-Calais)
32
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
adapt the technical, administra-
tive and financial powers of the
Commission to the design and monito-
ring of a resulting project;
prepare, as soon as possible, an
urban transport plan covering the
entire scope of urban transport rela-
ting to the Commission.
insert the public transport pro-
ject definition on dedicated corridor,
including the route of tramway lines, in
a common reflection that includes the
various surrounding transport authori-
ties including the region and depart-
ment, so as to ensure consistency and
complementarity of urban and interur-
ban transport modes;
ensure use of the transport pay-
ment product in accordance with its
legal purpose which induces particu-
larly the mobilization of community or
intercommunity finances for the work
in excess of the strict domain of urban
transport.
In addition, it would be desirable
to set out the conditions for implemen-
ting the increase in the transport tax
rate authorized by the provisions of
Article L. 2333-67 of the CGCT, when
the population of the municipality or
public cooperation institution is grea-
ter than 100  000  inhabitants and the
urban transport authority has decided
to build a public transport infrastruc-
ture with a road or tracked mode.
Indeed, the insufficient maturity of
the project could lead to premature or
useless mobilization of this supple-
mentary tax resource.
Recommendations
33
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
Court of Accounts
11
Participation of local authorities
in financing of the Ligne à Grande
Vitesse Est (LGV Est): costly coun-
terparts, one station too many
The high speed line East (LGV Est),
inaugurated in June 2007, will link Paris
to Strasbourg over 406 km upon com-
pletion in March 2016, and will continue
to Germany. Trains from the German
company Deutsche Bahn are running
already, as are those of the SNCF.
Although passenger traffic is higher
than expected - 13 million in 2011 - the
economic impact for local authorities
has yet to be measured.
A complex
financing
Financing
of
the
LGV
Est
construction work, divided into two
phases so as to avoid delaying opening
of the line, presents a novel character:
the State, as the primary financier, is
associated with the local authorities, the
second source of funding, and with the
Réseau Ferré de France (RFF -
French
Rail Network
), as well as the European
Union and the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg.
The financing plan has been slow to
develop because of the significant num-
ber of communities concerned, sixteen
in the Champagne-Ardenne, Lorraine
and Alsace, plus the Île-de-France
region.
The search for co-financing and
competition between the communities
for access to the TGV has weakened the
project’s direction.
Questionable choices of invest-
ment
The choice of location of the
Lorraine TGV station has been the sub-
ject of difficult negotiations. Originally,
it was planned to be located between
Nancy and Metz. The Cheminot-
Louvigny
site
has
been
selected.
However the station located there has
not interconnection with the Nancy-
Metz TER line. Despite this choice, the
project to locate another station at
Vandières, better served, has not been
abandoned; financing is however not yet
defined. If the full project is completed,
it would lead to construction of two
TGV stations, located at least 20  km
apart, for a total cost of
156 million.
Operating deficits at the com-
munities’ expense
The demand for regular direct ser-
vice by the TGV, from stations not loca-
ted on the high speed line has also led
the communities involved to finance the
Participation of local authorities in financing the
High Speed East line (LGV Est)
34
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
For the State and RFF:
ensure, by seeking co-financing
from the local authorities for major
transport infrastructures, to preserve
the project’s course, optimizing the
high speed line’s route and the equili-
brium of its future operation;
suspend performance of work
on the Vandières station up to the time
when traffic evolution ensures the
project’s socio-economic profitability;
For the local authorities:
limit, in case of co-financing, the
number of participating communities;
promote and assign the role of leader
to the region;
inform the financial participa-
tion of communities by prior assess-
ments of the choices of the lines
routes and service lines, complemen-
ting the overall assessments done by
RFF;
For the State, RFF, and local
authorities:
exclude the location of TGV
stations in open country without inter-
connection to the regional transport
network;
For the SNCF and RFF:
provide better information to
the local authorities on the results of
traffic, possibly with a confidentiality
clause.
Recommendations
corresponding operating deficits, while
the sustainability of some of them is
still not assured.
uncertainty about
economic benefits
The economic benefits for the local
authorities concerned still seem to be
uncertain. Some communities have
nonetheless proceeded, at stations ser-
ved by the TGV, with major urban deve-
lopments, particularly by building office
buildings or shops. Projects which they
have co-financed, whether the high
speed line or service lines, have not been
the subject of a priori evaluations or
retrospective assessments. These assess-
ments are also hampered by the reti-
cence of the SNCF to supply precise
data on traffic, for reasons of commer-
cial confidentiality.
35
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of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
Court of Accounts
12
Management of Brittany
fishing ports:
regional steering to be
strengthened
Although it represents 46% of the
value of seafood products marketed in
the seafood markets in France in 2011,
Breton fishing declined significantly
including the disappearance of half the
ships and fishermen in the last 20 years.
Operation of fishing ports adap-
ted to a context of crisis
Faced with an acute crisis, the opera-
tors have developed new services such
as online sales which expands the
demand or transportation assistance to
supply certain seafood markets with fish
unloaded at other ports. Human and
technical resources have sometimes
been pooled. However, the port supply
now seems excessive in some coastal
areas.
The fishing port facilities fee
(REPP -
redevance d’équipement des
ports de pêche
) is the main operating
revenue
for
concession
holders.
Regulation governing it is subject to
interpretation, generating tensions bet-
ween the ports. Thus, the REPP prima-
rily benefits unloading ports and not
those with seafood markets where the
large part of services borne by opera-
tors are concentrated.
Investments financed largely by
public aid
Some ports, particularly on the
north coast of Brittany, have conducted
extension work to improve the condi-
tions for management of vessels and
allow additional boats to be received.
Other ports have conducted major
health and environmental standardiza-
tion work to sustain activity, especially in
South Brittany.
Financing these investments is only
provided through major subsidies,
which can represent up to 80% of the
cost of equipment.
Inadequate concession holder
contracts
Concession holder contracts, often
old, are neither suitable nor fully respec-
ted. Concession holders are responsible
for the choice and project management
of investments while they only partially
finance them. When renewing existing
contracts, the concession holders could
retain responsibility for project manage-
ment of infrastructure investments.
Management of Brittany fishing ports:
36
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Relationships between local
authorities to be reviewed
The powers of different levels of
local authorities should be clarified.
Three of the Breton fishing ports
having a seafood market belong to the
region (Saint-Malo, Lorient and Brest),
the others are the property of depart-
ments. This sharing of powers between
these two levels of authorities does not
always favour consistency and relevancy
of regional port investments.
For
management
of
Brittany
fishing ports:
pursue the efforts to streamline
the supply of ports, particularly in
Cornouaille;
sharing good practices for all
ports;
applying a uniform policy of
royalties;
better defining accounting proce-
dures for closing concessions to secure
current concession holder manage-
ment;
define the respective roles of
delegators and delegatees better, for
carrying out investments, by favouring
on tenancy for the next public service
delegations;
strengthening the role of the
Brittany region in the choice of port
infrastructure by providing for esta-
blishment of a regional fishing port
equipment plan contracted between
the departments and the region, which
would set the list and location of
investments to be made;
For the State and the national
fishing port management policy:
review the regulations on the
fishing port equipment fee to take into
account new practices of ship-owners;
harmonize taxation applicable to
fishing ports;
examine the possibility of modi-
fying the division of powers relating to
fishing port management between
local authorities, by strengthening the
steering role of the region;
Recommendations
37
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
Court of Accounts
13
the State’s support of
tobacconists:
unjustified aid
The State’s financial support of
tobacconists is old. Establishment of
future contracts beginning in 2004 signi-
ficantly strengthened it. These grants,
designed to support a profession which
it was felt was weakened by the rise in
tobacco prices, proved unjustified and
costly. Under the guise of breaking, the
current future contract (2012-2016) per-
petuates this situation. A rapid and com-
plete reconsideration of this mechanism
is therefore imperative.
Assistance to the profession:
future contracts” were added
to traditional assistance
The State’s financial support of
tobacconists is old. It funds up to two
thirds of their supplementary pension
scheme established in 1963, and has par-
ticularly subsidised securing their pre-
mises since 1995.
Future contracts signed between the
State and tobacconists were added to
these traditional assistances beginning in
2004. The first contract (2004-2007) was
primarily intended to compensate for
the losses in revenue that were presu-
med to have resulted from lower pur-
chases on the regulated market, as a
result of price increases decided by the
government for public health purposes.
The total amount of support for the
profession amounts to
2.6 billion bet-
ween January  1,  2004, and the end of
2011 (
1.4 billion for the period corres-
ponding to the first contract and
1.2 billion for the second), in average a
little more than
300 million per year.
unjustified aid, causing massive
windfall effects
Contrary to the initially pessimistic
expectations, the rise in tobacco prices
between 2002 and 2003 contributed to
increasing, for tobacconists, the average
sales turnover related to tobacco.
Indeed, although the volume of sales
dropped 30%, from 90,000  tons per
year at the beginning of the 2000s to
65,000  tons per year from 2004, sales,
including taxes, grew by more than 20%
between 2002 and 2011, from
14.7 bil-
lion to
17.8 billion.
The average earnings of tobacco-
nists rose sharply, amplified by the
decline, formerly, of the number of
tobacconists. Excluding direct State aid,
earnings grew by 53.9% between 2002
and 2011, rising from
29,070 to
44,725. With this assistance, growth
was 67.1% (
29,070 to
48,564).
38
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Except for certain tobacconists
located in certain border areas who are
confronted with tough competition due
to tobacco prices in France, generally
higher than foreign prices, most tobac-
conists
have
received
assistance
although their sales turnover related to
tobacco had not fallen.
This situation is explained by the
lack of targeting mechanism established
by the administration which has favou-
red universal assistance, that is, benefi-
ting all tobacconists regardless of chan-
ging circumstances rather than assis-
tance granted temporarily only to tobac-
conists with a sharp fall in their activity
following the increase in tobacco prices.
the current contract: a
more apparent than real failure
The current contract (2012-2016)
provides for a better targeting of sup-
port and a considerable decrease in bud-
getary assistance, including the phasing
out
of
the
additional
discount.
However, alongside these measures, the
increase in the rate of net remittance,
which grew from 6.5% to 6.9% and will
generate a cumulative gain for tobacco-
nists of about
260 million, is expected
to fully offset the decline in budget sub-
sidies.
The failure seen is therefore more
apparent than real. Indeed, if the effort
made by the community in favour of
tobacconists spends less in the future in
payment of budgetary assistance, it will
remain overall in the same range as in
the previous contracts. It will actually
affect public finances since agreeing on
an increase in net remittance, supported
by the manufacturers, with a margin
unchanged by them the State has depri-
ved itself of the possibility to collect
additional tax revenues. In addition, the
mechanism is still less targeted than
before: given the proportional character
of the net remittance compared to the
sales turnover, this measure will increa-
singly benefit wealthy tobacconists.
the State’s financial support of tobacconists
the State’s financial support of tobacconists
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
39
Recommendations
undertake a rapid and complete
reconsideration of the measures cho-
sen in early 2012 as “2012-2016 future
contract”;
leave only the structural sup-
ports (end of activity allowance, secu-
rity subsidy, public service premium)
intended to modernize the network
and strengthen tobacconists’ safety;
maintain, for the next four years,
the net remittance rate at the level rea-
ched on January 1st, 2012;
establish, after consultation with
the profession, a declining balance
mechanism for the net remittance,
based on the sales turnover level.
40
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Court of Accounts
14
the aid plan for the printed
press 2009-2011: a missed
opportunity for reform
Following the Estates-General on
the Printed Press in 2008, the President
of the Republic announced a very signi-
ficant assistance plan for the 2009-2011
period:
450  million in supplementary
budgetary expenses over three years,
5 billion taking into account the cumu-
lative cost of direct budgetary assistance
and fiscal measures over the same
period.
The government has however laun-
ched this plan without a prior diagnosis
which would have identified the most
effective support.
the predominance of emer-
gency measures to the detri-
ment of structural measures
Adoption of a moratorium on pos-
tal rates, for which the budgetary cost is
estimated at
32  million for 2013, has
contributed to delaying the develop-
ment of delivery of the daily press, sup-
ported by the State in respect of struc-
tural measures.
Furthermore, the high increase in
assistance for distribution of the natio-
nal daily press for political and general
information (
74  million in assistance
from 2009 to 2011) and the exceptional
measures in favour of press distributors
(
62.6 million over the same period) has
not improved the economic situation of
the two main players in press distribu-
tion: the Presstalis press courier and the
points of sale.
Modernization assistance has been
provided to printers while development
of the Internet should have been a pre-
ferred strategic component. Assistance
with social modernization of the press
has proved particularly costly, with an
average cost of over
150,000 per bene-
ficiary of the “Print” plan.
Ministerial direction strengthe-
ned too late
The procedures and structures that
the
Ministry
of
Culture
and
Communication has provided for more
effectively leading its press assistance
policy was only implemented after com-
pletion of the assistance plan. The mea-
sures provided by the decree of
April  13,  2012, are going in the right
direction but their methods of imple-
mentation are not yet set.
The
approach
of
multi-year
contracting undertaken with the media
companies will depend on setting pre-
cise objectives for financial support
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
41
from the State as well as effective moni-
toring of agreements.
Regarding, budgetary information,
progress has been made. But transpa-
rency now provides more complete
information on the amount of assis-
tance granted to publishers and press
owners.
It has become urgent to finalize the
methodological and operational frame-
work of control and assessment mecha-
nisms.
too timid reduction in the cost
of assistance
Credits open in 2012 in respect of
press assistance have diminished by
10% compared to 2011, but inflexibility
is delaying the return to the level of
public expenditure found before the
implementation of the 2009-2011 trien-
nial plan.
The 2013-2015 triennial program
provides for a reduction of about 13%
of budgetary credits allocated to the
printed press, without relying on a
reform of mechanisms, the only way to
generate real leeway.
A strategy for State intervention
to be rebuilt
A more selective approach and a
stronger concentration of resources on
the key objectives of the assistance
policy to the press are now imperative.
Development of distribution must
lead to consistency among the many
existing mechanisms and prepare tools
for overall steering by 2015, the date
when the agreements on postal assis-
tance expire.
Preservation of pluralism involves a
reflection on the scope of application of
preferential postal rates and the VAT
rate “super reduced” to 2.1%, in order
to better take into account the specific
situation of each press family in relation
to this objective.
Finally, for modernization of the
printed press sector, the intervention of
the strategic funds created in 2012 must
be oriented to innovative projects and
the political and general information
press.
the aid plan for the printed press 2009-2011
the aid plan for the printed press 2009-2011
Recommendations
Concerning governance and mana-
gement of assistance:
effectively implement contrac-
ting with companies receiving subsi-
dies;
publish the annual amount of
assistance granted to each press title;
systematize the procedures for
assessment and control and improve
consistency of the mechanism;
Concerning the State’s intervention
strategy:
accompany the scheduled reduc-
tion of public assistance with an overall
reflection aimed at:
- ensure consistency between the
different assistances to be distributed
by 2015;
- accentuate their targeting in
favour of press families presenting
challenges in terms of pluralism;
- refocus assistance with moderni-
zation on innovative projects.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
42
43
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
15
Maintenance purchases by
the Ministry of Defence:
a high potential for savings
The Ministry of Defence is the pri-
mary buyer of the State. Every year it
brings about
13  billion to merchant
businesses to purchase everyday goods
and services and especially military
equipment and maintenance services for
its military equipment.
Purchases relating to equipment
maintenance,
constantly
increasing,
represent about
3  billion in payment
credits each year. Performance of ser-
vices responsible for these purchases is
therefore essential so that the armies
have a good level of maintenance of
their equipment at the best possible
cost.
A buyer under constraints
Three joint army services purchase,
on behalf of the armies, equipment
maintenance services; the Aircraft
Maintenance Services (SIMMAD), Fleet
support service (SSF) and the ground
equipment
maintenance
service
(SIMMT). In 2011, they consumed
1.95 
billion,
630 
million
and
460 million credits respectively.
In these services, the contracts with
the greatest financial and technical
stakes are granted to a limited number
of companies without competitive bid-
ding, these being exclusive suppliers or
monopolies. In addition, the State’s
position is sometimes ambiguous -
often present in the capital of these
companies as a minority or majority sha-
reholder, it cannot ignore the impact in
terms of industries or jobs of its pur-
chasing decisions.
Insufficient professional buyers
Although the Ministry of Defence
declares its willingness to obtain signifi-
cant savings in this domain where costs
vary while budgetary constraint is
increasing, it does not draw on the
consequences in terms of organization
and procedures which would allow it to
improve its performance.
The number and qualification of
professional buyers are insufficient, in
particular for aircraft maintenance ser-
vice, the SIMMAD, where the very low
number of professional buyers is inap-
propriate for the financial and operatio-
nal procurement issues. The Ministry
of Defence does not devote more
buyers for these crucial purchases in
terms of consumption of budgetary
resources (over
2 billion per year) and
of operational consequences, than for
everyday purchases (security, mainte-
nance, fluids) of a defence base, which
only represents a few million Euros.
Court of Accounts
Limited implementation of
investigative powers
The State makes insufficient use of
the
provisions
of
the
Public
Procurement Code which allows it,
when there is little or no competition, to
investigate the costs and margins of its
suppliers.
This power is entrusted to a cost
investigation division placed under the
central purchasing authority of the
Ministry of Defence general armament
directorate. The role that it should play
to improve negotiation conditions bet-
ween the Ministry of Defence and its
monopoly suppliers is altered by the fact
that it does not decide its investigation
program and that the maintenance ser-
vices, which depend on the general staff,
cannot use them directly.
In comparison to the United
Kingdom and Germany, this investiga-
tion service has little staff. Its powers of
investigation are limited to the phases of
completed tenders and it is not always
able to meet their obligations of trans-
parency to supplier companies. Finally,
the results of investigations are used at
the discretion of purchasing services.
Therefore, negotiations are not underta-
ken in good conditions.
Delayed negotiation for mainte-
nance of new programs
When the Ministry of Defence
acquires new military equipment it esti-
mates the cost of ownership over its
entire life, including maintenance. Since
2010 this estimation has been automatic,
which is a significant improvement over
past practices. However, maintenance
contracts remain shared between those
under the initial commissioning phase
negotiated by the DGA and the mainte-
nance contracts negotiated by the main-
tenance services. This second negotia-
tion comes when all components of the
equipment contract have been already
defined, frequently without competitive
bidding. The supplier companies provi-
ding maintenance are then in a position
of strength to obtain the highest prices
possible.
The Ministry of Defence should
involve the maintenance services well
upstream with specifying equipment
and with negotiations with the compa-
nies and seek to obtain commitments
from the industry on the future cost of
maintenance while providing some
flexibility to take into account changes
in these costs and effective use of
equipment.
Maintenance purchases
by the Ministry of Defence:
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
44
45
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Recommendations
strengthen and professionalize
buyer workforces for armed services
responsible for priority service within
aviation
equipment
maintenance
(SIMMAD);
strengthen the powers of inves-
tigators of the cost investigation divi-
sion of the DGA, by modifying the
regulatory provisions that limit their
powers of investigation a priori, so the
State buyers can appreciate the reaso-
nable
character
of
margins
of
contracts concluded with monopoly
suppliers;
reattach the cost investigation
division directly to the armament
Delegate General;
increase, within the Ministry, the
control or second opinion mecha-
nisms on buyer service practices to
avoid an excessive concentration of
functions;
give scope to the maintenance
services in the definition of estimated
costs of ownership to all stages of
development of an armament pro-
gram;
anticipate, from the acquisition
of military equipment, a part of the
negotiation on future estimated main-
tenance costs, with the industrial sup-
pliers.
On the basis of examination of a
sample of cost investigations, the
Court estimates that savings in the
order of 10% of the total of annual
maintenance service purchases, or
300  million, should be able to be
achieved for future maintenance
contracts of the Ministry of Defence
if these measures are implemented.
Maintenance purchases
by the Ministry of Defence:
16
Visa issuance and residence
permits modernization to
be accelerated and
simplifications to pursue
A complex legal framework
Since 1945, the laws relating to entry
and stay of foreigners have been amen-
ded thirty six times. Community law has
evolved, and the majority of short term
visas are now “Schengen” type. There is
a variety of permits: one year stay cards,
ten year resident cards, «skills and
talents” cards, etc. In 2009, a major sim-
plification was introduced with the crea-
tion of the long stay visa.
Increased resources for overall
stable activity
The issuance of these permits
makes use of resources of the Ministry
of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and the
French Office for Immigration and
Integration (OFII).
For 60% of visas granted, consu-
lates call upon external service provi-
ders, totalling some 700 persons, for ser-
vices paid for by the applicants. Despite
this outsourcing, consulate human
resources have held practically steady.
Those of prefectures have increased,
while the volumes processed have not
changed much: visa applications rose
from 2,411,000 in 2005 to 2,431,000 in
2011
(+1%),
visas
issued
from
2,053,000 to 2,153,000 (+5%); perma-
nent residence permits issued by the
prefectures remained nearly constant:
from 846,000 in 2006 to 849,000 in
2010, with a temporary jump in 2011
(935,000).
The total cost of visa issuance was
about
54.3  million in 2011 (including
42 million for staffing), or
22 per visa
issued. Revenues collected by the State
amounted to
116  million, or
54 per
visa issued.
The total cost of permanent and
temporary residence permit issuance
was about
121.5 million in 2011 (inclu-
ding
82 million for staffing), or
120
per permit issued. It was covered by the
fees paid by applicants.
unification of management still
yields few results
The
General
Secretariat
of
Immigration and Integration (SGII),
created in 2007 and today placed under
the authority of the Ministry of the
Interior, is both a source of orders, a
facilitator and a coordinator of prefec-
tures and consulates in order in particu-
lar to increase exchanges of experience.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Court of Accounts
46
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
47
Visa issuance and residence permits
But all the expected beneficial effects
have not yet been obtained from this
reorganization.
Thus, the former computerized
applications from Ministries of the
Interior and Foreign Affairs do not
always allow for sharing of data.
Existing appointment services are not
effective. Collection of statistical data is
unreliable. The Ministry of the Interior’s
project is delayed by over two years and
that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is not included in the 2013-2015 trien-
nial budget.
The combat against documentary
fraud is still inadequately coordinated
and the services are unevenly active.
Clarification of powers completed in
2012 at the central administration remai-
ned partial.
Two fraud prevention mechanisms -
the «return control” in the country of
origin and the requirement imposed on
employers to check the validity of cer-
tain work permits - should especially be
assessed.
Hard road for the residence per-
mit applicant
In the most sought for prefectures,
long queues lead to tensions, sometimes
to parallel systems for changing places
for consideration. The prefectures issue
on average 1.4 million temporary docu-
ments per year. This large number helps
to clog the wickets and testifies to orga-
nizational defects that raise questions
about the equality of treatment for dif-
ferent users.
The statement and issuance are, in
some cases, scattered, especially bet-
ween prefecture and sub-prefectures.
Several town halls and police stations
still gather applications or issue permits.
To reduce the risks of unequal treat-
ment, in 2011 the central administration
issued a receptionist’s guide which
brought together the previously scatte-
red texts and encouraged modernization
and simplification of services and
reception of the public.
“Best practices” are not automati-
cally disseminated. Some websites are
incomplete; several prefectures do not
sell the necessary tax stamps, without
notice to applicants.
Simplifications must be continued.
For example, family reunification appli-
cations are to be sent to the single OFII
but the excessive number of instruction
players, which lengthens delays, have not
been reduces.
In conclusion, in the 2006-2011
period, the resources have generally
increased while the number of applica-
tions have changed little. New avenues
for simplification of procedures must
be explored.
The coordination and exchange of
information between the prefectures,
consular posts, the OFII and the police
and gendarmerie have progressed but
the SGII does not fully perform its role
of direction, in particular for moderni-
zation of information systems and the
combat against documentary fraud.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Visa issuance and residence permits
48
ensure compliance with the law:
- correct certain differences in
interpretation of tax law;
- remind prefectures to comply
with the requirement of physical
appearance when prescribed by the
Code of Entry and Residence of
Aliens and the right to Asylum;
- eliminate certificates of deposit
not provided for by this code;
facilitate the administration’s
work and the user’s pathway:
- limit the number of instructor
services for a single application;
- develop paperless operation,
remote procedures and electronic
updating of permits;
- assess the effectiveness of the
«return control» and the requirement
for employers to check the situation of
foreign employees;
coordinate the networks better;
- modernize computer systems by
facilitating data exchange and statistics
collection;
- designate a single interdepart-
mental correspondent responsible for
combating documentary fraud;
- develop best practices exchange
within and between networks.
Recommendations
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
49
Court of Accounts
17
the General Directorate of
Civil Aviation: generous and
costly social action
Social action in the public service,
enshrined in the Law of July 13, 1983,
on the rights and obligations of civil
servants, consists of all specific services
which the State grants to its active and
retired employees in the fields of food,
housing,
childcare
and
leisure.
Within the Ministry of Ecology,
Sustainable Development and Energy, it
applies in a specific manner to staff of
the General Directorate of Civil
Aviation (DGAC) and for historical rea-
sons to those of Meteo-France.
The mechanism gradually lost sight
of its mission of solidarity and now
only seeks to provide services to the lar-
gest possible number of agents.
Abundant structures for
redundant actions
Social
action
is
implemented
through a tangle of over 120 national,
regional and local associations. The
pooling policy performed is not up to
the challenge. In general, the administra-
tion does not perform the duties of
management and direction that fall to it.
Management of this costly mecha-
nism (
1,300 per agent per year) lacks
clear vision. Its effectiveness and the
rigor of its management have been
seriously affected by the dilution of
skills between its different bodies (admi-
nistration, social action committee).
A generous mechanism
The cost of a very generous policy
(more than
15 million annually) proves
to be higher than the appropriations
voted and allocated by Parliament
(
9.2 million in 2010).
In terms of investment, the “re-use”
technique, without a regulatory basis,
leads the return to social action of the
proceeds of real estate transfers which
should be dedicated to debt repayment
of the air operations Control and
Operations budget.
In addition, a “rule” without any
other legal basis than the protocol
(2007-2009) negotiated with the social
partners provides that in any construc-
tion at least 2% of the amount of the
investment must be devoted to socio-
cultural equipment.
Weak management by the
administration
The control that the administration
must exercise over the associations that
it subsidizes is, in practice, very inade-
quate. It would be even facilitated by
collecting and exploiting the informa-
tion available and improving its control
and evaluation tools. Truly objective
contracts should be entered into with
the associations concerned.
Two examples illustrate the Court’s
findings: the “Bataillet” family vacation
home (Hautes-Pyrénées), where work
was done under questionable conditions
is well maintained despite having now
lost its attractiveness, and the Maison
des
associations
du
Raizet
(Guadeloupe), completed in 2010, was
still not in use at the end of 2012.
Finally, the staff made available to
associations was not always under
conditions consistent with the regula-
tions. Leaves of absence granted are not
systematically recorded in the accounts.
Recommendations
refocus social action on solida-
rity, by supporting the administration’s
modernization;
significantly reduce the number
of associations supported, by favou-
ring attachment to a local social action
committee according to a principle of
service;
ensure that the administration
exercises its role of defining and
implementing social action;
finance social action by appro-
priations registered for this purpose in
the related budget;
develop scoreboards for effec-
tive management of social action;
enter into objective contracts
with associations receiving subsidies
of over
23,000 and periodically eva-
luate their activities;
define and plan all measures
relating to the closing of the Bataillet
vacation center.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
the General Directorate of Civil Aviation:
50
18
Electricity distribution
concessions: organization to
be simplified, investments
to be financed
Electricity distribution includes rou-
ting it from the high voltage network’s
output to user’s meters.
An atypical and potentially
conflicting organization
Electricity distribution is managed
in the form of very specific public ser-
vice concessions on nearly the entire
national territory. Municipalities and
their groups are required to entrust elec-
tricity distribution to ERDF, a 100%
subsidiary of the EDF group, under the
law.
This organization compared to
other public service concessions is aty-
pical and potentially conflicting.
The atypical character is reflected
first of all by a distribution rate set
nationally through a cross-subsidization
that allows all consumers to pay the
same amount for electricity, unlike water
for example.
It is also reflected in the lack of
choice by granting authorities to des-
ignate their distributor, ERDF having a
legal monopoly on virtually the entire
territory.
Conversely, the granting authorities
have a power that they do not have for
the other public service concessions:
that of providing contract oversight for
certain projects in rural areas and the-
reby benefiting from financing paid by
the distributor.
The uncertainty over long term
maintenance of the ERDF monopoly
complicates relationships between the
distributor and some of the granting
authorities and could jeopardize this
balance from the post-war period.
Rising investment needs
However, in this already tense
context, the need for investments on the
distribution network is increasing:
ERDF currently invests
3  billion per
year on the network but this amount
could reach
5 billion by 2020. For their
part, the granting authorities invest
about
1  billion per year on the net-
work.
The current increase in investments
(from
1.5  billion at the beginning of
the 2000s to about
3 billion in 2011 for
ERDF) is explained primarily by the
need for renovation of the network
which is aging and more sensitive to cli-
matic uncertainties. The average electri-
city outage time has tended to increase
in France since the beginning of the
2000s, even though this deterioration
Court of Accounts
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
51
remains limited (50  minutes of outage
in 2000, 85 minutes in 2010, a level less
than many comparable European coun-
tries; however, Germany has a lower
average outage time).
In addition, the rise of new decen-
tralized and intermittent energy sources,
such as wind power or photovoltaics
involves building intelligent networks,
for which a primary element will be the
future Linky communicating meter. The
cost for deployment of this meter alone
is estimated at
4 billion.
A need to streamline expenses
Electricity distribution in France
could evolve towards two different
models: optimisation of expenses by
national management of investments,
becoming all the more necessary with
more interconnected and interdepen-
dent electrical networks, or otherwise
increasing the autonomy of local autho-
rities, in a context of less centralized
electricity production and limits to
monopolies.
In the absence of choice between
these two opposing models, the Court
recommends better regulation of invest-
ments under the current electricity dis-
tribution system and a streamlining of
expenses before increasing rates, which
assumes that:
- the ERDF distributor controls its
expenses such as staffing costs or pur-
chases;
- the ERDF shareholder, EDF and
indirectly the State, limits raising divi-
dends with the need for investments on
the network;
- the granting authorities, of which
there are still too many (736) accelerate
consolidation. In addition, funding allo-
cated to them should be simplified and
reoriented towards work that improves
the quality of the electricity;
- finally, to deal with these needs for
investment, the current electricity distri-
bution organization should be impro-
ved: coordination between ERDF
investments and granting authorities in
the form of local planning which could
be eventually consolidated nationally, to
direct efforts towards priority challenges
such as the medium voltage network
which currently is the source of most
outages.
Only after these improvements can
a rate increase be potentially considered
if there remain investments to be cove-
red.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Electricity distribution concessions
52
accelerate consolidation of gran-
ting authorities to complete depart-
mentalization;
conclude
a
public
services
contract between the State and ERDF;
establish a local program of
investments between ERDF and gran-
ting authorities, aimed at directed
them to priority issues in terms of
electricity
quality,
especially
the
medium voltage network. These local
programs should eventually be conso-
lidated nationally;
simplify the system for finan-
cing of granting authorities’ invest-
ments by refocusing on priority invest-
ments for electricity quality;
review the position of EDF and
the State with respect of rises in
ERDF dividends, in the light of future
investments to be agreed for the net-
work;
increase ERDF’s productivity
efforts to develop its capacity for self-
financing of investments in the next
tariff framework;
review longer term develop-
ments on the electricity distribution
model.
Recommendations
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
Electricity distribution concessions
53
54
Court of Accounts
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
19
Wastewater treatment in
the Corbeil-Essonnes-Évry
region: overlooking the
general interest
Wastewater
treatment
in
the
Corbeil-Essonnes-Évry region, in the
eastern central section of the Essonne
department, has the distinction of being
provided by two adjacent stations, loca-
ted on the banks of the Seine River, on
the territory of the Évry municipality.
This situation originates from the rivalry
between the towns of Corbeil-Essonnes
and Évry, since creation of the new city
of Évry, since the end of the 1960s to
today.
Failure of cooperative
renovation of the stations
Renovation of the stations was
necessary both to increase treatment
capacity and to comply with emission
standards required by the European
Directive of May 21, 1991, on wastewa-
ter.
A comprehensive and consistent
wastewater treatment policy was first
sought. A joint commission for water
treatment (SYMETRIE), including both
inter-municipal contracting authorities,
was created and in 2004 proposed seve-
ral scenarios.
In the scenario based on the coope-
ration of contracting authorities and
seeking optimal use of both sets of
equipment, the overall estimated cost of
work and operation were clearly less
than those of the scenario opting for
renovation of both plants indepen-
dently of each other.
Yet the latter, overall less effective
and more expensive, was the one that
prevailed.
Cost overruns resulting from the
disagreement
The cost of renovation work of the
SIARCE station, the intercommunity
commission of whose main municipa-
lity is Corbeil-Essonnes, increased by
54%
in
four
years,
rising
from
20.08  million in August  2006 to
30.89  million in April 2010, after six
changes. The change relating to the
creation of a sludge composting unit,
which lead to an increase in the amount
of the initial contract of about 40%,
was a reflection of the failure of the
solution of joint treatment of sludge by
a single station.
Meanwhile, the Greater Évry com-
munity undertook the renovation of its
plant, whose work is not yet completed
and for which the cost amount to about
43.5 million.
The work of extending and bringing
the two plants into compliance with
standards can thus be estimated overall,
at the end of 2012, to be about
80 mil-
lion. The updated cost at the same date,
of coordinated renovation, would
amount to about
70 million.
The cost overrun due to the lack of
cooperation can therefore be assessed at
about ten million Euros without consi-
dering the overall operational expenses
assessed at
1.11 million per year.
Overlooking the general interest
None of the many stakeholders
have been able to uphold the general
interest.
The contracting authorities have
been unable to overcome their old
oppositions and act in a concerted man-
ner.
The public funders, the Seine-
Normandy Water Board and the
Department of Essonne in particular
certainly preferred joint action to
modernize equipment but they were not
able to oppose the choice of contracting
authorities.
It was the responsibility of the
State’s representative to uphold the
general interest. However, the State’s
services were primarily aimed at com-
pleting as quickly as possible the work
for bringing wastewater treatment plants
up to standards following the condem-
nation of France in 2004 for failure to
comply with the obligations prescribed
by the European Directive of 1991.
Urgency therefore prevailed to the detri-
ment of the most economical solution
for public funds.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Wastewater treatment for the
Corbeil-Essonnes-Évry region
55
Recommendations
For the two communities concer-
ned:
act from now on in a joint man-
ner, preferring the most sensible
approach for management of their
equipment, in terms of investment
and operating costs.
For State services:
ensure that the general interest is
upheld in the exercise of their respon-
sibilities.
20
Restoration of the
maritime character of
Mont-Saint-Michel:
a poorly managed project
Restoration of the maritime charac-
ter of Mont-Saint-Michel is a vast pro-
ject
whose
current
management
methods have not promoted a compre-
hensive consideration of all aspects of
the project.
A project whose effectiveness
can only be measured in the
long term
The current project, initiated in
1969 and assessed in March  2011 at
185 
million,
consists
mainly
of
construction of a new dam whose
object is to restore to the Couesnon the
needed hydraulic power. Combined with
the force of the sea and new facilities
giving way to the free flow of water
around the Mont, it is expected to drive
sediments away.
The actual effectiveness of these
methods may however be unable to be
confirmed for many years (by 2025) and
will permit restoring the insular charac-
ter of the Mont for several hours per
year during outstanding tidal conditions.
Ambiguous dual management
which did not facilitate
overall consideration of this
project
Initiated by the State in 1990, the
current project is managed by the local
authorities through a joint commission.
However, being aware of the diffi-
culty of disengaging from such a project
which evidently goes well beyond a sim-
ple regional context, if only due to regis-
tration by UNESCO of the site as a
World Heritage, the State established,
along with the joint commission, a
management commission, which consti-
tutes the primary joint decision-making
body.
The result is an ambiguous dual
management, this committee legally not
having the real decision-making or ope-
rational role, penalizing joint reflection
on the future of this remarkable site.
In addition, the current arrange-
ments for funding this commission
involve some common members but
not all, and an associated community
which cannot legally take part in the
decisions, representing so many poten-
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Court of Accounts
56
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
57
tial sources of conflicts in the event of
discrepancies.
Faulty operational execution
The conduct, management and ope-
rational execution of this project by the
Baie
du
Mont-Saint-Michel
Joint
Commission reveals deficiencies, espe-
cially in overall management and direc-
tion of this project.
Thus, construction and operation of
facilities and public reception services,
entrusted by the joint commission to the
Veolia Transport company by a public
service delegation contract agreed for a
13  year duration, reflects a lack of
control and vigilance.
The Commission noted that this
delegate would not be able to provide
rolling stock on the planned date of
start-up (April  2012). In addition, ini-
tially designed transport equipment will
need to be broadly reviewed. This situa-
tion could lead to questioning the terms
of the delegation.
Future operating conditions on
hold
According to the project’s schedule,
all planned improvements and construc-
tion to restore the maritime character of
Mont-Saint-Michel will be completed by
the end of 2015.
However, the financial contributions
of commission members were defined
in 2006, largely to finance the invest-
ments needed for the project’s operatio-
nal achievement. Nothing to date has
been planned for future contributions
for operation, once the work is comple-
ted.
Similarly, the protocol signed with
the State only determined contributions
to the cost of the work in the broad
sense, without addressing the conditions
for financing operating expenses in a
sustainable perspective which integrates
the cultural, touristic and environmental
dimensions of this world renowned site
which is visited by many foreign visitors.
Restoration of the maritime character
of Mont-Saint-Michel
58
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Recommendations
For the State:
initiate a new reflection on
governance and operational manage-
ment of the projects, by integrating
the cultural, touristic and environmen-
tal dimensions of the site, particularly
in such a way as to include the com-
mission of the municipalities that are
financing the project;
effectively
exercise
financial
control of the joint commission, since
it is the maritime public agent of the
State;
encourage the local authorities
concerned to precisely specify the dis-
tribution of funding for the site’s ope-
ration, from 2015, the year when work
is planned to be completed;
For the Baie du Mont-Saint-
Michel Joint Commission:
prepare a real depreciation sche-
dule from a regularly updated asset
inventory and accurately assess future
operational changes;
implement control of the dele-
gate, including management of recep-
tion structures;
make financial monitoring of
the project reliable.
Restoration of the maritime character
of Mont-Saint-Michel
59
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Court of Accounts
21
Property of local
authorities: towards more
dynamic management
The real estate assets of local autho-
rities and their groups are increasing and
diversifying with the extension of their
areas of operation and new needs of
inhabitants. It represents a very impor-
tant asset which also generates costs for
its operation.
Today, while local public authorities
are called upon to contribute to the
effort to restore public finances and,
with respect to pressure on local bud-
gets, exercising more effective property
management is required.
Preparing a policy of assess-
ment of public property of local
authorities
The current real estate situation
often results in a succession of ad hoc
decisions based on needs, opportunities
and constraints over real estate transac-
tions. However, defining a real estate
strategy can provide a clear overview in
the medium and long term, making the
connection between the various policies
that affect real estate assets.
However, real estate transactions
that translate this overall vision rarely
result in decisions made after review by
assemblies deliberating on various
potential scenarios and the steps taken
so that they can make a real choice are
not accomplished.
Knowing the property
A physical inventory, allowing a
complete census of properties and their
monitoring, are sometimes non-exis-
tent. It is often partial, succinct, presen-
ted in the form of a simple list, with
insufficient information.
Management of real assets also
involves accurately identifying the legal
systems that affect occupancy condi-
tions and the obligations related to the
property owned and/or occupied. In
this area there are gaps, especially during
transfers related to decentralization or
intercommunity development, and also
with respect to private real assets.
Finally, real asset accounting mana-
gement allows for traceability of trans-
actions and verification of their subs-
tantiation. Improvement of the quality
of information produced is therefore
important for managers. In most cases,
the statements and writings related to
real estate transactions only imperfectly
meet the rules for accounting quality.
Property of local authorities
60
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Optimizing the costs
for investment and operation
For office real estate only, there
appears to be inadequacies, correction
of which would bring significant impro-
vements.
Real estate management operations
mobilize legal, technical, accounting and
budgetary powers of various depart-
ments but are not integrated into a dedi-
cated unit. This segmentation is not
conducive to mobilization of skills and
control of costs and risks. To meet their
needs, communities can choose their
asset management tools but the possibi-
lities available are not always used, or
even poorly or underused, and the
information produced is incomplete or
poorly shared, which is detrimental to
more overall management of the pro-
perty.
In conclusion, the observations
made by the regional chambers indicate
that management of real estate assets is
not yet a major concern for most local
authorities. The practices of local
authorities who have implemented more
dynamic management show, however,
that although the costs of activities
undertaken remain modest the benefits
in terms of economy, efficiency and
effectiveness are significant.
Recommendations
For the State:
clearly distinguish in the inven-
tories of local authorities between the
properties relating to their public and
private domains and mention the main
legal information principles related to
the source and characteristics of their
property;
generalize in the large local
authorities establishment of a master
plan for land and property assets,
coordinated with their multi-year
investment plan;
strengthen the obligation of
information to deliberative assemblies
on the one hand, on decision-making
criteria relating to real estate transac-
tions, and on the other hand, on their
closing balance sheets;
for major real estate transactions
require production for deliberative
assemblies of overall investment and
61
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
operating costs with an assessment of
potential alternative solutions.
For the State and local authorities:
finish as soon as possible, along
with streamlining of the map of inter-
community cooperation public institu-
tions, steps for unbundling of pro-
perty, both for property transferred by
the State under decentralization laws
and for those allocated to the joint
municipalities or returned to munici-
palities;
ensure, through strengthened
collaboration of authorising officers
and accountants, compliance of the
local authorities’ balance sheets with
the reality of their real estate assets.
For the local authorities:
establish, when needed, the sin-
gle and complete physical inventory
provided by regulation and ensure
when a property is recorded that it
receives only a single inventory num-
ber, common to all departments of the
authority and communicated without
delay to the public accountant;
strengthen sharing of commu-
nity services in the joint municipality
framework and coordination of their
respective real estate policies;
identify a “real estate” function
in the communities’ organizations and
implement management tools using
the real estate data available in the
information systems;
list real estate made available to
third parties and consolidate all agree-
ments and information relating to each
property concerned in a single file;
define a policy for coverage of
risks related to a property and regularly
audit insurance contracts to always
have coverage at the best cost of insu-
red properties.
the real property of local authorities
Court of Accounts
22
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
62
the national Office for
Water and Aquatic
Environments (OnEMA):
poorly prepared transfor-
mation, poor management
The National Office for Water and
Aquatic Environments (ONEMA) is a
public administrative institution created
in 2007. Under the supervision of the
Ministry
of
the
Environment,
it
employs some 900  people and has an
annual budget of around
110 million,
mainly financed by a levy on water fee
paid by users and collected by the water
boards.
The scope and growth of tasks
entrusted to the ONEMA, in an envi-
ronment that is changing, complex and
subject to the pressure of Community
deadlines, has not been supported by
provision of resources that meet the
challenges. The result is numerous defi-
ciencies and irregularities in administra-
tive and financial management which
have harmed the effectiveness of activi-
ties by the new public institution.
An accumulation of poorly insu-
red duties
ONEMA has not emphasized, in
the early years of its existence, the qua-
lity of management essential to econo-
mically and effectively conduct the
duties of the institution which commits
France in terms of water policy.
Recommendations had yet made by the
Court on this subject from the point of
view of creating the institutions from
the Higher Fishing Council.
Projects relating to the water infor-
mation system (SIE), needed to achieve
the priority objective of water know-
ledge and to report to the European
Commission on the results obtain on
water quality, were delayed.
The police task was improved after
the recommendations previously made
by the Court. Tools and guidelines have
been deployed. However, coordination
of the States’ relevant departments
remains mainly incomplete for lack of a
shared tool for monitoring of police
actions. The effectiveness of these acti-
vities is still difficult to assess in the
absence of appropriate indicators. The
pressure of controls requested to com-
bat water pollution by nitrates is too
weak in view of the challenges.
ONEMA provides financial support
to water sanitation policies, including
wastewater for France to comply with
its Community obligations. For Corsica,
the financial mechanism itself is ques-
tionable. For the DOM-TOMs, financial
monitoring is unsatisfactory.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
63
national Water and Aquatic Environment
Agency (OnEMA)
Deficiencies in organization and
management
The resources have not been suita-
ble for the objectives and therefore
duties have been performed imperfectly.
The public institution has been slow to
take corrective measures. In this respect,
confusion of the roles of the chairman
of the board of directors and supervi-
sion has not allowed the process to be
expedited.
Accounting and financial manage-
ment have presented serious shortco-
mings. The accounts have proved to be
unreliable and the procedure for addres-
sing spending deficient up to 2010.
ONEMA’s contractual practices have
not allowed financial control to be fully
exercised. Management control remains
inadequate due to lack of scoreboards.
Until 2011, multiple and costly
management errors were committed,
ONEMA often exempting themselves
from the rules of the public procure-
ment code. They are the source of
delays in project performance, essential
for the exercise of duties of the public
institutions and compliance with the
commitments of France.
The weakness of personnel mana-
gement organizations, the inadequacy of
statutes and the legal inefficiencies
noted have confronted ONEMA with
recruitment problems which even today
expose it to the risk of a loss of skills.
Financially,
although
strengthening
management
largely
explains
the
increase in payroll (+27% in 4  years),
several measures related to compensa-
tion or vacations, disputable or even
irregular, have accentuated growth of
expenses. Finally, the organization of
local services and the pace of work by
some agents (4 days per week) are not in
line with the institution’s duties. While
the 2015 deadline is approaching for the
2000 water framework directive, to
achieve “good condition” of waters
and, at a time when the 2012 Finances
Law has increased the annual ceiling on
the water charges paid to ONEMA
from
108 million to
150 million from
2013, it is imperative to provide rigo-
rous management to the institutions by
continuing activities recently underta-
ken.
64
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
national Water and Aquatic Environment
Agency (OnEMA)
Recommendations
separate the functions of super-
vision and presidency of the board of
directors;
make accounts reliable and as
soon as possible put in place formal
internal audit procedures;
establish rigorous direction and
monitoring of computer projects,
including those related to the water
information system;
reorganize the territorial mecha-
nism;
review the conditions for human
resources management including the
conditions for allocation of the mobi-
lity allowance, monitoring work time
and the adequacy of the four day work
week with the duties of the ONEMA;
continue activities undertaken
for water police by redefining the
monitoring indicators and significantly
increasing the pressure for control on
themes or areas at issue.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
65
Court of Accounts
23
Remuneration to EDF SA:
rapid growth, accumulation
of benefits, little connec-
tion with performance
The audit period coincided with
major changes in the enterprise: listing
on the stock market for a portion of
capital, spin-off of network and distri-
bution networks, end of the monopoly,
globalization of activities. In parallel,
the 65,931 employees of EDF SA at the
end of 2011 remained for 94% gover-
ned by the statute of electrical and gas
industries, whose foundations were laid
by the law of April 8, 1946. Exempted
from the common labour law, this sta-
tute sets the rules for pay and refers to
sectorial agreements, then to company
agreements for the application and
improvement
of
conditions
for
employees.
A generous pay policy
Unlike employees of the private sec-
tor, within the EDF Group, the deve-
lopment of the average net salary per
head has represented more than 3% per
year. In addition, salaries at EDF are
higher at hiring (16% more than the sta-
tutory minimum wage for a young per-
son with no degree, 26% for a holder of
a technical school certificate), and have
an automatic growth guarantee. At the
end of their career, the seniority remu-
neration can constitute as much as 22%
of the set remuneration. Additional
remunerations can represent over 50%
of the total remuneration for some
employees, five years after hiring.
Decided at the company level, and
in addition to the above increases, indi-
vidual measures are also more favoura-
ble than in the private sector and more
widespread: 67% of agents received
them in 2010.
The EDF group initiated in 2008-
2009 a merit pay system with variable
mechanisms for remuneration, as do
many public and private enterprises. Its
uniqueness is however to allocate to a
greater
proportion
of
employees
amounts that are still low (less than 4%
of primary remuneration).
66
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
EDF SA remuneration
Remuneration of executives
increasing strongly until
recently
From 2005 to 2010, the overall remu-
neration of the CEO of EDF SA mul-
tiplied, in constant Euros, by 2.35,
under the effect of two cumulative
movements: regular and significant
increases of the fixed annual portion
(
1 million in 2010) and fixing of a
variable portion whose criteria were
reached in the period at the upper part
of the range (between 75 and 100%).
This remuneration, expressly approved
by the Minister of the Economy, rea-
ched about
1.5 million in 2011. Since
the Decree of July 26, 2012, it was cap-
ped at
450,000. The remuneration of
other corporate officers followed a
similar trend, and their bonus rates
achieved high amounts, above 75%.
The State shareholder is only aware
of the policy for remuneration of EDF
SA executives through items infre-
quently communicated to the remunera-
tion committee, issued by the board of
directors of which it is a part. It is
unfortunate that from 2004 it ceased to
perform the annual survey on remune-
ration.
During the period audited the num-
ber of executives increased by 32.5%
and their fixed salary at close to 4% per
year, as for all employees. Added to this,
however, is a higher variable share (with
a maximum of 26 to 37% of the fixed
salary). No executive achieved less than
90% of the objectives set in 2010. The
bonus therefore appears more like an
additional remuneration than a variable
incentive.
Many employment benefits
Supply of electricity at a preferen-
tial rate
Like all electricity and gas industry
employees, those of EDF SA benefit
from an “agent’s fee”, which represents
a cost to the company estimated at
222 million in 2010.
This benefit is exorbitant for several
reasons: subscription is free and the
supply of energy at the preferential rate
is open without consumption limits,
regardless of household composition,
to employed and retired agents, for the
primary and secondary residence, and
even for occasional vacation homes.
It is also taxed under conditions and
on a favourable scale, and in addition
undervalued for social contributions.
A wide range of additional benefits
Employees of EDF SA may benefit,
under certain conditions, from staff
housing, or a monthly allowance inten-
ded to share housing costs (cost to EDF
SA in 2011:
263.7 million). They col-
lect or have collected profit shares, free
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
67
EDF SA remuneration
shares, and benefit from collective
savings schemes matched by the com-
pany under favourable conditions, com-
pared to the private sector. EDF SA can
also provide them with loans for
consumption.
In May 2011, the Court issued com-
ments on the organization of the health
insurance scheme for electricity and gas
companies which guarantees higher ser-
vices that the common law, further
enhanced by additional and supplemen-
tary coverage.
The level of family and retirement
benefits
and
guarantees
to
EDF
employees is also considerably higher
than in the average branches of the eco-
nomy: many family advantages in the
form of paid holidays and specific allo-
wances, even combining these two
benefits for a single reason, such as mar-
riage for example; retirement calculated
on the bases of the last six months,
combined with supporting arrange-
ments.
Recommendations
For the company and government:
continue
differentiation
of
remuneration by remunerating perfor-
mance rather than statutory position;
set objectives for the variable
part sufficiently ambitious to justify
the concept itself of the variable part;
restore the annual survey of exe-
cutive remuneration of public compa-
nies, including the EDF group in it;
study the impact on the hierar-
chy of the provision for capping of
executive
remuneration
that
was
recently introduced;
end provisions for exemptions
from common tax and social law that
are currently related to the agent tariff;
set a consumption ceiling for the
energy subject to this tariff and index
it to the real price of electricity;
redefine the housing policy so
that the housing benefit and/or hou-
sing allowance are granted to agents
who need it due to the constraints of
their duties;
review the family policy in rela-
tion to its cost and changes in the
family structure.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
68
Court of Accounts
24
Communications expenses
of SnCF: expensive transac-
tions, irregular contracts
The Court has audited the regularity,
efficiency and effectiveness of external
and internal communications expenses
of the public institution between 2000
and 2011.
the slow formulation of the
“SnCF” single brand strategy
Over the last decade, the SNCF
undertook an active policy of “group”
communication which covers the scope
of the industrial and commercial public
institutions (EPIC SNCF) and its subsi-
diaries. At the end of a slow develop-
ment, the SNCF opted in July 2010 for
the “SNCF” single brand strategy, appli-
cable to the entire group.
Difficult assessment of the cost
of communication
The SNCF has not done analytical
monitoring
of
its
communication
expenses (commercial, institutional or
internal communication) and the overall
cost of the activity is difficult to quan-
tify. For EPIC alone, it is estimated at
153 million of average annual expenses
between 2007 and 2011, to which
should be added on average
55 million
payroll per year, for a total of close to
210  million per year. This amount
equals about 13% of EPIC investments
which amounted to
1.6 billion in 2010.
Insufficient control
and monitoring of expenses
Controlling
and
monitoring
expenses suffer from weak budgetary
planning, budget gaps in the audit trail,
inadequate anticipation of operations
and the non-existence of annual balance
sheets. Consequently, there are many
significant budget overruns. Committed
in 2009 to a policy of reducing its struc-
tural costs from 2% to 4% per year, the
SNCF planned, on the basis of an exter-
nal audit, a reduction of communication
expenses of
1.5  million from 2010,
6.5 million in 2011 and
8.3 million in
2012; it did not happen.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
the SnCF’s communication expenses
69
Purchasing practices
non-compliant with the rules in
force
The excessive recourse to negotiated
contracts, without competitive bidding,
is the greatest concern. These practices
relate to 71% of the 41 largest contracts
concluded since 2007 and audited by the
Court. They show non-compliance with
the broad principles of public procure-
ment
defined
by
the
Order
of
June  6,  2005, and its implementing
Decree, to which is subjected the SNCF
communication expenses and shows
that the institution is also non-com-
pliant with its internal procedures in this
field.
The invocation of extreme urgency
or technical specificity, to escape the
requirement for competitive bidding,
was not the subject of justification in
accordance with the regulations in force
or SNCF internal rules. The reference to
a “request by the president” shown in
strengthening justification of these
exceptional procurement procedures
cannot justify their use and does not
figure among the cases provided by the
regulation in force.
A periodic overall survey shows that
the SNCF suffers from a poor image
with the public, however the effective-
ness of the SNCF communication acti-
vities remains poorly evaluated. Tests
were carried out occasionally to measure
the effectiveness of advertising cam-
paigns and other marketing activities.
However, the achievement of these
objectives of the SNCF in terms of
communications was not evaluated for
any
of
the
operations
studied.
Significant sums were thus spent in the
absence of any evaluation or feedback.
SNCF is committed to implement,
according to a precise timetable and in
the short term, the necessary measures
to stop such practices. It presented its
board
of
directors
on
December 20, 2012, with the main lines
of its communication strategy and the
measures decided as a result of the
Court’s audit.
the SnCF’s communication expenses
70
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
Recommendations
formalize the multi-year com-
munication strategy, detail it in action
plans with the objective of managing
costs and presenting it to the board of
directors;
anticipate and evaluate annual
needs in order to improve the quality
of forecasts;
formalize a project management
approach for each operation including
budgetary aspects;
make a financial assessment of
each major projects and establish a
performance review of the annual
budget;
provide annual information on
expenses by major strategic lines by
presenting reliable financial informa-
tion, consolidated for EPIC and the
group;
ensure strict application of pro-
cedures required by Order 2005-649
of June  6,  2005, and strengthen the
internal control mechanisms to ensure
legal security of exceptional proce-
dures.
71
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
25
Court of Accounts
From Sonacotra to Adoma:
drift corrected late
The Adoma semi-public limited
company, formerly SONACOTRA,
manages over 500  hostels for migrant
workers or social residences, housing
70,000 people and representing 60% of
hostels for migrant workers and social
residences.
In its special public report on “wel-
coming and integration of immigrant
populations”, the Court had referred in
positive terms to activities by SONA-
COTRA while underlining the com-
pany’s difficulties, urged to move from
the status of “immigrant landlord” to
“landlord of the poorest”.
A fluctuating strategy at the
expense of the renovation of
homes
The State holds 57% of Adoma.
From the end of the 1990s, its priority
was to renovate the hostels of migrant
workers. Adoma did its part in the
effort. However, in 2012, half of the
rooms offered by the company to its
customers continued to have an area of
9 square meters or less, and only one in
five has self-contained comfort ele-
ments, integrating individual sanitary
and kitchen corners.
These mixed results are largely
explained by the instability and the dis-
persal of objectives set for the company.
Thus the 2005-2010 objectives contract
invited Adoma to diversify its activity to
social housing for families in difficulty
as well as to housing for young people,
especially students.
The company is also involved in
reception of asylum seekers and provi-
ding emergency shelter, for which its
own funds, provided by the State, have
been used to finance construction on
lands granted at-will, sometimes for
only 5 years. Early redemption of such
transactions contributed to much of the
accounting loss of
26 million recorded
in 2010.
Serious management
failures
For housing young people and fami-
lies, rather than accelerating the trans-
formation of hostels into social resi-
dences, it was decided to create additio-
nal capacity. Operations conducted in
the emergency led, especially in the
south-east of France, to acquisitions at
higher prices than the field estimates or
without prior technical study, which led
to cost overruns for work and difficul-
ties in using certain buildings.
To carry out this investment policy,
Adoma is indebted within the limits
provided in the objectives contract. It
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
From Sonacotra to Adoma
72
has however agreed, in a risky fashion,
to speculative contracts with the banks,
which have already led to a certain loss
of
7 million and created a latent unrea-
lized loss estimated at
57  million in
outstanding debt.
In day to day management, the com-
pany’s procurement policy as experien-
ced drifts, curbed only since 2011. A
certain laxity has long tainted human
resources management, local manage-
ment being too dispersed and the bene-
fits provided in terms of housing not
always justified by service constraints.
Finally, a profit-sharing agreement was
established so while the regulations did
not permit it; denounced late, this agree-
ment continues to pose a legal and
financial risk.
A late recovery
New governance was established in
2010, operational control of the com-
pany being entrusted to a minority sha-
reholder, the SNI, subsidiary of the
Caisse des dépôts et consignations. This
has highlighted the strategic refocusing
that began in 2009 and established gui-
delines that go in the direction of reco-
very.
Adoma thus disengaged itself from
non-priority sectors. It implemented a
savings plan and workforce reduction
that allowed it to make a profit in 2011.
The State must now set clear ultimate
objectives to provide this operator with
a stable shareholder structure, sufficient
capital and transparent governance.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
From Sonacotra to Adoma
73
Recommendations
The Court recommends that the
State shareholder:
specifies public service duties
that it assigns to the Adoma company;
encourages the necessary syner-
gies with the national property com-
pany, to provide Adoma with a stable
shareholding structure, sufficient capi-
tal and transparent governance;
strengthen inter-departmental
coordination and ensure that specific
duties entrusted to Adoma benefit
from balanced funding and allow for
sustainable achievements;
determine strategic priorities
over a sufficiently long period to
obtain robust results, and make up for
delays in rehabilitation of hostels,
especially in the elimination of small
rooms and completing the transfor-
mation of homes into social resi-
dences.
The
Court
recommends
the
Adoma company to:
continue streamlining its mana-
gement and securing its loans.
Court of Accounts
26
the Monnaie de Paris:
a fully committed change,
challenges to overcome
Management of coins and medals
was transformed into a public industrial
and commercial institution called “La
Monnaie de Paris” by the 2007 Finance
Act.
With 500 agents today, the Monnaie
de Paris must carry out several duties
provided by law, some as a monopoly
(minting common and collector legal
coinage, punches) and other competitive
items (decorations, medals, common
foreign coinage).
The company faces two main chal-
lenges: to provide its economic balance
by sufficiently developing its commer-
cial activities to compensate for an
unprofitable sovereign activity, and suc-
ceed in the new duty entrusted to it of
increasing its Paris real estate assets.
A change of status source of a
positive dynamic
Before the change of status, the
company’s economic situation was
greatly deteriorated. Structural handi-
caps, in particular related to the large
payroll, were aggravated by the difficul-
ties to be related to the transition to
Euro (very large orders followed by a
sharp drop in activity).
The social climate was very tense
within the company, in a context of
uncertainty on the sustainability of acti-
vities. In 2006, despite a significant
decline in workforce that began in 2002,
the financial situation of coinage and
medallion management remained criti-
cal.
In 2007, new governance was
rapidly established and a strategic plan
was defined and validated by the board
of directors in less than one year.
A system of voluntary departures
helped accelerate the workforce reduc-
tion, while simultaneously engaging in a
renewal of personnel on targeted func-
tions.
Five years after the change of status,
the results are encouraging. The staff
are now better suited to the company’s
transformation, and the social climate is
better.
Turnover has increased by over 50%
in five years. The payroll has stabilised
and now represents 20% of turnover.
These results allowed for the first
time in 2009 payment of a dividend of
8.3 million to the State. The dynamic
was confirmed in 2010, with a payment
of
12.2 million and
9 million in 2011.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
74
the economic model of the
Monnaie de Paris remains
fragile.
The company’s fixed costs are still
too high. The effects of reducing the
workforce have in reality been compen-
sated by certain hirings focused on high
levels of responsibility, and therefore
pay. The level of salaries and the average
age of staff consequently remain high
(
3,600 monthly gross on average, and
49.6 years of age).
Similarly, efforts at reorganization
have not been sufficiently extensive.
Support functions are still very high
compared to operational functions.
Finally, the company remains struc-
turally with overcapacity in the produc-
tion of coinage. At the time of changing
over to the Euro, the need for 1 Euro
and 50 cent coins were greatly overesti-
mated, which led Treasury management
to destroy 310  million coins, For the
State, the overall cost of overproduction
of Euro coins may be valued at
41.5 million, or a net cost of
20.5 mil-
lion if the sale of the metal is taken into
account, which should bring in close to
21 million.
Orders from the State (about
850 million coins) are now permanently
lower
than
production
capacities
(1.5 billion coins).
To increase profitability of produc-
tion tools, the activity of minting
foreign common coinage must be deve-
loped. This market is however very
competitive and this activity remains for
the moment at a deficit for the com-
pany.
Ultimately, the current improvement
in the economic situation of the
Monnaie de Paris is mainly related to the
success of face value collector coins
(“gold or silver Euros”). However, it is
based on a “novelty effect” and a “wind-
fall effect” which may disappear.
Other commercial activities of the
institution are being rethought and the
Monnaie de Paris should consider stop-
ping some.
A new mission of enhancing
assets with uncertain impact
Since it was created, the public insti-
tution has been entrusted by the law
with a mission of enhancing the Hôtel
de la Monnaie, from which the
Metalmorphosis project arose.
All the Paris property was however
deprived of the Year IV Plot, two years
after the change in status, while it was
useful for operating the company, being
occupied by workshops that were diffi-
cult to move. Its transfer to the Institut
de France to build an auditorium was
decided by the State without studying
the impact and without taking into
account the consequences for the
Monnaie de Paris.
The loss for the institution is
3.6 million on the accounting level, but
it has also suffered major indirect costs
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
La Monnaie de Paris
75
related to the work resulting from
moving the machinery.
In addition, transferring the plot
forced the institution to modify the
Metalmorphosis project, although the
prime contract work had already been
completed.
The institution’s management drawn
on the fact that the decision to transfer
from the Year IV Plot was imposed for
broad leeway in project implementation.
Estimates of economic benefits are
very optimistic; the project must there-
fore have constant attention from the
sponsor (State holdings agency) and the
board of directors.
Finally, with regard of the duty of
presenting its historical collections, the
Monnaie de Paris must strive, with the
support of its leadership, to build part-
nerships to develop its assets better.
With regards to the production
activity:
provide an alternative scenario
intended to deal with the possibility of
a slowdown of the “face value collec-
tion coinage” activity;
undertake, in connection with
the sponsor, an accurate and complete
study to evaluate the relevance of each
commercial activity and consider the
economic and organizational conse-
quences of their potential shutdown.
With regards to the company’s
expenses:
better manage changes in pay;
continue the effort to streamline
support functions;
limit the use of external service
providers by reclaiming strategic
management.
With regards to the task of enhan-
cing asset value:
review
and
update
the
Metalmorphosis project business plan;
develop partnerships, especially
with the Cité de l’économie et de la
monnaie, to better present historical
collections.
Recommendations
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
La Monnaie de Paris
76
Court of Accounts
27
the Heritage Foundation:
a unique model
Instituted
by
the
Law
of
July 2, 1996, and recognized as of public
utility by the Decree of April 18, 1997,
the Heritage Foundation received the
public service mission to contribute to
the conservation and enhancement of
unprotected national heritage. This heri-
tage, whose elements do not benefit
from a system of classification or regis-
tration
as
historical
monuments,
consists of several hundred thousand
movable and immovable assets that pre-
sent an architectural, memorial or land-
scape interest (traditional housing, wash
houses,
halls,
bread
ovens,
rural
churches, etc.).
A beneficiary foundation of
major public
supports
Fifteen large companies participated
initially in constituting the capital of the
Heritage Foundation. They are still all
represented on its board of directors
where they hold a majority of votes.
The Foundation today has about
32 million of annual resources, inclu-
ding public financial supports which
represent, depending on the years, bet-
ween 35 and 50% of its budget. For the
2000-2011
period,
the
Heritage
Foundation assisted over 18,000  pro-
jects of varying sizes (14,000 among
them under private heritage and close to
4,000 of public heritage).
After a slow and difficult start, the
Foundation has experienced growth
from the year 2000 when it was authori-
zed by the tax authorities to grant the
“Heritage Foundation” label. The year
2004 marked a new step thanks to the
decision to allocate it a share of the
State’s property revenues from eschea-
ted estates. During the 2006-2010
period which brought the Court’s audit,
the Foundation was rapidly expanding.
In just four years, its revenues increased
by 80%.
The Heritage Foundation is a
unique organization, irreducible to any
known legal category: a private organi-
zation directly allocating tax rulings, a
foundation benefiting from the State’s
property revenues, a foundation whose
mission and operation was not establi-
shed by its founders but by law, a foun-
dation with a status exempted from the
foundation law.
For the legislator, the Foundation’s
original objective was to boost private
initiatives and funding in favour of non-
protected heritage so they would com-
plement the rather feeble public action
and credits in this area. For this purpose,
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
77
the Foundation has been granted some
unusual rights for a private institution of
this type, such as the ability to trigger, by
award of the “Heritage Foundation”
label, tax reductions or even by way of
waiver from the status of recognized
public utility foundations, the possibility
offered to individuals or legal entities of
direct membership.
Despite such a unique and privile-
ged situation, it is clear that the Heritage
Foundation has not been able to raise
significant funding from companies.
Yet, to accomplish its mission in favour
of non-protected heritage, it has taken
advantage of many powers and skilfully
combines public funding, tax incentives
and initiatives by individuals.
However it is a result of the legal
system in which the Foundation ope-
rates that the public expenditure asso-
ciated with its various actions remains
poorly understood in its amount and
difficult to read in its signs. What is even
more questionable, considering that this
budgetary and fiscal effort is much more
significant than originally envisaged by
the legislator at the beginning: property
revenues allocated, annual subsidies
from local authorities, tax expenditures
related to the “Heritage Foundation”
label and gifts.
Broad support for
volunteering
The Foundation’s activity is now
based on significant support of public
grants, not originally planned. In addi-
tion, the Heritage Foundation’s develop-
ment has been at the expense of a reo-
rientation of its activities compared to
the perspectives outlined by the legisla-
tor. It does not rely on a vast network of
individual members or on major natio-
nal partnerships, it draws little on corpo-
rate sponsorship, it does not manage
any renovation projects as contracting
authority.
The Foundation managed however
to find other avenues for developing its
actions, in particular through a commu-
nity of very active volunteers and laun-
ching of local public subscriptions to
finance its largest projects.
The Heritage Foundation has there-
fore met the objectives of its mission,
within the extent of its resources, accor-
ding to its original conditions for action
and within satisfactory management
conditions.
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the
Court of Accounts
the Heritage Foundation
78
For the Ministry of Culture and
the Ministry of the Budget:
annually inform Parliament of
the amount of revenues allocated to
the Foundation and its use;
institute a mechanism capping
this revenue;
begin a dialog with the Heritage
Foundation on its objectives and
actions to integrate with the national
heritage policy;
strengthen the consistency bet-
ween the general heritage protection
policy and the tool that the represents
the label.
For the Heritage Foundation:
strengthen headquarters’ control
on regional delegations in financial
matters;
develop further private resources
that are less used to date: corporate
sponsorship, relaunch of the member-
ship arrangement;
apply all obligations relating to
appealing on public generosity, in the
framework of “popular patronage”
subscriptions.
Recommendations
Summaries
of the Annual Public Report by the Court of Accounts
the Heritage Foundation
79