C
our des
C
omptes
The labour market:
faced with a high level of unemployment,
policies need to be better targeted
g
Important Notice
Summary
of the
Public Thematic Report
T
he present summary is intended to facilitate the
understanding and use of the report produced by
the Cour des Comptes.The Cour des Comptes shall
only be bound by the report itself.
The responses of the administrations and bodies
concerned are published in the wake of the report.
January 2013
Contents
3
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
Introduction
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
1
the dualism of the labour market exacerbated by
the crisis
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
2
unemployment benefit funding which
is difficult to maintain
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
3
systems that are less than efficient with regards to the rise
in unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
4
policies that are not targeted enough towards populations
in need
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
5
A complex and insufficiently coordinated representative
public governance system
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
General conclusion
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Recommendations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
Introduction
5
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
T
he outbreak of the crisis in summer 2007 and its effects on the economy
which were felt as of late 2008 resulted in a significant increase in unem-
ployment in our country, causing it to rise from 7.4% at the end of 2007 to 10.6%
in December 2012, its highest level in two decades. In an economic climate that does
not offer any short-term indication of a return to sufficient levels of growth to bring
about a net creation of jobs, the French economy will more than likely have to deal
with a higher than average level of unemployment over the coming years.
In the light of this situation, public policy is no longer passive and a large num-
ber of initiatives have been undertaken. However, having failed to take into account
all the changes that have occurred in the labour market, these have had limited effect
and have been unsuccessful in halting the increase in unemployment. Such policies are
now double-bound by an economic context which has increased the need for interven-
tion and a public finance situation which has limited the means available for such
intervention.
Drawing on surveys carried out over the past two years, the Cour has focused its
analysis on ‘policies designed to boost the labour market’. This notion, developed by
Eurostat as of 1996, relates to ‘public intervention in the labour market aimed at
facilitating the smooth running of the market itself and correcting imbalances, and
which can be distinguished from other more general labour policy interventions inso-
far as they are selective in encouraging specific groups within the labour market’. Such
policies are therefore characterised by their targeting of unemployed citizens registered
with the public employment service, as well as other groups experiencing difficulty
accessing or staying in the labour market. Having said that, they are not part of the
more general measures taken, such as social contribution exemptions and reductions,
or even measures relating to employment law. In this respect, they represent a total
annual expenditure of over €50 billion, or 2.5 GDP points.
In continuation of the present summary, the Cour would suggest that the poli-
cies designed to boost the labour market be redirected, thus allowing for better alloca-
tion of the means available to those job-seekers and employees that have been left most
vulnerable by the crisis.
The main conclusions reached by the Cour are outlined in the five chapters of
the report:
- despite the various measures implemented since 2008, unemployment levels
have deteriorated more in France than in various other European countries, with
those members of the working population that are the most vulnerable appearing to
be the main victims of the crisis;
- unemployment insurance implements various protective compensation rules,
but it would appear difficult to sustain its financial development over a period of very
poor growth;
- certain systems designed to deal with the deterioration of the employment
situation, such as short-time working and assisted contracts, are not as efficient as they
need to be;
- the targeting of systems designed to improve access to employment or help those
who needed it most to stay in employment has been less than satisfactory;
- the measures taken to deal with the issue of having multiple players involved
in labour and professional training policy have not achieved the desired effects.
g
Introduction
7
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des comptes
1
The dualism of the labour market
exacerbated by the crisis
Whilst economic activity has resis-
ted the crisis somewhat better in France
than in the average OECD country, and
labour market policy has played quite a
major role in this, the increase in unem-
ployment in our country since 2009 has
been more significant than that expe-
rienced by some of our neighbours, and
Germany in particular.
Source: OECD
The dualism of the labour market
exacerbated by the crisis
8
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
A more in-depth analysis showed
that the deterioration of the employ-
ment situation has not affected the
entire working population in the same
way. Indeed, the more vulnerable seg-
ments of the population, – including
those in precarious jobs, young people,
low-skilled workers and those employed
in small businesses, – were the most
heavily affected.
This situation is a result of two spe-
cific features of the reaction on the part
of the French labour market since 2009:
- firstly, employers have adapted to
the decline in activity by reducing work-
force numbers (external flexibility)
rather than the number of hours wor-
ked (internal flexibility). In this respect,
France differs greatly from Germany
and certain other European countries
which have managed to limit the
increase in unemployment during the
crisis by appealing for internal flexibility
mechanisms, notably short-time wor-
king, to be adopted;
Source: OECD
The dualism of the labour market
exacerbated by the crisis
9
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
- secondly, the significant decline in
the situation of the most precarious
employees since 2009 has accentuated
the ‘ dualism of the labour market’,
comprising, on the one hand, relatively
protected workers whose jobs are relati-
vely stable, and on the other, more vul-
nerable workers whose jobs are tempo-
rary and who often have no choice but
to travel around for work.
The comparison with the crisis of
1993 illustrates this progression - whe-
reas in 1993 economic redundancies had
been the primary means of adjustment,
in 2008, mass reductions in the number
of precarious positions (temporary wor-
kers and those on fixed-term contracts)
bore the brunt of the effects of the cri-
sis, since these types of positions had
become far more common since the late
1990s. These changes in the labour mar-
ket were brought about before the ins-
truments of labour and professional
training policy had even been adapted to
reflect this new situation.
11
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des comptes
2
Unemployment benefit funding
which is difficult to maintain
Unemployment benefit plays an
essential role when it comes to labour
market policy instruments since it helps
maintain
consumption
levels
and
reduces the effects of economic ebbs
and flows by providing those without
employment
with
a
replacement
income. The rules governing the alloca-
tion of such benefits also help encou-
rage job-seekers to get back into the
workplace.
The financial situation regarding
unemployment insurance has greatly
deteriorated over the past few years;
indeed, the 2009 convention introduced
a regime that is distinctly more protec-
tive than those of other countries.
Furthermore, the sustainability of the
regime is now being questioned by a
consistently high level of unemploy-
ment.
Better unemployment insu-
rance cover than in other
countries
France tackled the crisis with a new
unemployment insurance convention,
signed in early 2009, which had been
negotiated over the course of the pre-
vious year and was primarily designed to
encourage better cover for the unem-
ployed, particularly those in more preca-
rious situations. The convention resul-
ted in the extension of the conditions
governing access to benefits. Whilst
under the previous system the minimum
period of work required in order to qua-
lify for benefit payments was 6 months
over the course of a 22-month base
period, the new convention reduced the
minimum period to 4 months over the
course of a 28-month base period.
The French unemployment benefit
system has certain features which could
result in it being considered protective
in relation to the systems in place in
other countries:
- it is more accessible than in most
European countries due to its short
minimum contribution period and its
rather long base period. Whilst benefit
payments in France, for example, are
available to employees who have worked
for at least 4 months over a period of 28
months, in Germany and Italy they are
only available to those who have worked
for 12 months over a period of
24 months;
Unemployment benefit funding
which is difficult to maintain
12
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
______________
(1) Relationship between the benefits paid out by unemployment insurance and the
previous employment income.
(2) Net replacement rate incorporating social and fiscal deductions as well as additional
social benefits (including housing allowance).
Net replacement rate depending on reference salary
(2)
Net replacement rates including additional social benefits, including housing allowance
for a single job-seeker with no dependants
Source: OECD tax-benefits calculator, Cour des Comptes calculations
- the level of benefits offered, mea-
sured in terms of the ‘replacement
rate ‘
(1)
, is rather high: close to the
European average, it is nevertheless
higher than in other countries for
employees at either end of the income
scale - those on the highest incomes and
those on the lowest incomes;
Unemployment benefit funding
which is difficult to maintain
13
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
- it offers a long maximum benefit
period (24 months as opposed to
12 months in Germany, 10 months in
Sweden and 8 months in Italy), but is
reserved for employees in more stable
positions, that is those that have worked
for longer periods of time.
An unemployment insu-
rance system facing crisis
The unemployment insurance sys-
tem was weakened by the crisis:
- it now offers a reduced rate of
coverage (the rate of coverage relates to
the number of people in receipt of
benefits divided by the total number of
job-seekers) decreased from 48.5% in
2009 to 44.8 % in 2011, notably due to a
high proportion of job-seekers reaching
the end of their benefit qualification
period;
- its nature has been affected by the
strong development of the benefit sys-
tem and has moved towards a ‘reduced
working hours’ approach which enables
recipients to concurrently work part-
time or on a fixed-term contract and
receive benefit payments. This system
affected 45% of beneficiaries in 2011
and brought about a fear that certain
companies might incorporate this situa-
tion into their management methods,
using benefit payments as a means of
paying those employees in the most vul-
nerable positions;
- its links with solidarity schemes
(allocation of specific forms of social
welfare benefits, such as the RSA) have
become complex and have resulted in
failures in the way certain job-seekers
are treated;
- finally, its financial situation has
greatly deteriorated since 2009. The
debt of the unemployment insurance
system could well increase from
€
9 bn
in 2010 to
€
18.5bn in 2013, that is nearly
one GDP point. This development is
notably linked to the persistent aggrava-
tion of the benefit system by temporary
workers in the entertainment industry
(Appendices 8 and 10 of the unemploy-
ment insurance convention), the annual
shortfall of which stands at
€
1bn and
benefits only 3 % of job-seekers.
15
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des comptes
3
Systems that are less than
efficient with regards to the
rise in unemployment
France dealt with the crisis using
various labour policy instruments that
were sometimes obsolete and failed to
be as effective as was hoped. This was
particularly true with regards to short-
time working and assisted contracts.
The insufficient implemen-
tation of short-time wor-
king practices
Having become quasi-obsolete by
the start of the 21
st
Century, there was
an attempt to reform the situation with
a return to the short-time working sys-
tem, which enables an establishment to
temporarily reduce its working hours to
below the legal working period in order
to avoid having to make economic
redundancies, in the wake of the crisis.
The modernisation of the system resul-
ted in the creation of a new, more
favourable short-time working system in
2009 that was known as APLD (‘long-
term short-time working). This new sys-
tem operates alongside the old one and
has not replaced it.
The changes made to the short-time
working benefit system did not succeed
in ensuring that the system was put to
best use during the crisis; in fact, the use
made of the system was far below that
observed in Germany, for example
(250,000 employees affected in France
in 2009 as opposed to 1.5 million in
Germany over the course of the same
year).
This poor uptake of the short-time
working system is the result of a combi-
nation of factors:
- the modernisation of the system
came too late with regards to the dyna-
mics of the economic context; in parti-
cular, it was not possible to implement
the APLD system until the 3
rd
quarter
of 2009, once the height of the crisis
had already passed and companies were
already demonstrating less of a need to
resort to short-time working practices;
- persistent difficulties were expe-
rienced in the implementation of the
system, notably due to its complexity;
- the financial nature of the short-
time working system was less than
attractive to companies. In this respect,
the outstanding amount payable by the
employer in the framework of the
short-time working system is notably
higher in France than in other countries,
standing at around 30% of the cost of
the employee’s previous salary as oppo-
sed to 15% in Germany (excluding any
potential contractual provisions).
Systems that are less than efficient with regards
to the rise in unemployment
16
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
Persistent resorting to inef-
ficient assisted contracts
The conditions surrounding the
implementation of assisted contracts,
which are more widely-used in France
than in other European countries, where
they have all but disappeared, have not
been conducive to obtaining satisfactory
results in terms of long-term integra-
tion in the labour market. This is parti-
cularly noticeable in the case of assisted
contracts in the non-commercial sector,
where less than half result in integration
and where certain assessments show
that they can even reduce the indivi-
dual’s chances of later securing perma-
nent employment in some cases. There
are several reasons for these mediocre
results, including inadequate targeting,
very short contract durations and insuf-
ficient support and training for benefi-
ciaries.
17
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des comptes
4
Policies that are not targeted
enough towards populations
in need
The difficulties relating to the targe-
ting of labour and professional training
policy systems are not a new phenome-
non; indeed, professional training initia-
tives struggle to reach those that need
them the most. The same was true of
the reliance upon professional training
contracts and outplacement schemes in
the wake of the crisis.
An imbalance in professio-
nal training initiatives
Professional training in France
attracts a considerable amount of fun-
ding, totalling over
€
31bn, that is 1.6%
of the GDP, nearly half of which is
accounted for in benefit payments for
trainees. This initiative does, however,
benefit various segments of the popula-
tion in very different ways and to diffe-
rent extents. It also tends to reproduce,
and even amplify, the inequalities
brought about by the way in which the
labour market works. Indeed, the availa-
ble data suggests that on-going profes-
sional training is more beneficial to bet-
ter-trained employees, whilst it is the
lower-skilled workers that are at the
highest risk of unemployment.
The efforts made with regards to
training are particularly insufficient in
the case of job-seekers, among whom
the level of access to training is dis-
tinctly lower than that of employees
currently in employment. Indeed, accor-
ding to the INSEE’s 2011 employment
survey, the level of access to training
among the unemployed is believed to be
around a third lower than that of those
currently in employment.
Ultimately, the likelihood of benefi-
ting from training in France increases in
accordance with the individual’s initial
qualification and the size of the com-
pany
and
decreases
with
age.
Furthermore, employees currently in
employment benefit to a far greater
extent from training than do job-see-
kers. This inequality in the access to pro-
fessional training questions the ability of
our system to offer training for those
who need it most.
Increased difficulty in tar-
geting schemes in the wake
of the crisis
The rise in unemployment has resul-
ted in increasing competition when it
comes to accessing the various systems
in place, which has in turn had an affect
on the profile of their beneficiaries, drif-
ting sometimes significantly from the
Policies that are not targeted enough towards
populations in need
18
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
original target audience. Such problems
have been observed at all levels of
labour policy, with regards to both inte-
gration and reintegration into the labour
market.
Indeed, assisted contracts and pro-
fessional training contracts, that is
employment contracts that incorporate
a sandwich training course, have not
been targeted enough at those with
fewer qualifications, contrary to the
objectives sought by the government
and social partners. With regards to pro-
fessional training contracts, the propor-
tion of less qualified citizens among
beneficiaries of this initiative was in
constant decline between 2009 and
2011, whereas that of higher education
graduates increased by 60% over the
same period.
Indeed, certain job-seeker outplace-
ment schemes showed the same lack of
targeting. Consequently, professional
transition contracts (CTPs) and perso-
nal outplacement agreements (CRPs)
made provision for offering employees
who had been made redundant for eco-
nomic reasons an increased benefit pay-
ment and improved access to training.
These schemes (which were merged into
a single system, the CSP (‘professional
support contract’), in 2011), required
significant means that were mobilised to
help the population concerned, despite
the fact that there was no guarantee that
all of its members were in a position
that fully justified these specific efforts.
Indeed, not all of those made redundant
for economic reasons are necessarily the
most vulnerable in terms of the labour
market. It is sometimes the case with
employment protection plans (PSE),
particularly those involving a voluntary
aspect, which is common in large com-
panies, that a significant proportion of
those made redundant have qualifica-
tions and experience which make it no
more difficult to outplace them than the
average job-seeker. Conversely, those
employees coming to the end of their
fixed-term contracts or temporary pla-
cements will include a number of low-
skilled workers for whom access to a
scheme such as the CSP (‘professional
support contract’) would be useful and
justified but who cannot benefit from
such schemes due to the current state of
the legislation.
19
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
Cour des comptes
5
A complex and insufficiently
coordinated representative
public governance system
The number of players involved in
labour and professional training policy
is particularly significant. Initiatives led
by the State, regional authorities, social
partners and their various agencies (such
as the
Pôle Emploi
job centre service,
the OPCA, etc.) all operate concurrently
without any real coordination.
A large number of players
Whilst the State plays a decisive role
in driving labour policy, ongoing profes-
sional training policy is determined by
social partners, in conjunction with the
extended powers the regions have at
their disposal and the rights held by the
State in this domain. This overlapping
of powers results in the increase of
control and coordination structures
relating to the issues of employment
and professional training at local level.
The
Pôle Emploi
regional directorate in
Ile-de-France, for example, revealed that
it was part of 13 coordinating bodies of
this kind.
This proliferation of policy centres
certainly does not make it easy to intro-
duce policies aimed specifically at the
labour market, which would require a
certain unity with regards to the mana-
gement of the various players involved.
Current reflection on decentralisation
must take into account the need to dras-
tically simplify this complex system so
as to make way for both tighter gover-
nance and the necessary involvement of
players in the process.
The social investment fund:
an incomplete
attempt at coordinating the
State and the social part-
ners
The creation of a social investment
fund (FISO) was announced at the
social summit held on 18 February 2009
and was designed ‘to coordinate efforts
to boost employment and professional
training
by
consolidating
various
sources of funding from both the State
and social partners, with each maintai-
ning full responsibility for their own
funding’.
This system failed to produce the
desired results. The equality of funding
between the State and social partners
that was originally announced was never
reached, the FISO having instead prima-
rily served as means of ‘labelling’ finan-
cial resources allocated to employment
as part of the 2009-2010 French econo-
A complex and insufficiently coordinated
representative public governance system
20
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
mic recovery plan. The existence of the
FISO steering committee, which was
intended to enable representatives of
the State and of the relevant social part-
ners to monitor the way in which these
funds were used, was very fleeting and
the committee ceased to meet after little
more than a year after it was introduced.
Although the coordination resulting
from the creation of the FISO was
more effective at local level than at
national level, this system ultimately had
a very limited impact and appears to be
something of an incomplete attempt at
better structuring the means at the dis-
posal of social partners and of the State.
The
Fonds Paritaire de
Sécurisation des Parcours
Professionnels
(‘Joint
Career Security Fund’,
FPSPP):
ambitious plans but still
some operational flaws
The FPSPP was born as a result of
the national inter-professional agree-
ment of 7 January 2009 and the law of
24 November 2009 and represents a
major institutional innovation in the
field of ongoing professional training.
Its ambitious plans include the follo-
wing:
- to better target professional trai-
ning towards less qualified or more vul-
nerable employees and job-seekers with
a view to making professional training a
means of securing their professional
pathways ;
- to make the entire professional
training funding system more transpa-
rent;
- to encourage joint funding bet-
ween the State, social partners and
regional authorities.
The results have failed to reach ini-
tial expectations:
- with regards to co-funded initia-
tives, the imbalance between commit-
ments, payments and certified achieve-
ments underlines the fragile nature of
the system, the limited absorption capa-
city of project sponsor and the malad-
justment of the control system; clearly,
the contribution of ESF credits brought
about the need to introduce a series of
very strict control procedures which lar-
gely
exceeded
the
administrative
resources of the FPSPP, resulting in
significant difficulties in terms of pro-
ject management;
- the absence of regional authorities
in calls for proposals, despite the fact
that the law permits this possibility, limi-
ted the resources available to the FPSPP
for the purposes of achieving the ambi-
tious objectives it had been set.
Conclusion
21
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
T
h
e present report highlights the weaknesses of the French contingency plan for the
labour market, many of which are long-standing, and which were underlined by
the crisis that broke out in 2008. Consequently, despite the various reforms that have
taken place over the past few years, this system is still very poorly adapted to a context of
consistently high unemployment.
The Cour would like to draw the attention of all of the players concerned, namely the
State, regional authorities and social partners, to the need for change in the way labour
market policy is made. Given the unprecedented nature of the situation, traditional solu-
tions are no longer appropriate and changes need to made with regards to both the systems
themselves and the way in which they are managed by the various players involved in
labour and professional training policy.
With this in mind, the recommendations of the Cour are intended to improve the
‘resilience’ of the labour market in order to limit the economic and social cost of the cur-
rent crisis as much as possible.
g
Recommendations
22
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
With regards to the unemploy-
ment insurance system:
–
to review all of the factors that
would enable the financial situation of
the unemployment insurance system
to be re-evaluated, paying particular
attention to the following aspects:
- reviewing the benefit rules of
Appendices 8 and 10 with a view to
significantly reducing the system’s defi-
cit, notably by distinguishing the rules
applicable to stage technicians from
those that apply to artists;
- replacing the current flat contri-
bution rate with an increased rate for
those on limited-term contracts, thus
increasing the contributions payable by
those employers who use these types
of contract (fixed-term and tempo-
rary) the most;
- introducing a diminishing unem-
ployment insurance benefit replace-
ment rate for the highest levels of
benefit payments, as is the case in most
European countries.
–
to increase incentives to return
to work:
- encouraging geographical mobi-
lity or a reduction in salary in the event
that this is a key factor in the indivi-
dual’s re-entering the workplace;
- withdrawing the different forms
of outplacement support offered,
given the limited number of beneficia-
ries and the need to limit the number
of systems designed to achieve similar
objectives;
- re-examining the benefit rules
applicable to those working short-time
hours;
- simplifying the systems designed
to encourage people to return to work
(employment bonus, earned income
supplement, active employment) and
striving to achieve a better balance bet-
ween the financial value of such incen-
tives and the unemployment insurance
benefit replacement rate at around the
minimum wage.
–
to assess the effects of restructu-
ring the unemployment benefits sys-
tem to simultaneously incorporate a
platform based on social welfare and a
level devoted to unemployment insu-
rance. This assessment should focus
on the financial consequences of such
restructuring and the ways in which it
might be used to support faster outpla-
cement.
–
To improve coherence among
the benefits paid to job-seekers:
- improving the links between the
benefits paid out by unemployment
insurance and social welfare benefits
(allocation of specific forms of social
welfare benefits and basic earned
income supplement) and optimising
the exchange of physico-financial
information between the
Pôle Emploi
,
UNEDIC and the State’s employment
departments in order to achieve this;
- simplifying the welfare benefits
paid to job-seekers with a view to
more accurately taking into account
the situations of those who do not
currently have access to any form the-
reof.
Recommendations
23
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
With regards to short-time wor-
king
:
–
to merge the two systems which
currently co-exist (long-term part-time
employment and ‘traditional’ short-
time working);
–
in the wake of such simplifica-
tion, to re-examine the suitability of
the economic balance of the French
short-time working system, which is
currently
more
favourable
to
employees and less appealing to
employers than it is in other countries.
With regards to the general features
of assisted contracts
:
–
to review the balance between
contracts in the commercial sector and
those in the non-commercial sector in
favour of the former, except in the
event
that
the
non-commercial
contract in question is designed to pave
the way for integration at a later date;
–
to reserve access to assisted
contracts exclusively to beneficiaries
who cannot be directed towards sys-
tems which appear to have better-foun-
ded success.
With regards to training for job-
seekers
:
–
to reflect upon the way in which
training requirements are organised
and the support provided for job-see-
kers entering training: drawing on the
expertise of specialist advisers and
structuring short and long-term trai-
ning towards qualification without
losing sight of the job in question ;
–
to direct the
Pôle Emploi
profes-
sional training offering towards priority
audiences, as provided for in the State-
Pôle
Emploi-UNEDIC
tripartite
agreement signed in 2011;
–
to offer target audiences a series
of robust, high-performance support
services;
With regards to the targeting of
assisted contracts
:
–
to reserve contracts for those
with a low initial level of qualification
in order to avoid a situation whereby
better-trained individuals who could
find other means of accessing the job
market are evicting less qualified
potential beneficiaries;
–
to systematically combine the
execution of a contract with training
that goes beyond merely adjusting the
individual to the position;
–
to adapt the help available to
reflect the quality of the training outli-
ned in the contract;
–
to maintain assisted contracts for
a sufficient period of time (over
1 year), particularly where the benefi-
ciaries in question are audiences that
are distanced from the labour market;
–
in return for this long-term main-
tenance of contracts, to ensure that the
advisor verifies, on a regular basis, that
the employer is fulfilling their obliga-
tions with regards to training and sup-
port;
Recommendations
24
Summary
of the Public Thematic Report produced by the Cour des Comptes
With regards to professional trai-
ning contracts
:
–
to withdraw ineffective lump-
sum amounts paid by the
Pôle Emploi
so as to direct professional training
contracts at those with the fewest qua-
lifications;
–
to implement the Aims and
Means Contracts (COMs) that exist
between the State and the OPCA for
the purposes of directing the funding
they
provide
towards
priority
audiences;
With regards to professional sup-
port contracts
:
–
to determine access to the pro-
fessional support contract not based
on a factor relating to the beneficiary’s
legal status but rather on an assess-
ment of their distance from the labour
market;
–
to incorporate training into a
career plan, combining long and short
training courses which require the
beneficiary to play a significant role in
the development of their own career
plan and constructive collaboration
with the body responsible for suppor-
ting them.
With regards to the capacities of
the various players involved and the
coordination thereof
:
–
to clarify, with regards to the new
stage in the decentralisation process,
the actual powers of the various
regions and other players in the
employment and training sectors by
limiting, wherever possible, situations
in which the powers of a particular
body might be limited by co-funding
or joint decision-making procedures ;
–
to simplify and improve the effi-
ciency of the bodies responsible for
coordinating players at local level by
specifying the prerogatives of the
senior manager responsible for both
professional training and labour policy.
With regards to the
Fonds Paritaire
de
Sécurisation
des
Parcours
Professionnels
(‘Joint Career security
Fund’) and allocating a proportion of
professional training funds to training
job-seekers
:
–
to take the negotiation of the
2013-2015 framework agreement bet-
ween the State and the FPSPP as an
opportunity to encourage the fund to
undertake initiatives that are coordina-
ted with those carried out by the
regions by means of FPSPP-Regional
council agreements, as provided for by
the agreement and the law which led to
the creation of the fund;
–
in light of this same agree-
ment, to re-examine the relevance of
resorting to the European Social Fund
to provide the funding allocated by the
State to the
Fonds Paritaire de
Sécurisation
des
Parcours
Professionnels
;
–
to improve the efficiency and
transparency of the way in which the
fund is managed by putting in place
the necessary procedures to allow the
efficient use of the funds by project
owners to be verified and monitored in
real time.