QUALITY OF SERVICE ON

THE ÎLE-DE-FRANCE

REGIONAL EXPRESS

NETWORK (RER)

Public thematic report

Executive Summary

October 2023

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Executive Summary

The Regional Express Network (RER) has grown steadily since the 1970s, marking a

turning point in transport services in the Île-de-France region. Given the scale of the impact

on passengers, reliability, frequency and passenger information are key issues for this

network.

The five RER lines are operated by SNCF Voyageurs and RATP, on a shared basis for

lines A and B, and entirely by SNCF Voyageurs for lines C, D and E. They are a typical

example of mass transit, particularly lines A and B, which rank first and second in Europe in

terms of ridership, each carrying more than a million passengers a day.

The RER allows very high travel volumes at a relatively low cost to users.

The challenges of service quality on a fragile and saturated network

All the lines present major challenges in terms of ridership (up by around 20 % in

10 years), infrastructure and quality of service. Some are saturated (the capacity of lines B

and D has reached a ceiling, even though their traffic has been increasing by 2 % a year since

2010), and not a week goes by without incidents of some kind affecting the level of service,

causing misunderstandings and exasperation.

The public service contracts signed between Île-de-France Mobilités (IDFM) - the

transport organising authority (AOM) - and the operators of the RER lines include various

performance objectives (punctuality, regularity, information, reception, accessibility,

cleanliness, availability of equipment, passenger satisfaction, etc.) aimed at guaranteeing the

smooth running of the network and providing passengers with a quality service. These

objectives are accompanied by financial “bonus

-

malus” mechanism which, in the latest

generation of contracts, constitutes a more significant variable part of operator compensation,

the amount of which influences their results.

RER service quality, a key factor in modal shift and the decarbonisation of

transport in the Paris region

Quality of service on public transport is a major factor in encouraging people to switch

to more energy-efficient modes of transport. The first benefit of this modal shift is a reduction

in greenhouse gas emissions. With its 603 km of lines, the RER is therefore a key factor in the

success of the overall trajectory towards more energy-efficient passenger transport, to which

the 200 km of lines of the Greater Paris Express should also contribute.

Shifting car use to the RER and public transport is also beneficial in terms of public

health issues, particularly air pollution. This pollution, for which road traffic is partly

responsible, is estimated to have caused more than 5,000 premature deaths and more than

three million lost working days in the Île-de-France region in 2015. Its impact on health was

estimated at nearly €8 billion in 2015, or 1

% of the Paris Region’s GDP

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.

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Île-de-France Atmosphere Protection Plan 2018-2025 DRIEAT.

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The criteria for taking user opinion into account would benefit from being

reviewed

As well as performance targets, the contracts provide for passenger satisfaction surveys

to be carried out each year. A

bonus-malus

budget is attached to these and paid out according

to the score obtained. The budgets have been significantly increased in the latest generation

of contracts. For several years now, surveys have shown consistently favourable feedback for

the five RER lines, with between 74 % and 86 % of passengers declaring themselves satisfied.

The financial authorities wanted to carry out their own survey to compare these figures.

They organised a survey of a sample of 4,000 regular Navigo pass holders, and then carried

out qualitative analyses in focus groups made up of daily passengers on each RER line. The

results showed lower levels of satisfaction. The main drivers of customer satisfaction were

regularity (20 %), information (26 %), cleanliness (19 %) and safety (16 %).

The weighting of criteria used in the IDFM perception survey should be adjusted, as

punctuality and, even more so, confidence in the overall reliability of the network, are the

overriding criteria for users and should be the focus of efforts to encourage modal shift and

contribute to the decarbonisation of transport.

Alternative indicator proposal

Source: Court of Accounts

Unsatisfactory performance and controls to be stepped up

With the exception of line A, which has benefited from comprehensive investment (rolling

stock, infrastructure, coordination tools and automatic operation), the punctuality of the lines

remains below the former targets. The punctuality of portions of lines or routes, which is often

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much lower than the punctuality of entire lines, is a better reflection of the delays experienced.

Lines B and D, which combine heavy traffic, mediocre punctuality rates and a foreseeable

increase in ridership, are the most worrying.

Change in passenger punctuality on entire RER lines from 2008 to 2022

Source: IDFM - RER line punctuality data

Aside from punctuality, quality of service performance continues to vary from line to line

and operator to operator. Cleanliness, passenger information and accessibility are improving,

often as a result of investments made. For operators, this generates financial bonuses that

compensate for punctuality penalties.

There is little precise information regarding ridership. The contractual reports submitted

to IDFM do not provide it with all the information it needs to effectively manage the contracts

and plan investments. IDFM is encouraged to step up its control of operators, as part of a

genuine audit strategy and contract preparation. IDFM could also publish an annual report

setting out the performance of each line in relation to its own specific challenges, in particular

its ridership. As for the operators, they should provide IDFM with operating and ticketing data

in real time, as well as data relating to investments with a sufficient degree of precision.

New incentive arrangements presented as more attractive, but with

limited impact on service quality

Since 2020, IDFM has succeeded in obtaining numerous changes to the contracts,

which are now more precise and include more indicators. Most targets have been raised, with

the notable exception of punctuality. The

bonus-malus

ceilings have quadrupled. Financial

penalties (corresponding to the reduction in compensation when the scheduled train is

cancelled), are now wholly or partly without an initial threshold or upper limit. However,

calculated on the basis of unit amounts three times lower than in the previous contract (on the

basis of audits), they are less of an incentive than before.

Assessing the effects of these contractual changes is difficult at this stage. Punctuality

has improved for all lines, in 2021 and to a lesser extent in 2022 (where it is down on the

previous year), but the exceptional context of lower ridership following the health crisis and

the development of remote working is favourable (average RER ridership in 2022 was 27 %

lower than in 2019). It has also led to an improvement in other service quality indicators,

including those derived from satisfaction surveys.

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As a result of both the post-crisis context and the new contractual terms and conditions,

SNCF’s service quality

bonus-malus

amounts were higher in 2021 than at any time since

2012, and financial penalties for planned kilometres not travelled were lower. In addition, the

financial results obtained by the operators for punctuality or quality in 2021, and to a lesser

extent in 2022, are more favourable to the operators than they would have been under the old

contract. Moreover, to correct the impact of this result, IDFM and SNCF signed an amendment

at the end of December 2022, agreeing to increase certain targets and return €180 million to

IDFM as a “commercial gesture”. In return, the contract with SNCF was extended until 2025.

Despite the quadrupling of their maximum amount, the new bonus-malus linked to

punctuality and quality have an uncertain, or at best limited, effect on the level of service

quality. The levers for improving service quality lie elsewhere, mainly in investment and in

coordinating the players involved.

Efforts to renew rolling stock but late and insufficient investment in

infrastructure

Joint investment in rolling stock, infrastructure and operating systems is a prerequisite

for sustainable improvements in punctuality.

This proactive and costly approach, which raises the question of how it will be financed,

has led to the progress seen on line A. On the other hand, lines B and D, for example, have

ageing rolling stock - line B still runs single-deck trains introduced in the 1980s - and will not

see the effects of the planned investment until the end of the 2020s. The report identifies

shortcomings and delays, analysing the model case of the NExTEO system, which should

make it possible to increase throughput in the tunnel shared by these two lines between

Châtelet and Gare du Nord and partly remedy a major source of problems on lines B and D.

It also appears that IDFM has few levers for action with regard to existing infrastructures,

their maintenance and, in the case of SNCF, their renewal, which appear to be insufficient

overall. Some catenary systems, for example, are almost a hundred years old.

In addition, work on infrastructure, which is certainly essential but likely to cause major

disruption to users, is an issue whose importance should be better taken into account. IDFM

is attentive to the alternative transport solutions offered to users during works. In practice,

however, it has only limited control over the prioritisation, scheduling and conditions under

which these works are carried out. In particular, incentives should be created to ensure that

deadlines are met.

It appears necessary to establish a contractual link between IDFM and SNCF Réseau,

which manages the national rail network and, as such, is responsible for the reliability of a

large part of the network on which RER trains run. A form of financial incentive, based on

specific performance indicators and a bonus-malus mechanism, already exists for RATP, as

infrastructure manager, as well as in regions other than Île-de-France with SNCF Réseau

itself. Such an approach should also apply to SNCF Gares & Connexions.

Organisation of the busiest lines not conducive to a high-quality strategy

While the operators are taking steps to encourage quality of service and to train their

teams in the challenges of mass transit, the joint organisation of the operation of the most

problematic lines is much more laborious, at the crossroads of two sets of regulations, two

cultures and two sets of expertise. For example, the difficulties experienced for several years

by SNCF and RATP in reaching agreement on the location of the single command centre for

lines B and D are unacceptable. The Court recommends that a solution for establishing this

centre be found as soon as possible.

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The current organisation of lines shared between operators is inadequate. It is too

complex, even confusing, and dilutes responsibilities. A new organisation, adapted to a line-

based approach, is necessary, without waiting for the opening up to competition in 2040.