2017
ANNUAL PUBLIC
REPORT
Observations
Summaries
g
DISCLAIMER
These summaries are intended to facilitate the understanding
and use of the report produced by the Cour des comptes.
Only the original report is legally binding on the Cour des
comptes.
The responses of the administrations and government authori-
ties concerned appear after the report.
The order of the summaries corresponds to the order of the
chapters of the report.
3
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Introduction
The Cour des Comptes annual report, first made public in 1832, is one of the
main methods used to publish the work done by the Cour des Comptes and its
regional and territorial chambers of accounts, and the lessons to be learned from
that work. The 2017 report covers an extremely large proportion of Government
work and players, identifying progress and successes and the risks that need to
be managed to ensure that work becomes more effective and efficient.
The
2017 Annual Public Report
is published in two volumes:
-
volume I
sets out the observations and recommendations made as a result of
a set of audits and investigations undertaken in 2016 by the Cour des Comptes
and its regional and territorial chambers of accounts;
-
volume II
sets out the organisation and duties of the financial jurisdictions, the
results of their work and in particular how administrations, local authorities and
other audited bodies have followed up the observations and recommendations
made in previous years.
The annual report of the Court of Financial and Budgetary Discipline is appended
to the two volumes.
This booklet presents the summaries of the 17 reports contained in volume I
(Observations).
The 17 summaries are organised by topic:
- part one:
public finances
(1);
- part two:
public policies
(11);
- part three:
public management
(5).
5
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Summary
Observations
Part one - Public Finances
Overview of public finances (at end January 2017)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
Part two - Public Policies
Chapter I - Employment and solidarity
1.
Amicable compensation of the victims for medical accidents:
a misguided implementation, a mandatory overhaul
. . . . . . . . .
19
2.
The
Ordre national des chirurgiens-dentistes
(College of Dental
Surgeons) - rediscovering the meaning of public service
. . . . . . . . . .
23
3.
Continuous employee training: a policy for identifying
and fighting against fraud
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Chapter II - Energy, Sustainable Development and Transport
1.
Heavy goods vehicle ecotax: a strategic failure and costly
abandonment .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
2.
Urban parking - the missing link in mobility policies
. . . . . . . . . .
34
3.
Household waste recycling in Île-de-France: missed targets . . 37
4.
The Amétyst waste treatment plant in Montpellier:
a gamble on a complex industrial process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Chapter III - Education, Universities
1.
The Paris-Saclay Project: major ambition at risk of dilution . . . 49
2.
France Business School: failed merger
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
Chapitre IV - Territories
1.
The municipality of Levallois-Perret and its districts:
complicated, unclear management
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59
2.
Local governments in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region
and the performing arts: dynamic policies, tight finances
and a need for stricter management
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61
6
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Summary
Part three
- Public Management
Chapter I - Sovereign Policy Implementation
1.
Replacement of Customs aircraft and vessels: repeated
and costly failures; pooling or resources is required
. . . . . . . . . .
69
2.
Use of mobile police and Gendarmerie Nationale forces:
capacity close to saturation; better management required . . . 72
3.
Social policy at the Interior Ministry: complex organisation;
risks identified; questionable effectiveness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
Chapter II - Project Management
1.
The National Natural History Museum: incomplete change,
an institution weakened by Vincennes Zoo
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
83
2.
Chambers of Agriculture: creating an effective network
. . . . . .
88
Part one
Public Finances
Overview of public finances
(at end January 2017)
9
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
2016 saw a moderate fall in the
public deficit again thanks largely
to a drop in interest rates.
According to the latest Government
forecasts, the fall in the public deficit
that started in 2010 has continued
through
2016
(see
chart
below)
although at a modest level. The re-
sult has been a government budget
balance of -3.3% of GDP (up 0.2%
on 2015) and a structural balance,
neutralising the impact of economic
conditions, of -1.5% of GDP (up 0.3%).
Overview of public finances
(at end January 2017)
Public administration balances 2000-2016 (% of GDP)
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
2000
2004
2006
2007
2008
2012
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
2001
2002
2003
2005
2009
2010
2011
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source : Cour des Comptes based on Insee data to 2015 and Government forecasts
for 2016
10
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The 0.2% deficit reduction forecast
by the Government for 2016 is very
largely the result of lower interest
payments, themselves entirely attri-
butable to the drop in interest rates.
The public debt itself has not fallen. So,
the primary balance (which excludes
interest charges) has gone down very
little. Over 40% of the drop in the
public deficit 2012-2016 is attributable
to the declining cost of interest (see
chart below).
Overview of public finances
(at end January 2017)
Primary balance and interest expenditure as a proportion of improvement
in the public balance (% of GDP)
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
interest expenditure
primary balance
Source : Cour des Comptes based on Insee data to 2015 and Government forecasts for 2016
NB: primary balance is the public balance minus interest expenditure
A more limited slowdown
in public spending in France
since 2010 than in most other
European countries
If we compare France with her European
neighbours we can see how far she is
behind them in the improvement of
her public finances. The headline and
structural balances of most of our
neighbours are in better shape than
those of France.
France’s 2015 public deficit (3.5% of
GDP) was higher than that of most of
our European neighbours. Only four
EU Member States had bigger public
deficits: Greece, Spain, Portugal and
11
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
the UK. The European Commission
estimates that only three countries
(UK, Spain and Belgium) had a struc-
tural deficit equal or greater than
France (2.6% of GDP).
French
public
finances
have
also
worsened since 2010 when 11 EU
Member States had a worse headline
deficit and 7 a higher structural deficit
than France.
France has been slower to cut its defi-
cits than her partners mainly because
spending
has
remained
materially
greater than in other Eurozone and
EU countries (see graph below). Of the
13 countries in the European Union that
have over five million inhabitants, only
Belgium, Sweden and Finland posted
public spending growth above France
2010-2015, but compared to France
their deficits were far lower in 2010.
Overview of public finances
(at end January 2017)
Public spending as a % of GDP, France and the rest of the Eurozone
45
47
49
51
53
55
57
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
France
Eurozone excluding France
% of GDP
7.5%
of GDP difference
between France and the
rest of the Eurozone
10.7%
of GDP difference
between France and the
rest of the Eurozone
Source : Cour des Comptes based on Eurostat data
12
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
A 2017 deficit cutting target
that is more ambitious than
in 2016 - but will be very hard
to achieve
2017 Government plans for cutting the
public deficit (0.6% of GDP, reducing it
to 2.7% of GDP) are more ambitious
than for 2016. This target will be
extremely difficult to achieve.
Estimates of public revenues are opti-
mistic and based on economic growth
forecasts judged rather elevated by the
High Council of Public Finances since
they
assume
‘spontaneous’
growth,
i.e. (and barring changes in legislation)
slightly imprudent assumptions of total
tax revenue.
The deficit forecast takes account of
increased public spending, primarily
on category-specific measures and
higher public administration pay.
Government
spending,
excluding
interest and pensions, will therefore
increase significantly in 2017 (see
graph below), mainly as a result of
the over 3% expansion in the State’s
compensation of employees - equal
in just one year to the entire expan-
sion 2011-2016. At the same time,
the national healthcare expenditure
target (ONDAM) (+2.1% vs. +1.75%
in 2016) records the impact pay rises
and higher charges are having under
the new medical agreement.
Overview of public finances
(at end January 2017)
Budget Bill (PLF) forecast for Government spending excluding interest
and pensions (%, constant scope)
0 %
0,2 %
0 %
- 0,5 %
- 1,5 %
- 1 %
1,2 %
- 2,0 %
- 1,5 %
- 1,0 %
- 0,5 %
0 %
0,5 %
1,0 %
1,5 %
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
En %
Value terms
Source : Cour des Comptes based on Budget Bills for each year
13
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Despite this, the announced growth in
public spending is probably unde-
restimated since a number of the
savings included (especially concerning
unemployment benefit) will be lower
than expected. There is also a significant
risk that the other limits on spending will
be overshot (Government spending and
ONDAM).
After 2017 the planned structural
rebalancing of public finances will
require spending to be cut to an
extent so far unseen.
The multi-year public finance projections
in the Budget Bill see the public deficit
tapering by an average 0.7% of GDP a
year 2018-2020, enabling France to meet
its commitment to reduce its structural
deficit over the medium term to below
0.5% of GDP. The projections show that,
in order to meet this target, the pressure
on spending will have to be increased to
an entirely new level. Expenditure will
have to stabilise in volume terms (see
graph below, Government scenario)
after growing 0.8% 2010-2015 and
2.3% 2000-2009, and even though the
Government is still planning increases
of 1.3% in 2016 and 0.8% in 2017.
The growth scenario used as the basis for
the multi-year public finance projections
is also optimistic and based on positive
assessments of potential growth and
output gap. A more prudent approach
would at least bring these assessments
more into line with other available
assessments.
If we use the European Commis-
sion’s assumptions of output gap
and potential growth, the multi-year
plan cannot be met by stabilising
spending but by cutting it by 0.3%
in 2020 (see chart below - Commis-
sion’s economic growth scenario). In
the light of the serious uncertainties
that exist about the output gap, the
assumption is eliminated by 2017
and therefore that actual growth is
equal to potential growth will mean
making an around 0.6% per year cut
in spending with respect to those
already planned by Government (see
chart below - Growth scenario equal
to Commission’s potential growth).
Moreover, while interest charges have
helped reduce spending 2010-2016 (by
0.4% a year), we cannot count on this
situation continuing. The potential for
any further drops in interest expendi-
ture has become limited but the risk
that they may rise in the medium term
is now significant.
Overview of public finances
(at end January 2017)
14
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Finally, the 2017 Budget Bill introduces
no structural savings. Indeed, the only
steps taken that will have any impact
after 2017 will probably increase spending.
*
**
Greater efforts can be made to control
spending and meet the targets France
has set for herself. Since 2010 public
spending as a proportion of GDP has
fallen everywhere in the Eurozone
except France. In France it has simply
stabilised. Above all, the particularly
high level of public spending in France
has totally failed to produce results in
line with the outlay, as in the case of
housing policy, professional training
and health. In the years to come the
public
authorities
must
therefore
make resolute efforts to improve the
effectiveness of public spending by
making clear choices that are based
on reassessment of the duties of pu-
blic administrations in general, and
on better targeting of intervention
policies.
Overview of public finances
(at end January 2017)
Spending (in volume terms) needed to meet the 2017 multi-year PLF
forecast in the economic scenario
- 1,0
- 0,5
0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Government scenario
Commission's economic growth scenario
Growth scenario equal to Commission's potential growth
0,0
-
0,3
-
0,6
(%)
Source : Cour des Comptes based on European Commission AMECO data
Part two
Public Policies
Chapter I
Employment and solidarity
1.
Amicable compensation of the victims of medical accidents:
a misguided implementation, a mandatory overhaul
2. The
Ordre national des chirurgiens-dentistes
(College of Dental
Surgeons) - rediscovering the meaning of public service
3. Continuous employee training: a policy for identifying and
fighting against fraud
19
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
1
A medical accident is an unpredictable
event that causes harm unrelated to the
foreseeable change in the patient’s health
during care, prevention or diagnosis. It
may be the result of a technical medical
error or therapeutic risk, defined as the
occurrence - through no fault of the
practitioner or healthcare facility -
of an accident that has a low rate of
occurrence.
Compensating therapeutic risk -
essential progress for victims
Before 2002, medical accidents were
not
compensated
unless
medical
liability could be proved. The Law
of 4 March 2002 on the rights of
the sick and the quality of the care
system introduced a major change
in the form of an exemption from
ordinary French law on liability. This
established that even if negligence
is not involved, compensation must
be given for all medical accidents of
certain degrees of seriousness.
The new law introduces
an amicable procedure
for compensating the victims
of medical accidents, whether
or not negligence is involved.
To prevent claims coming before the
courts, an amicable procedure has been
created. This is free for the victim, who
does not have to hire a lawyer or pay for
expert reports, is fast (less than one year),
involves both parties and is based upon
reports produced by authorised experts.
Compensation decisions are made by
local committees chaired by a judge.
The procedure applies only to serious
accidents and the victim may withdraw
at any time to bring a claim through the
courts.
Organisation is based on three institutions:
the National Committee for Medical
Accidents (CNAMed), which is a scientific
authority that approves medical experts
and harmonises the scheme; Conciliation
and Compensation Committees (CCI) that
examine requests for compensation; and
a public department, the National Office
for Compensation for Medical Accidents,
Adverse Medical Events and Nosocomial
Infections (ONIAM) that compensates
victims based on CCI opinion.
Amicable compensation of the
victims for Medical Accidents:
a misguided implementation,
a mandatory overhaul
20
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Disappointing results
through organisational
failure caused by a defective
public department
Fifteen years after the law was
passed, the amicable procedure is a
real disappointment. Despite the low
number of patients using the system
(4 500 out of the 10 000 expected),
the proportion of claims rejected
is huge (76%). Between 2011 and
2015, 5 700 accidents have been
recognized, including 3 000 where
therapeutic error was claimed.
58% of victims had still only received a
partial offer after 4 years, after which
they have no chance of receiving a full
offer.
Average waiting time for those
who did receive a comprehensive offer
was 2 years 9 months - 2 years lon-
ger than a claim brought before the
first-instance courts.
The system was thrown out of balance
mainly because of the role assigned
to ONIAM, the only body that has a
legal personality. Although ONIAM is
responsible for calculating and paying
compensation, it has adopted a wider
Amicable compensation of the victims for Medical
Accidents: a misguided implementation,
a mandatory overhaul
Compensation procedure
Conciliation and
Compensation Committee
VICTIMS
6 months
4 months
1 month
ADVICE
No negligence
Negligence
Compensation
Insurer
Rejection
ONIAM
Compensation
Judge
Offer
Offer
Rejection
Rejection
Expert report
Source : Cour des Comptes
21
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
view of its role - reviewing CCI decisions
based on medical findings, despite not
having the necessary skills to do so, and
acting as if it were an insurer trying to
reduce its liability in a claim. Using a
procedure that excludes the victims and
is contrary to the principles set out in
the law, ONIAM has rejected 8.5% of CCI
decisions in favour of the victim, even
when the victim had previously been
informed of the decision. Victims are
now deserting the amicable procedure.
CNAMed, which has no resources of
its own, has been unable to regulate
the scheme or even to produce a
large enough list of medical experts.
The misapplication of the law
has been made worse
by ONIAM’s extremely
poor internal management.
The management, which is often irregu-
lar, lacks leadership and an effective IT
system, does not collect its receivables
even though this would reduce health
insurance costs, and produces incorrect
accounts.
Regarding
the
Médiator®
cases,
ONIAM has claimed all the merits for
the work done by the experts panel
that approved in 2015 41% of all
claims. In reality, it did no more than
simply supplying a logistical support.
Ignored victims must be put
back at the centre of concern
Overhaul of ONIAM management
must be an essential condition of
any further assignment of duties to
the Office. Given the current state
of ONIAM’s management, it would
be too risky to entrust ONIAM with
the job of compensating the victims
of Dépakine®, where the scope and
challenges involved are even greater
than in the case of Médiator®. ONIAM
must stop rejecting CCI findings in
favour of victims of medical accidents
from using the scheme and compro-
mising the foundations for an amicable
procedure.
CNAMed could be relieved of its duty
to approve medical experts. The list of
court experts could be used instead,
leaving CNAMed to focus on regulating
the scheme.
Support for victims has
absolutely to
be improved through more systematic
assistance from voluntary associations
and CCIs; by setting up a website to
which files may be uploaded throughout
the procedure and easier access to
medical records; by introducing fines
for late transmission of documents
by relevant healthcare facilities and
professionals and fines for obstructing
the course of justice.
Amicable compensation of the victims for Medical
Accidents: a misguided implementation,
a mandatory overhaul
22
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
1.
restore the initial concept of an
amicable
compensation
system
by legislating that CCI opinions
are enforceable on ONIAM and
giving CNAMed the triple job of
guaranteeing the quality of expert
reports, harmonising CCI case law
and acting as an appeal jurisdiction
against CCI opinions;
2.
cancel
the
national
list
of
medical experts and use the list
of court experts instead, making
sure that court experts find it
attractive to work for CCIs, and
organising
continuous
training
for them;
3.
give CNAMed its own budget to
run its own operations and the CCIs;
4.
facilitate victim access to the
amicable compensation procedure
by setting up a secure
e-platform
to which all documents in the
procedure can
be uploaded at all
stages, introducing a system of
fines for late upload and criminal
fines for obstructing access to
medical files; and looking into
the possibility of fixed travel
allowances for expert reports
using
CNAMTS
social
policy
funds;
5.
design and implement without
delay a plan to overhaul ONIAM
management before any new duties
are assigned to it.
Recommendations
Amicable compensation of the victims for Medical
Accidents: a misguided implementation,
a mandatory overhaul
23
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The General Dental Council was founded
under the Decree of 24 September 1945
and now has almost 44 000 members
who pay membership fees worth €20
million each year. Its main duty is to
control access to the profession and
to ensure practitioners comply with its
code of conduct. It has administrative
and jurisdictional authority.
Unsuitable organisation
and governance
As legally required, the Council
is organised into departmental,
regional and inter-regional councils
that report to the national council.
While the Council’s main duties are
carried out at departmental level,
the relevance of the regional level
is a matter for discussion. In addition,
the very long time national directors
remain in post, the over-representation
of
inactive
members,
the
under-
representation of women and the
concentration of power in the national
office to the detriment of the plenary
body have led to the continuation of an
inward-looking governance method. A
more transparent and more democratic
system is needed.
Lack of control and transparency
With the exception of the accounts
of the national and a very few depart-
mental councils, the general Dental
Council accounts do not comply with
the French general chart of accounts.
They have never been audited by a
statutory auditor and present nume-
rous anomalies. Since the Council
has no audited accounts, it has no
general understanding of its financial
position or property assets, which the
Cour des Comptes estimate are worth
€50 million. It does not know what its
liabilities and receivables are. It has
no internal control system to ensure
that the transactions it posts are real,
comprehensive or accurate. As there is
no risk management, the Council is at
risk of error, abuse and fraud.
A questionable approach
to public service
The Council has neglected some of
its duties to organise and supervise
the dental profession in favour of a
defence of dentists’ interests that is not
its job. Its supervisory duties (surgery
inspections check that dentists comply
with their statutory duty to undertake
continuous training, etc.) are carried out
The
Ordre national des chirurgiens-
dentistes
(General Dental Council):
rediscovering the meaning
of public service
2
24
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
less than thoroughly. The Council mainly
focuses, in violation of the 1945 Order,
on fighting a number of changes in the
profession, such as the introduction of
mutual insurance care networks and
dental care centres, which it accuses of
unfair competition. Finally, its particu-
larly close relations with certain trade
unions compromise its duty to remain
independent and neutral.
Unsuccessful reform
of the professional tribunals
Many factors point to the need for reform
of the professional tribunals to make
them more independent. Members who
can sit on a professional council while
also acting as assessors in disciplinary
tribunals may be acting as both judge
and judged. The State councillor who
presides over the national disciplinary
tribunal (2
nd
degree jurisdiction) also
assists the national council. This is
unsatisfactory in terms of the rules on
independence and impartiality. Half the
presidents of first-instance disciplinary
tribunals (1
st
degree jurisdiction) are
paid by the General dental Council in
violation of rules drafted specifically to
ensure they remain independent. Finally,
although not specifically stated in any
rule or regulation, the Council also pays
the president of the national disciplinary
tribunal. This unlawful practice must be
corrected.
Constant rise in the annual
membership fee despite
a large cash surplus
The €417 membership fee for active
members in 2016 went up 14.25%
2009-2016 - an annual average increase
of 1.9% and almost twice that of the
consumer price index. The uplifts are
particularly unjustified in that they are
needed to fund significant spending by
the Council on matters that lie outside
its public service duties. The Council
also has financial investments worth
around €30 million - the equivalent of
eighteen months’ membership fees
- and could have used those funds to
finance its needs without raising fees.
Poor
management
The principle that positions in ordres
are unpaid, introduced by the Law
of 21 July 2009 on hospital reform,
patients, healthcare and territories
(HPST) is implemented to different
degrees by the département councils.
Nationally, councillors were paid a
total of over € 600 000 in 2015, more
than €400 000 of which went to the
eight members of the bureau who also
all receive official apartments.
It has become a habit for the dental
councils to pay a large number of ex-
penses that have nothing to do with
its duties. These include pleasure trips
and spa stays by councillors and the
purchase of numerous luxury gifts.
There
is
no
official
procurement
policy. The selection of providers is
extremely opaque and increases costs
to the Council. This practice is very
far from the principles set out in the
23 July 2015 Order to which councils
are to be subject.
The
Ordre national des chirurgiens-dentistes
(General Dental Council): rediscovering
the meaning of public service
25
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Recommendations
1.
publish immediately the imple-
menting regulations for the Euro-
pean Alert Mechanism on sanctions
applied
to
practitioners,
which
flows from Directive 2005/36/EC
on the recognition of professional
qualifications;
2.
overhaul the Council’s territorial
organisation to give administrative
duties to the departmental and
inter-departmental
levels
and
leaving the regions with only
jurisdictional authority;
3.
limit the number of consecutive
terms that can be served on the
same Council committee; introduce
equality;
ban
the
simultaneous
holding of more than one local and/
or national mandate and ensure the
national council and its president are
elected by all Council practitioners;
4.
change the composition of the
national disciplinary tribunal to include
elected departmental councillors in
place of national councillors;
5.
regulate the amount and method
of
remuneration
payable to the
president of the national disciplinary
tribunal;
6.
prohibit the same person from
simultaneously holding positions as
president of the national disciplinary
tribunal and also as councillor on
national committees;
7.
make the holding of Council
tribunal
positions
incompatible
with the holding of trade union
positions;
8.
begin an immediate overhaul of
management by:
- requiring all remuneration and
benefits to councillors to be
published, giving the names of
the councillors involved;
- submitting the Council to procure-
ment procedures that comply with
the advertising and competition
rules set out in the draft order in
article 212 of the Law of 26 January
2016 on the modernisation of our
health system.
The
Ordre national des chirurgiens-dentistes
(General Dental Council): rediscovering
the meaning of public service
26
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
An enquiry into how the State and
accredited joint bodies (accredited
fund
collecting
and
distributing
agencies – OPCA – and accredited
personal training leave agencies –
OPACIF) which manage the professional
training schemes set up for employees,
identify and fight against fraud was led
by the Cour des Comptes. The Court
checked that the funds earmarked by
companies for the continuous training
of their employees (around €11.2 bn in
2014, of which €6.3 bn direct purchase
and € 4.8 bn through OPCAs) were being
properly used. At the end of the enquiry
the Cour des Comptes found that the
current system of controls is faulty and
that the advances made by the Law of
5 March 2014 on professional training,
employment and social democracy are
insufficient to fight effectively against
the risk of fraud in this sector.
A sector at risk of irregularity
and fraud
As a sector, professional training is
extremely open to the risk of irregularity
and fraud, mainly because of the intan-
gible nature of the services provided
and the very large number of providers
(over 75 000). Easy access to the trainer
market and ease with which fraud
can be committed (by e.g. making
fictitious increases in the number of
training hours given or in the number
of trainees) help put this sector at risk
of fraud. More sophisticated methods
producing larger scale embezzlement
have also been detected.
Few, generally ineffective
controls increase risk
State control of professional training
is inadequate given the money and
number of providers involved (just
0.8% of all training providers were
inspected in 2014). The effectiveness
of controls is also affected by the
fragmented nature of supervision,
which
is
shared
by the
General
Department of Employment and Pro-
fessional Training (DGEFP) and the
Regional Departments of Companies,
Competition,
Consumption,
Work
and Employment (Direccte). There is
no national scheduling of inspections
and the distribution of inspectors
does not reflect the distribution of
the
work across the country. In addition,
the most common problems are
almost never penalised because of
the enormous amount of red tape
involved.
Despite their statutory duties and
the high risk of fraud, the accredited
joint bodies make few inspections
and those they do undertake are
generally documentary and ex-post.
Spot inspections in situ are essential
to ensure services are actually being
provided.
3
Continuous employee training:
setting up a policy for identifying
and fighting against fraud
27
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Need for an inspection strategy
involving both the State
and the accredited bodies
The Law of 5 March 2014 on professio-
nal training, employment and social
democracy focuses on the need for
quality training. The list of approved
training providers produced by the
institutions financing training should
go some way towards restricting mar-
ket access for inadequate providers.
However the scope of the list, which
came into force on 1 January 2017, is
limited. It does not apply to all forms
of training and does not prevent fraud,
including by approved providers.
Although quality regulation could in
future reduce the risk of fraud, this
must not mean that the State and
accredited joint bodies should
reduce
their inspections. Instead, it should
be seen as an opportunity to create
a policy covering inspections and the
fight against fraud that involves all the
institutions that finance professional
training.
Continuous employee training: setting up
a policy for identifying and fighting against fraud
State inspections in 2014
Collecting and
distributing agencies
Companies
Training
providers
Number of inspections
9
502
630
192
72 804
76 551
5%
0,7%
0,8%
Source : Cour des Comptes based on DGEFP data
28
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Recommendations
Continuous employee training: setting up
a policy for identifying and fighting against fraud
Government:
1.
introduce an inspection strategy
based on annual timetabling and
an organisation better suited to
meeting real challenges.
Accredited joint bodies:
2.
produce a strategy and internal
control processes able to cope with
identified risks.
Government:
3.
increase the number of OPCA
and OPACIF controls and audit
their internal control procedures.
Government and accredited joint
bodies:
4.
objectives and means agreements
signed by the Government and the
accredited joint bodies must specify
the duties of the latter in terms of
training inspections; increase the
proportion of management fees
dedicated to inspections and the
fight against fraud.
Government:
5.
give Direccte statutory authority
to impose administrative and financial
penalties for failure to meet the
obligations set out in the Labour
Code.
Chapter II
Energy, Sustainable Development
and Transport
1. Heavy goods vehicle ecotax: a strategic failure and costly
abandonment
2.
Urban parking - the missing link in mobility policies
3.
Household waste recycling in Île-de-France: missed targets
4.
The Amétyst waste treatment plant in Montpellier:
a gamble
on a complex industrial process
31
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
1
An ambitious transport policy
tool
The heavy goods vehicle (HGV) ecotax
was one of the big projects to come out
of the Grenelle Environment Forum. It
was passed by Parliament on an almost
unanimous vote in 2009 and was based
on the european
charging framework
for the road network. The aim of the
innovative tax was to cover the cost
of using French roads (excluding toll
concession motorways and some local
roads). The tax, which was to be paid by
mainly foreign HGVs in transit through
France, was charged by the kilome-
tre and applied to an approximately
15 000 km network. The Government
ensured that the end taxpayer would
not be the French haulier by creating
a system whereby the tax was paid by
the end user.
The
Ecomouv’consortium
was
awarded the contract to collect the
HGV ecotax under a public-private
partnership agreement in October
2011- The tax was supposed to bring
in almost €890 million net a year in
revenue to the public authorities,
€684 million of which was to be used to
fund national transport infrastructure.
Without going into the negotiation of
the partnership agreement or available
parliamentary works, the Cour des
Comptes decided to
assess and review
the management of the project and
the total cost of its abandonment.
Abandonment marking the loss
of strategic vision
When strong objections to the HGV
ecotax began in autumn 2013, the Prime
Minister announced on October 29TH
of that year that he was suspending it
for review. The decision, which had no
legal basis in contract, marked the start
of a series of delays. The loss of strategic
vision in favour of a short-term approach
could be seen in the Government’s
decision not to make any payment to
Écomouv’ in 2014 and its failure to
make a final decision on whether the
project was to continue or be stopped. A
number of decisions were then taken
that created legal and financial risks.
Negotiation of a protocol agreement
with Écomouv’, which was not signed
until 20 June 2014, brought the situa-
tion back onto a contract footing but
left the Government with expenses it
would not have had to pay if it had not
decided to suspend the HGV ecotax.
The revised ecotax did not appear
until spring 2014 - as an “HGV
tran-
sit toll” plan. The scheme was based
on a much lower tax road network
that was therefore not financially
Heavy goods vehicle ecotax:
a strategic failure and costly
abandonment
32
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
viable. Opposition to the new plan
continued and led to the announcement
of its indefinite suspension by the
Environment Minister on
October 9th
2014. Notice of the termination of the
partnership agreement with Écomouv’
was served on
October 30th 2014,
effective
December 30th 2014.
Heavy goods vehicle ecotax:
a strategic failure and costly abandonment
Compensation for terminating the partnership agreement
Source : Cour des Comptes based on data from the Ministry of the Environment,
Energy and the Sea
Policy abandonment at very
high cost to the public purse
with loss of income offset by
higher car tax
Abandonment of the HGV ecotax
has been at a high cost to the public
purse, firstly because of the loss of
the forecast income (€9.8 billion
over the term of the contract) and
secondly because of the high cost of
abandonment
for the Government,
which had to:
-pay €958 million to Écomouv as
compensation for its withdrawal
from the partnership agreement;
-pay around €70 million to organise,
implement
and
manage
project
abandonment.
The terms of payment of the €958
million cost of getting out of the
partnership agreement with Écomouv’
are not in favour of the Government,
which effectively agreed to pay all
doubtful costs. Furthermore, in order
to reduce the immediate impact of
the abandonment of the ecotax on
the public accounts, payment of part
of the compensation will be spread
until 2024. The additional cost of this
(mainly interest) is €35 million.
The Government decided to offset
the loss of HGC ecotax revenue by
raising the tax on oil . The offset is
unsatisfactory both in financial terms
and also in terms of the original purpose
of the HGV ecotax.
On the one hand the revenue from
the increased domestic consumption
tax on energy products (TICPE) masks
the uneven spread of that revenue.
While the general
State budget will be
over-compensated for its loss of income,
33
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
this will not be the case for local
authorities, which will lose €160
million a year that they had been
counting on.
On the other hand, higher TICPE will
increase the costs of French HGVs but
will hardly touch foreign HGVs, which
represent almost 40% of the traffic
but only 2% of revenue in TICPE
and means the purpose of the HGV
ecotax will not be achieved. Above
all, the new system transfers around
€650 million in annual expense onto
the shoulders of car drivers, who were
not affected by the HGV ecotax in the
first place but are actually financing
its abandonment.
Heavy goods vehicle ecotax:
a strategic failure and costly abandonment
Comparison of annual payment by type of user - HGV ecotax vs oil tax
Source : Cour des Comptes based on CGEDD (2015, 2013 data) and DGITM
An industrial and social failure
affecting European transport
policy
The HGV ecotax leaves the Government
with hundreds of thousands of pieces of
useless equipment on its hands. Since
the likelihood of their use for other
purposes is almost zero, they have been
written off in full in the Government’s
accounts. Some assets have been sold
but at between 2 and 30% of their
value at the date the contract was
terminated.
The failure finally means that France
will be unable to improve recovery of
the cost of using its road network even
though equivalent systems have been
successfully introduced in many other
European countries including Germany,
Austria, Poland and, in 2016, Belgium.
The abandonment of the HGV ecotax is
costly to the public purse and damaging
to the clarity and consistency of transport
policy and its financing.
Looking to the future, the Cour des
Comptes can only advise the Govern-
ment to anticipate, assess and manage
better the risks inherent in any pro-
ject to reform sensitive sectors like
transport.
34
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Following examination by the regional
chambers of accounts of the urban
parking policies of 45 local authorities
2
,
the Cour des Comptes, noting that the
regulation methods adopted are unsui-
table and local strategies frequently
inadequate, makes the following three
recommendations:
Unsuitable institutional
response
Urban parking management has been
essential in conurbations for decades
now to regulate how vehicles occupy
public spaces.
Management itself generally takes
the form of parking charges and the
construction of car parks. Since car
parks cost several million euros to
build, they only make financial sense if
enough cars use them. This is possible
only if the local authority introduces
tough on-road parking controls.
If these conditions are not met illegal
parking will follow, making travel
more difficult and placing a significant
proportion of these parking costs on
the shoulders of the local taxpayer.
2
Including Paris and the local authorities in the Paris region (Grand Paris Seine Ouest, etc.), big
provincial cities (Lyon, Lille, Toulouse, etc.) and medium-sized cities (Le Havre, Chambéry, etc.)
Proper management of urban car
parking is therefore essential, not
just to the quality of daily life but
also to meet the challenges facing
the community.
Urban parking management involves
several types of public local action:
policing; regulation of road use; car
park management; planning law to set
urban environment requirements and
in business premises to set parking
space requirements. The question of
urban parking therefore demands a
strategic approach that takes account
of traffic flow within the conurbation
as a whole.
All action taken in these areas must
by law be compatible with urban
travel plan (UTP) requirements on
the identification of areas subject to
regulated, paid parking and to pricing
policy.
Despite the framework, the institutional
response to urban parking management
is inadequate. Municipalities have tradi-
tionally managed parking. Although some
responsibilities have been transferred to
federations of municipalities, the policing
of traffic and parking remains one of
the prerogatives of the mayor, except
in the City of Paris. In some cases
2
Urban parking: the missing link
in mobility policies
35
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
this system creates problems with
traffic flows. This will occur when
neighbouring municipalities make
different
decisions
on
whether
to
charge for on-road parking. The system
also sometimes prevents federations
of municipalities from fully exercising
the powers delegated to them in this
field by the municipalities.
Better urban parking management
therefore means better sharing of
responsibility at local level. Proper
understanding of traffic flows within
conurbations will expand the role of
the mobility management authorities,
which through the UTP must decide
the basic principles of urban traffic
and transport organisation.
Badly designed local strategies
and poor implementation
Two main weaknesses were discovered in
local authority urban parking strategies.
Firstly, the strategies are insufficiently
rooted in UTPs, which are not as rigid as
the law requires. Secondly, the authorities
do not properly understand how much
parking they are offering and do not
generally set the cost.
The Cour des Comptes therefore
recommends that the mobility mana-
gement authorities should ensure that
urban transport plans are sufficiently
rigid and should create observatories
that also involve users to collect the
data needed to manage parking.
Three weaknesses have been discovered
in the implementation of these local
strategies.
Firstly, on-road parking is often
cheaper than in car parks, which
does not give drivers an incentive to
use the car parks.
Secondly,
contracts
between
the
local authorities and their parking
contractors are often imbalanced and
inadequately monitored by the local
authorities.
Finally, and above all, even though
motorists in France very rarely pay
on-road parking fees, local authority
parking inspections are insufficient
and vary considerably from year to
year.
The lack of inspections compromises
local urban parking strategies as a
whole.
To resolve the problem, we recommend
amending the law to give mobility
management policing and parking
monitoring authority.
The changes are particularly necessary
given that the new charged parking
system is due to come into force in 2018.
This will replace the current fines
on motorists who do not pay their
parking fees with a post-parking
package set by the local authorities
and subject to a legal ceiling.
The reform will give the local authorities
more power and means the State will
have to create a new jurisdiction, evolve
the IT system used by the National
Automatic
Offence
Processing
Agency, and adapt the complex rules
that currently govern the allocation
of fine revenues.
Urban parking: the missing link
in mobility policies
36
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Urban parking: the missing link
in mobility policies
Recommendations
Government:
1.
amend the General Local Authori-
ties Code to transfer power to police
and monitor parking to the mobility
management authorities.
Mobility management authorities:
2.
ensure that article L. 1214-2
Transport Code on the mandatory
content of urban travel plans, as
they concern urban parking, is fully
implemented;
3.
set up urban parking observatories,
involving all relevant stakeholders,
to collate and assess all the data
(available parking, surveys of urban
parking needs, costs and revenue,
estimate of motor traffic nuisance)
needed to design local strategies in
this field.
Municipalities:
4.
take a determined, long-term
approach
to
on-road
parking
controls.
37
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Île-de-France has 12 million residents
who produce 5.52 million tonnes of
household waste a year. The problems
of the public waste management service
arise from the high population density
at the centre of the region and the signi-
ficant differences between the central
metropolis of Greater Paris and the,
essentially rural remainder of the region.
Unsuitable institutional set-up
and financing
Official waste management is organised
by 26 different bodies with very different
sizes. The region is home to Europe’s
biggest
waste
treatment
agency
(Agence Métropolitaine des Déchets
Ménagers – Syctom) which alone serves
5.7 million residents, or almost half the
waste produced in the region (44%).
98% of its territory lies within Greater
Paris. By contrast, 12 other agencies
each serve fewer than 200 000 residents.
Since there has been no improvement
in waste selective collection, Syctom’s
current permitted capacity for its
incineration units is inadequate. Syctom
cope with the problem through co-
operation with neighbouring facilities.
The map and organisation of waste
treatment agencies totally ignore
the full reorganisation of federations
of municipalities with proper taxing
authority now under way in Île-de-
France. Almost no action is being
taken to rationalise the organisation
of waste treatment and federations of
municipalities are still allowed by law
to sign up to several waste authorities
associations at the same time, thus
preventing improvement in the official
organisation of waste treatment in Île-
de-France.
The public waste management service
costs €72 ex-tax per residents in Île-de-
France. Although the cost is decreasing,
it is still higher than in the rest of the
country (€63 ex-tax per residents).
And there are significant differences
in cost even among Île-de-France
waste authorities mainly as a result
of different types of housing, collection
and treatment.
Île-de-France local authorities receive
€1.5 billion to fund waste management.
95% of this cost is paid by taxpayers
through the household waste collection
tax. User contributions to the cost of the
service are sufficient, and even excessive
in some cases.
Household waste recycling
in Île-de-France: missed targets
3
38
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
User contribution to
service funding
needs to be better balanced between
users and other
producers of waste and
manufacturers of products sold on the
market.
The
waste
generated
by
public
administrations,
businesses
and
industries account for a quarter of
all waste managed by the public
services in Île-de-France. The special
funding of this form of waste, through
a dedicated fee, is applied in only 30%
of the municipalities in Île-de-France
and covers only 5% of total waste
management funding.
While the manufacturers of products
sold on the market do now make
some contribution to finance public
waste management (as a result of
greater manufacturer liability), in Île-
de-France their contribution is below
the national average.
Household waste recycling
in Île-de-France: missed targets
Local waste processing authorities (EPCLs) in Île-de-France at 1
st
January 2016
Source: Regional observatory of waste in Île-de-France (Ordif)
39
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Waste treatment performance
falling well below the average
for France and other European
metropolis.
Separate waste
collection and recycling
is below the average for
France and
other European metropolis, all types
of waste flow considered. The sorting
of glass (20 kg/resident p.a.), light
packaging (10.5 kg/resident p.a.) and
paper/cardboard (12.5 kg/ resident
p.a.) is well behind target. Separate
waste collection is also of very me-
diocre quality and 25.7% of waste is
rejected as non-recyclable at entry
in the sorting centres for selective
collection - without improvement
since 2005. There is no separate
collection of household biological
food waste even though this will be
a legal requirement by 2025.
The organisation of waste treatment
methods is static in Île-de-France and
lacks diversity. Incineration remains
the main processing method (60%)
for dealing with household waste
while there is still little recycling
(26%) and a remaining use of landfill
(9%).
Meeting European, national
and regional performance
targets is now urgent
Insufficient prevention
The three main sources of finance for
the prevention of waste production
are the Region, the Environment and
Energy Management Agency (Ademe)
and Syctom. Significant funding has
been given, especially for the set-up
of 61 local prevention plans (PLP)
covering 83% of the Île-de-France
population. While the co-ordination
of these stakeholders is improving,
not enough work has been done on
waste prevention and it is questionable
whether what has been done is properly
embedded.
Poor co-ordination
Tight
co-ordination
between the
regional and national government
levels is needed to manage waste
treatment
in
Île-de-France.
The
2009
regional
household
waste
programme did not take into account
the problems faced by public operators
or local needs and differences. The
regional plan capped incineration
at 4.2 million tonnes a year. When
incineration units shut down, central
government
allotted
incineration
capacities on the basis of day to day
requests, without any comprehensive
approach. The Regional Plan for the
Elimination
of
Household
Waste
(Predma) covers 2009-2019 and in
September 2016 the Region began
reviewing its waste treatment pro-
gramme, as required by the Decree of
17 June 2016.
Incentive pricing
The law requires public waste mana-
gement services to apply incentive
pricing. In Île-de-France only four
authorities
responsible
for
waste
collection do so, adjusting user fees
to reflect the amount of waste they
actually generate. Few household
Household waste recycling
in Île-de-France: missed targets
40
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
waste treatment authorities apply
a so-called level-2 incentive pricing
based on waste selective collection
performance.
The financial involvement from the
extended producer liability schemes and
their contribution
in terms of tonnage
from selective collection
is extremely
marginal. Extended producer liability
schemes deal with only 8% of Île-de-
France household waste.
Waste sorting performance must
see significant improvement
The region lags behind in waste selective
collection mainly because waste sorting
instructions have not been updated and
there is no communication in this field.
Separate
collection
in
Île-de-France
essentially consists in door-to-door col-
lection, which is more expensive than
collection from dedicated collection
points. Dual selective collection is the
norm, particularly in densely populated
areas where it is divided into one glass
bin and one mixed light packaging, paper
and cardboard bin. In most European
countries selective collection of three
different types of waste is the norm
for performance reasons: glass; light
packaging and paper/cardboard. The
region has one waste collection
site
per 69,000 inhabitants but Ademe
sets the optimum level at one site per
30 000 inhabitants while the average
for the rest of France is one site per
14 000 inhabitants.
The waste treatment system must
evolve without delay
The system will have to change
radically to move away from today’s
waste treatment methods. Centres
for selective collection will have to be
modernised to cope with the coming
major increase in this area. Waste
composting and methanisation is still
in its infancy but generalised selective
collection of household bio-waste,
planned to start in 2025, will offer
real prospects for growth. Transfer
platforms for residual household
waste are still too few to reduce the
amount of waste incinerated and
to cut the amount of household waste
sent for landfill. The recent recognition
in law of a new waste processing
technology, enabling dry waste to be
used to manufacture solid fuel from
recycled materials, should make it
possible to reduce the amount of
non-recyclable
household
waste
currently being sent to landfill in Île-
de-France.
Household waste recycling
in Île-de-France: missed targets
41
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Household waste recycling
in Île-de-France: missed targets
Government
1.
reorganise the map of mixed
waste
treatment
authorities
to
bring it into line with the reform of
the federations of municipalities in
Île-de-France.
Île-de-France region
2.
introduce
a
regional
waste
management
programme
that
takes account of local needs and
improve the co-ordination of local
stakeholders during its implemen-
tation.
Local authorities and relevant bodies
3.
improve the funding of the public
waste management service by raising
the financial contribution from the
manufacturers of waste put on the
market
and
developing
incentive
pricing in authorities located outside
the densely populated areas of Île-de-
France as a first step;
4.
expand
waste
sorting
by
developing
collection
systems,
focusing on dédicated collection
points, and introducing four selective
collections (glass, light packaging,
paper/cardboard and biological food
waste);
5.
adapt waste treatment by moder-
nising sorting plant to cope with the
introduction of plastics sorting and
to make them more competitive.
Government
6.
remove the uncertainty surrounding
the regulation of animal sub-products
to allow biological food waste collection
and treatment to develop.
Recommendations
42
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The new Amétyst plant –
a technical challenge
European regulation and the laws
resulting from the Grenelle Environment
Forum have encouraged the improvement
of waste management. The Hérault
département waste elimination plan
prioritised recycling and recovery as
early as 2001.
The Urban Community of Montpellier
(now
Montpellier
Méditerranée
Métropole) did not have enough
treatment facilities and each year
had to export almost 150 000 tonnes
of waste from the département.
Despite limited feedback, in 2003
it decided to build a mechanical/
biological/methanisation
sorting
plant called Amétyst, the largest
of its kind in France at that time
and was the first to be so close to
housing.
The Montpellier region does not sort
sufficient biological household waste
and local authorities are finding it
increasingly difficult to gain acceptance
for local incinerators or storage sites.
The service provider was subject to
a number of ambitious performance
targets for transforming biological
and residual waste into biogas, and
also to a minimum composting rate
for residual waste.
Quality criteria also applied to all
output and the provider was further
required to
meet
environmental
performance criteria in terms of
noise and small.
Immediate failure
From its opening in July 2008 the
plant suffered numerous malfunc-
tions: low digester output caused by
the inadequate quality of the waste
fed into them and major problems
with smell and insects - all of which led
to numerous complaints from local
inhabitants. The local council there-
fore refused to give acceptance to the
building works.
An accidental fire in September 2011
then reduced plant operation. The
repairs carried out at the provider’s
expense meant that the plant did not
start up again until 2 April 2012.
An industrial and financial failure
During the term of the contract
(2008-2014) results failed to meet
required performance levels. There
were also financial problems at both
construction and operating stages.
At the outset in October 2003, the
provisional budget for the construction
of Amétyst was €57 million plus tax.
4
The Amétyst waste treatment
plant in Montpellier: a gamble
on a complex industrial process
43
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The reserves applied at acceptance,
plus the operating difficulties caused
by design faults meant that significant
additional work was required to meet
regulations. The final total cost of plant
construction was €90.7 million plus tax.
Montpellier paid a total of €75.2 million,
more than double the figure stated in
the provisional operating accounts.
It also received almost nothing from
its co-contractor since the financial
penalties applicable under the contract
for failure to comply with performance
commitments were never enforced.
Amétyst’s cost of treating one tonne
of waste is at least €136 plus tax. By
comparison, the most recent national
benchmark published by Ademe shows
that top of the range costs for treating
residual household waste (all processes
combined) is €122 plus tax.
The Amétyst waste treatment plantin Montpellier:
a gamble on a complex industrial process
Location of the Amétyst plant
LAVÉRUNE
GRABELS
JUVIGNAC
SAUSSAN
PIGNAN
SAINT-JEAN
DE VEDAS
LATTES
SAINT-
GEORGES
D’ORQUES
PÉROLS
CASTELNAU-
LE-LEZ
CLAPIERS
MONTFERRIER-
SUR-LEZ
COMBAILLAUX
SAINT-GÉLY
DU-FESC
SAINT-
AUNÈS
MAUGUIO
LE CRÈS
JACOU
MONTPELLIER
0
1 km
D65
D613
AMÉTYST
Montpellier
Business School
St Peter's
Cathedral
Sabines tram stop
Park
Park
Polygone
shopping
centre
Saint-
Roch
train
station
Stadim
Montpellier
Town Hall
Jean Vives swimming pool
School
Montpellier conurbation transport
Carrefour
supermarket
MÉTRO supermarket
SAINT-
CLÉMENT
DE-
RIVIÈRE
VENDARGUES
Cour des Comptes/SRPP - DL- October 2016
D612
D132 E2
E80
N109
D986
D65
D65
E15
E80
D66
E15
D65
D65
D132
9 km
Towards planned
multi-waste
treatment plant
at Fabrègues (via D613)
8 km
Towards Thot dump
at Villeneuve-les-Maguelone
(via D612 D18SE)
19 km
Towards the final waste
storage centre at Castries
(via A9)
Source: Cour des Comptes
44
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Recent relaunch but the future
does not look rosy
In December 2014 Montpellier decided
to terminate the public service contract,
paying €4.7 million in compensation for
the termination.
It did not seek compensation for the
operating harm suffered and paid
most of the additional cost created by
the construction problems with the
plant.
Montpellier has now given the same
provider another 10-year contract on
the ground that it was offering more
far-reaching modernisation work for the
site than its competitors. It is however
probable that the compensation for
termination that it received has given it
room for manoeuvre.
Application of the aims set in the
Grenelle Environment Forum has
led to support for many mechanical/
biological/methanisation
sorting
plant projects.
However, in a June 2010 information
report
the
Senate
was
already
emphasising the major problems these
plant face as a result of the many
technical stages in the process. Invest-
ment and operating costs are also high at
a time of regulatory, social and economic
uncertainty.
The Law of 17 August 2015 on energy
transition for green growth recommends
the general sorting of biological waste
at source and therefore that new
mechanical/biological sorting plant
should not be built unless biological
waste is sorted at source. This type
of plant has also not been eligible
for Ademe grants for two years.
The Amétyst waste treatment plantin Montpellier:
a gamble on a complex industrial process
45
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Recommendations
Montpellier:
1.
improve sorting at source to
ensure better recycling of all
types of waste through better
information to users.
Montpellier and Government:
2.
make separate collection more
effective, especially by developing
the separate collection of biological
waste;
3.
obtain the resources to ensure
effective control of the economic and
financial balance of public service
contracts awarded to run plant
providing
mechanical/biological
treatment of residual household
waste, especially by checking the
efficiency the techniques used and
compliance with contract targets;
4.
assess the total cost of this
method of treating and recycling
residual
household
waste
by
including the indirect cost of
facility depreciation, of treating
non-recyclable waste and of the
economic consequences of an
end to compost sales.
Occitanie Region and the Government:
5.
monitor local treatment capacity
since if non-recyclable waste levels
cannot be reduced, methanisation
of residual household waste cannot
is not an alternative to last-resort
waste treatment methods (incine-
ration and landfill).
The Amétyst waste treatment plantin Montpellier:
a gamble on a complex industrial process
Chapter III
Education, Universities
1.
The Paris-Saclay Project: major ambition at risk of dilution
2.
France Business School: failed merger
49
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Ambition to create a world-class
scientific and technological cluster
Saclay and its surroundings provided
the location for pioneering aviation
pioneer at the start of the 20th century
and since the Second World War have
become home to many scientific and
university institutions: CNRS (the
National Centre for Scientific Research)
in 1946; ONERA (the National Office
for Aerospace Studies and research)
in 1947; CEA (the Atomic Energy
Commission)
in
1952;
Paris-Sud
University,
which
in
1971
was
hived off from the Orsay Faculty
of Science; the Paris HEC Business
School in 1964; Supélec (the Higher
2
ENS Cachan, École Centrale de Paris, AgroParisTech, Institut Mines Télécom, ENSAE.
3
École polytechnique, ENSTA, HEC, IHES, Supélec, Paris Sud University, Versailles-Saint-Quentin-
en-Yvelines University, CEA, CNRS, INRA, INRIA, INSERM, ONERA.
4
Air Liquide, Danone, Horiba, Kraft Foods, Peugeot, Renault, Thalès, etc.
School for Electricity Studies) in
1975 and the École Polytechnique
in 1976. By the end of the 2000s
the site already housed over 10% of
all French public-sector research (all
disciplines combined) which figure is
expected eventually to rise to 15%.
From
the
middle
of
the
2000s
Government decided to exploit this
extraordinary
potential
better
and
announced
that
it
wanted
Saclay
and
its
surroundings
to
become
a world-class scientific and technologi-
cal cluster. By 2020 a number of French
grandes écoles
2
will have joined the
public2
3
and private3
4
sector institutions
already operating in Saclay.
The Paris-Saclay Project:
major ambition at risk of dilution
1
The campus within the Saclay area
78
92
75
94
91
Saint-Quentin-
en-Yvelines
gathering of
municipalities
Paris-Saclay
Versailles
chantiers
CAMPUS
0
5 km
100 ha
Cour des Comptes/SRPP - DL- October 2016
Scope of EPAPS
Département
boundaries
Scope of OIN (programme
of national interest)
New planned line 18
Versailles
Grand-Parc
gathering of
municipalities
New planned Line 18
Source: Cour des Comptes
50
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The 2009 Greater Paris Act sped up
implementation of the project. The
Government decided that the public
funding of Paris-Saclay would be
extremely high - almost €5.3 bn have
been earmarked to date, of which
€700 million for science, €2.6 bn for
university property and €2 bn for
transport.
The project has three sections based
on Paris-Saclay University and EPAPS
(the Paris-Saclay local planning and
development
authority):
higher
education and research institutions,
urban planning for the site and its
economic development.
Cluster success depends on three
combined conditions:
- the organisation of the university
and scientific institutions must be
able to produce an overall strategy
that will culminate in international
recognition under the terms of
reference generally accepted by
the international community;
- the urban campus must be properly
served by public transport and must
have the housing and equipment it
requires;
- general governance must be strong
and able to overcome problems.
Inconsistent progress
Founded on 1 January 2015 as
a community of universities and
institutions
(COMUE)
comprising
The Paris-Saclay Project:
major ambition at risk of dilution
Location of research and higher education institutions on the Saclay site
Source: Cour des Comptes
Orsay Ville
Bures-sur-Yvette
La Hacquinière
Gif-sur-Yvette
BURES-
SUR-YVETTE
GIF-SUR-YVETTE
Le Guichet
ORSAY
SACLAY
RN 118
RN 118
Towards MASSY ORLY
SAINT-AUBIN
PALAISEAU
Lozère
Future line 18
Future line 18
Paris Sud
University
RER B
RER B
0
1 km
Cour des comptes/SRPP - DL
Octobre 2016
CEA
INRA
CNRS*
IHES
Institutions not members of a PRES
(research and higher education cluster)
HEC
INRIA
ONERA
INSERM*
Institut
Mines Telecom
Centrale-
Supélec
ENS Cachan
École
polytechnique
IOGS
ENSTA
AgroParisTech
Towards Versailles-Saint-
Quentin University
Institutions members of the old UniverSud PRES
Institutions members of the old ParisTech PRES
ENSAE
Old UniverSud PRES
Old ParisTech PRES
Own bus line
* In addition to its own campus at Gif, CNRS, like INSERLM (arbitrary location), is located across the entire campus.
Saint-
Aubin
gathering
municipalities
Orsay - Gif
Palaiseau
51
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
18 higher education and research
institutions
with
89 512
people,
including 10 676 lecturers/resear-
chers and over 68 000 students,
Paris-Saclay
University
already
awards its own doctorates and 80%
of its Masters degrees and is planning
to develop a unified research strategy
across its territory.
The economic development aim has
not been so closely pursued however,
either by the University that has been
unable to organize the exploitation
of the public research results, or by
EPAPS whose economic strategy was
produced too late.
Lack of general strategy
and governance
The management of the project is
poor but has managed to collect
together a large number of public
and private-sector players whose
skills, scope, resources and sometimes
even interests are different, not to say
at divergent from each other. There
is no overall project management to
ensure that all three sections remain
in line with each other.
Academically,
Paris-Saclay
University
was chosen in 2012 by an international
jury created to select excellence
initiatives (IDEX). IDEX aims to support
a limited number of actions to create
a very wide-ranging university and
scientific cluster financed by the Future
Investment
Programme
(PIA).
The
members of Paris-Saclay University have
however found it extremely hard firstly
to agree on the project and secondly
to bring it to its conclusion, although
IDEX will allow the start of growth-
generating transformations in future.
In order to develop the site EPAPS had
to negotiate with local stakeholders who
were initially opposed to the project. The
urban campus is now becoming a reality
but there is a real risk, despite the public
funds poured into it, that its attraction
will be limited by the inadequacy of its
public transport and student housing.
Massive funding,
bad needs assessment
The Cour des Comptes estimates
total public funding for the project
(including the new Metro line 18)
at €5.262 billion. But no Govern-
ment
department
is
monitoring
this spending, even though finan-
cial packages are often complex
and the end cost continues to rise
as
work
progresses.
The
public
authorities
have
also
relied
on
EPAPS documents when deciding
whether to increase some financial
contributions, even though EPAPS
management is poor.
The Paris-Saclay Project:
major ambition at risk of dilution
Number of students
at the Paris-Saclay site
4
4
6
2
9
4
7
6
6
2
4
9
2
8
6
5
1
4
5
2
5
3
6
8
2
40 000
45 000
50 000
55 000
60 000
Current 2017
2018
2019
2020
Source: Cour des Comptes
52
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The Paris-Saclay Project:
major ambition at risk of dilution
Paris-Saclay University:
1.
Quickly design an organisation that
can create a world-class university and
contribute to the development of an
international cluster.
Government:
2.
appoint
an
inter-ministerial
manager for the Paris-Saclay Project
and set out his/her duties in regulations;
3.
create
a
provisional
financing
timetable for identified needs so
that its sustainability can be checked
regularly.
CEO of EPAPS:
4.
give EPAPS the organisation and
management tools it needs to carry out
its duties reliably and efficiently and to
report to the Board of Directors and the
supervisory authorities.
University campus project
on hold
The Integrated University Project
developed as an IDEX is now in
difficulty as it has been unable to
overcome the problem of the dual
nature of the French higher education
system that includes both grandes
écoles and universities. Inadequacies
in joint governance have prevented
successful
completion
without
problems of the trial period for the
project and a further 18 months has
had to be given in which to produce the
target university model and to bring
on board the institutions committed
to building it. All stakeholders must
take advantage of the extended trial
period to consolidate the institutions
on the COMUE campus. The project
to create a Saclay academic and
research cluster, which has already
absorbed huge public funds, must
not be compromised by IDEX failure
and pragmatic solutions must be
devised and implemented fast that
take account of internal differences
and overcome them.
Recommandations
53
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The France business school (FBS),
which was founded as an association
on 6 July 2012 by merger of the Tours-
Orléans-Poitiers
École
Supérieure
de Commerce et de Management
(ESCEM) with the Amiens, Brest and
Clermont-Ferrand business schools, has
been unable to meet the challenges set
by its founders. After just two academic
years
(2013-2014
and
2014-2015),
the association was dissolved and
put into voluntary liquidation by
resolution of the general meeting on
8 June 2015. The Nouvelle Aquitaine
regional chamber of accounts looked
into the numerous reasons for the
collapse:
project
preparation
and
teaching strategy, poor management
that was unable to cope successfully
with
post-merger
challenges,
and
association governance, including the
involvement of a large number of
direct and indirect financiers.
An ambitious but doomed
project
In 2013 the Cour des Comptes noted in
its annual public report the changes and
problems facing non-university business
schools, highlighting the challenges
posed by the internationalisation of
(particularly
financial)
management
studies. Local and bottom of the league
business schools have had to adjust
their teaching projects to bring them
up to high academic standards. This has
required investment to ensure they can
remain, or become more, attractive
to French and foreign students. This
was the basis for the FBS project
and its implementation. The new
school was designed to be standalone
but decentralised, based on the
traditional networks and initiatives
of the old schools. The understanding
among the founding members of the
school was altered by the chosen
governance method, which is based
on parity and total equality among
members although contribution levels
differed.
The duties of association bodies are
given minimal description in the
articles of association, which say
nothing specific about funding or
human resource management. The
School’s governance methods were
inefficient and unable to resolve the
problems facing the School from
the start even though the President
had very extensively sub-delegated
authority to the CEO.
France Business School:
failed merger
2
54
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The FBS «
grande école
» teaching
programme
was
designed
and
then implemented to be extremely
innovative.
Competitive
entrance
exams were replaced by largely
interview-based
talent
days
that
focused on student know-how and
motivation more than on academic
achievement. The actual educational
content of the grande école programme
was not however fixed. This, together
with a big increase in fees led to the
collapse of applications and short and
medium-term problems for association
finances. FBS’s aims were finally deeply
compromised by its failure to obtain
MBA recognition for its grande école
programme. It is also regrettable that
the Ministry of Higher Education and
Research did not dissuade the schools
from going down the path of offering
just one recognised programme when
that programme did not meet objective
recognition
requirements
because
of the academic and research under-
performance of some of the founding
schools.
Poor management
The association also struggled with
serious financing problems as a result
of a slump in applications and an
unrealistic financial plan. The founding
members transferred the assets of the
founding schools when they set up
the association but the actual cash
contributed was far too low to cover
the School’s running expenses. In
addition, ESCEM’s very late signing
of its contribution agreement deprived
the School of the money it needed to
grow its business fast.
The association’s financial problems
were aggravated by totally disorganised
accounting. The disorganisation of
the accounts department, which is
contrary to many principles, also meant
that the accounts were untrue and thus
could not be certified by the auditors.
The association also frequently broke
public procurement rules.
The social climate within the School
was an additional hindrance to the
association’s project. The transfer of
staff from the old schools where they
had enjoyed different statuses was not
thought through properly. The trade
union representatives brought two
actions against the School challenging
their transfer to the new association
and in particular their change of status.
A working solution was arrived at
before the 1
st
January 2013 transfer
date but the lack of any previous,
formal agreement was damaging to
the social climate. The result was that
staff with different statuses worked
side by side in the School, making
daily human resources management
extremely
complicated.
Moreover,
since FBS personnel management was
not centralised, status and situation
differences were dealt with after the
schools had merged - too late to set up
central personnel management.
France Business School:
failed merger
55
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Wind up - the weighty financial
and educational consequences
Following the collapse in 2014-2015
applications the association decided
to end the FBS project and voted to
wind it up at the general meeting on
8 June 2015. A receiver was therefore
appointed for the voluntary process.
The founding schools applied for
recognition of their future training
programmes by the Ministry of Higher
Education and Training. Only the Brest and
Clermont-Ferrand business schools had
their courses recognised and obtained
MBA accreditation for their grande
école programmes. The applications
by ESCEM and the Amiens business
school for recognition of their grande
école MBAs were rejected. Eighty-five
students who had continued their
studies at ESCEM and Amiens did
not obtain MBAs, unlike their former
co-students, even though they had paid
FBS €9 000 in fees for the 2013-2014
academic year and €10 000 for 2014-
2015.
The winding up of the association
has led to 181 redundancies at
Amiens and ESCEM and the cost
to the taxpayer of the formation,
running and winding up of France
Business School is estimated at over
€36.6 million.
*
**
Given the list produced by the Cour des
Comptes of France Business School
governance and management failures,
the French Chamber of Commerce and
Industry should as part of its duty to
provide assessment and information,
inform all its branches of the conditions
necessary for successful business school
merger - particularly as regards finance,
education programme and controls.
France Business School:
failed merger
Final valuation of the additional cost of the France Business School project
* Of which €1 181 741 paid by the City of Poitiers and the département of Vienne
Source: Cour des Comptes
Chapitre IV
Territories
1. The municipality of Levallois-Perret and its satellites :
complicated, unclear management
2. Local governments in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region and
the performing arts: dynamic policies, tight finances and a
need for stricter management
59
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The municipality of Levallois-Perret
to the west of Paris in the Hauts-
de-Seine
département
has
around
65 000 residents. It is the most densely
populated municipality in France and in
Europe. Its urban planning and sociology
have changed considerably over the last
three decades following development
projects led by Semarelp, the local
public-private company in which the
town is the majority shareholder. The
population is now relatively well-off
and enjoys many local facilities and
public services.
In addition to its close relations with
Semarelp and its subsidiaries, the
municipality relies heavily on local
associations to manage sport, culture
and leisure services and to manage
actions in direct liaison with the town.
These quasi-municipal associations,
which are heavily dependent on
municipal grants, operate exactly like
the municipal services themselves.
The financial impact of this form of
local organisation is significant. The
town’s high level of debt (over €7 500
per inhabitant at the end of 2015 - over
four times the average for councils of
equivalent size) is largely attributable
to the advances given to Semarelp
for development work. This means
that the municipal finances will be
seriously at risk if the final budget of
city-planning operations carried out by
Semarelp is not balanced. The grants
paid to quasi-municipal associations
also account for an important
part
of the town’s operating budget and
are supplemented by the provision
of significant human and other
resources.
Since not all these close links are
formalized,
municipality
decisions
cannot be based on comprehensive
information and the city council
cannot therefore undertake all neces-
sary controls. The main information gaps
concern remuneration and benefits in
kind paid to elected Semarelp directors,
disposals and acquisitions and the town’s
off-balance
sheet
commitments.
The financing agreements with the
subsidised associations contain far
The municipality of Levallois-
Perret and its satellites:
complicated, unclear management
1
Source: Cour des Comptes
Municipality of Levallois-Perret
1
er
8
e
9
e
2
e
3
e
4
e
5
e
6
e
7
e
15
e
16
e
17
e
18
e
19
e
10
e
11
e
12
e
13
e
14
e
20
e
Vanves
Issy
Meudon
Sèvres
St-Cloud
Suresnes
Nanterre
Saint-
Denis
Montreuil
Pantin
Romainville
Bobigny
Aubervilliers
La Courneuve
Villetaneuse
La Garenne C.
Colombes
Clamart
Arcueil
Bagneux
Cachan
Villejuif
Vitry-sur-
Seine
Ivry-sur-
Seine
Montrouge
Gennevilliers
Courbevoie
Puteaux
Neuilly
Boulogne
Billancourt
Levallois
Clichy
Saint-
Ouen
60
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
too little information on amounts paid,
making them of little practical use as a
tool for managing and monitoring the
work done by the associations. There
is often insufficient basis for the many
examples of multiple positions held by
municipal executives in associations.
Finally, there is some doubt about
whether municipality relations with
its public-private company and the
associations comply with the principles
of public procurement. The public
contract won by Semarelp to manage
the municipality’s private assets was
not the result of proper competition.
The same applies to its specialist
subsidiary, Levaparc, which won the
contract to manage all public parking
in the Levallois area. The municipality’s
grant
to
Levallois
Communication
pays for a service awarded without
any competition.
The municipality of Levallois-Perret
and its satellites: complicated, unclear management
Levallois-Perret and its districts
Levallois Sporting Club:
quasi-monopoly over local
association sports
(33 shares, 17 000 members)
Municipality
of Levallois-Perret
Original 2016 budget:
- operations: €192 million
- investment: €103 million
Levallois Information:
municipal information centre,
reception of new residents
Levallois Communication:
design of municipal
communication media
Levallois Découvertes:
organisation of tourist stays
and excursions for local residents,
leisure centre management
Annual grant (2014)
for the four associations:
around €11 million + payments in kind
SEMARELP
(share capital: €19.8 million):
public-private municipal
development company
7
9
.
9
9
%
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
s
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
t
h
e
t
o
w
n
'
s
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
a
s
s
e
t
s
Levaparc
SCRIM IDF
property transactions
(sale of building rights,
consultancy)
Fully-owned
subsidiaries
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
s
a
l
l
p
u
b
l
i
c
p
a
r
k
i
n
g
l
o
t
s
Centre communal d’action sociale
Caisse des écoles
Comité des oeuvres sociales
Office public de l’habitat
Other local
public bodies:
Source: Cour des Comptes
Municipality of Levallois-Perret :
1.
put an end to the excessive
fragmentation
of
services
for
Levallois residents caused by the
use of semi-public associations,
and bring them back into municipal
management so that a true and
complete picture of their financial
and accounting management can be
provided.
Government:
2.
increase Government supervision
and monitoring of Municipality of
Levallois-Perret actions, in terms of
budgetary controls and legality.
Recommandations
61
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The majority of the €7.6 billion allocated
by local subnational entities to culture
is spent on support for the performing
arts.
In 2008 the former Rhône-Alpes Region
spent €370 million on the performing
arts.
The
Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes
regional chamber of accounts examined
the performing arts policies of several
local government in its jurisdiction
2
and
their management by several operators.
Performing arts policies cover not only
festivals like Les Nuits de Fourvière
in Lyon, Jazz à Vienne, the classi-
cal and sacred music festival at La
Chaise-Dieu, the Éclat street theatre
festival in Aurillac, or the Berlioz
festival of 19th century French music
in Isère départment but also permanent
facilities: the Grenoble cultural centre
(MC2) and the theatres at Villefranche-
sur-Saône, Bourg-en-Bresse, Vienne and
Décines-Charpieu.
Numerous actions
without adequate assessment
Local governments can support the
performing arts in a number of different
ways. While big governments often
get involved in direct management
2
Annonay (conurbation authority), Clermont-Ferrand (town and conurbation authority),
Décines-Charpieu, Riom, Villefranche-sur-Saône, Villeurbanne, etc.
and support of independent facilities,
policies of medium- or small-sized
governments are necessarily more
tightly focused. Whatever their size,
the reason for support is not just to
help create cultural works and give
a wide public access to them but
also enhance the attractivity of the
surrounding areas. Implementation
of these strategic policies still does
not pay enough attention to assessment
planning. Essential factors in the success
of a performing arts policy, such as the
choice of director and his/her artistic
project, setting clear targets in
MoU
between the local authority and the
operator or proper pricing should be
given more consideration.
Tight financing require diversi-
fication of resources
Public funding (all sources combined)
form, with few
exceptions,
a very
large proportion of the budgets of the
theatres and festivals in the sample.
National statistics show that across the
local
authority
spectrum,
municipal
sector is playing by far the greatest role,
accounting for three-quarters of all
public funding, with municipalities and
Local governments
in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region
and the performing arts:
dynamic policies, tight finances
and a need for stricter management
2
62
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
federations of municipalities dedicating
on average 8% and 7% of their budgets
respectively to the performing arts.
Départements and Regions also provide
their own contributions, which can be
the largest, as in the case of the Berlioz
Festival to which the Isère département
contributes a substantial proportion
of public funding through the Arts
Dissemination Agency of Isère (AIDA).
Central Government contributes to
the support of subsidized theatres
(« scènes labellisées ») (between
50 and 60% of the running cost of
national theatre centres, such as TNP
which receives €4.4 million of the
€7.6 million total public grant). It also
provides armarked grants through the
regional cultural affairs departments
(DRAC).
Local governments in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes
region and the performing arts: dynamic policies,
tight finances and a need for stricter management
Public funding as a proportion of budget
2
in 2014
2
In some cases the figures may be skewed by necessary approximations, particularly of the
subsidy: audience member ratio.
* includes assessed rent
Source: CRC Auvergne, Rhône-Alpes, based on data supplied by councils and organisations
The
transfer
of
municipalities
competency to the -aggregations
of cooperating municipalities is in
progress, as in the case of Annonay.
However, it remains low even though
the theatre and festival-going public
in the main town will often attend
performances across the conurbation
as a whole. The creation of metropo-
litan areas has however created new
opportunities. The Lyons metropolitan
area has for example taken over Nuits
de Fourvière from the département,
while given the importance of MC2 to
the metropolitan area, the Grenoble
metropolitan area could take over MC2
financing from the municipality.
Despite the significant support given to
the performing arts by local authorities,
its continuation cannot be taken for
granted. As
départements
refocus
on their main duties, their support
to culture has fallen.
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Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Local authorities:
1.
improve
the
terms
of
the
contracts between authorities and
operators by specifying clear and
measurable targets and including
indicators to measure results.
Performing arts operators:
2.
introduce formal public procure-
ment procedures;
3.
improve the rules on the use of
short-term artists’ contracts
Recommendations
Local governments in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes
region and the performing arts: dynamic policies,
tight finances and a need for stricter management
The
intermunicipal
authorities
for
cultural co-operation (EPCC ) originally
set up among others to stabilise funding
have not always achieved this goal since
their articles of association rarely
specify how much their members have
to contribute.
Addressing the risk of falling public
funding, at the end of 2014 the
Government created a number of
“cultural
agreements”
that
ought
to ringfence Government funding
over three years so long as the
other
signatories
maintain
their
own
contribution
levels.
Seven
agreements in total were signed in
Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes at the end of
2015.
Although public funding is essential
to the performing arts, the financial
constraints facing local governments
mean that other sources must be
sought: improved pricing policies or, to
a lesser extent, sponsorship or partner
companies.
Tighter management
In addition to additional funding, tighter
management by the performing arts
bodies themselves of their existing
resources
could
create
savings
through: improving the reliability of
their accounts, better public procu-
rement
management,
recruitment
procedures
and
tighter
control
over the use of short-term artists’
contracts. The Auvergne, Rhône-Alpes
regional chamber of accounts has
noted that while the performing arts
need to use artists on short-term
contracts, abuses do sometimes occur
in the system.
Part three
Public Management
Chapter I
Sovereign Policy
Implementation
1.
Replacement of Customs aircraft and vessels: repeated and
costly failures; pooling or resources is required
2. Use of mobile police and Gendarmerie Nationale forces:
capacity close to saturation; better management required
3.
Social policy at the Interior Ministry: complex organisation;
risks identified; questionable effectiveness
69
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
1
Considerable resources
for Interministerial missions
The main duties of the Customs
Surveillance Service are to fight
against fraud and trafficking (of
drugs, tobacco, counterfeit goods,
etc.). Customs also plays a part in
other missions together with other
Government services, e.g. in the fight
against sea pollution.
Customs carries out its duties using air
and naval resources, which it procures
and manages itself. In 2016 Customs had
38 vessels of different sizes located at
34 naval bases. It also has nine helicopters,
two single-engine aircraft and seven
Cessna F 406 twin-engine aircraft
based at six airports platforms, and
seven
non-operational
Beechcraft
King Air 350 twin-engine aircraft. The
resources Customs allocates to its
air and naval fleets represent a consi-
derable proportion of its budget (half
of all Customs investments) and of its
human resources (850 officers).
Aircraft fleet replacement:
inadequate method,
accumulated delay
After thirty years in service, Customs
decided to replace all the Cessnas
used for sea surveillance with more
modern aircraft (Beechcraft King
Air 350). Despite the high cost (over
€130 million) Customs have decided
to handle the procurement alone,
acquiring the aircraft itself over
2011-2015 and fitting all the necessary
equipment (radars, scanners, optronics,
etc.) solely under its own responsibility.
Beechcraft King Air 350
Source: Customs
Replacement of Customs
aircraft and vessels: repeated
and costly failures; Pooling
or resources is required
70
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Six years after delivery of the first
aircraft, none are yet operational and
unknowns
remain
concerning
the
fitting of the equipment for detecting
marine pollution, although already
procured.
In the meantime, Customs has to
manage and maintain two separate
fleets: the old Cessnas which are
still in use, and the new Beechcraft
which can fly but have no operational
capacity given that they have still not
been fitted with the surveillance
systems they need for their duties.
Partial replacement of naval
vessels: repeated malfunctions
With regard to its naval vessels,
over 2011-2015 Customs purchased
a coastal patrol boat, seven close
surveillance boats, two fast patrol
boats, two rigid inflatable boats and
one go-fast interceptor. Only the
procurement of the coastal patrol boat
has given no problems. The three other
procurements have suffered numerous
malfunctions.
Fast patrol boat
Source: Customs
Delivery of the first close surveillance
boat was 18 months late because of
electrical problems caused by a galley
oven and a number of other facilities
not originally included but requested
by the local unit that was to use the
boat.
In the case of the two fast patrol boats
for the DRGC (regional coastguards) in
Antilles-Guyana, Customs allowed DRGC
to introduce technical specifications that
are hard to implement. The decisions
taken by the contracting shipyard
in order to fulfil the specifications
compromised
navigability.
The
propulsion systems were oversized
to compensate for the significant
weight of the boat. After receiving
the boats, these proved hard to
manoeuver since they could not turn
properly at the speeds required. After
three years of unsuccessful attempts to
improve the performance of the boats,
Customs finally withdrew them from
service. They are still out of commission
and awaiting a possible buyer.
The same DRGC also stated a need
for a very fast, interceptor-type boat
to fight drug smuggling using go-fast
boats. Customs launched an invitation
to tender via an American agent and
has almost entirely paid for the boat
but has never received the vessel as
the counterparty defaulted. Customs
has been slow to bring civil and criminal
action.
Replacement of Customs aircraft and vessels:
repeated and costly failures; Pooling
or resources is required
71
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Need for Pooling of resources
is required
These malfunctions are clearly the
result of failures in project organisa-
tion, management and supervision.
Successive director generals of the
Customs Service have failed to realise
the lack of internal expertise, have
exercised insufficient authority over
local and central services and have
applied only remote monitoring of the
implementation of the very expensive
programmes that are essential to
fulfilment by Customs of its duties.
They have been more interested in
justifying mistakes than in taking
action.
These facts also demonstrate the
inappropriate nature of Customs’
self-contained practice of acquiring and
operating its air and naval resources
on its own. This must end and the
Service must begin to explore all
possible ways of sharing resources
with other Government Services,
particularly when it is working with
them on the same Interministerial
missions.
Replacement of Customs aircraft and vessels:
repeated and costly failures; Pooling
or resources is required
1.
make the procurement of air and
sea equipment subject to intermi-
nisterial decision and entrust these
operations
to
departments
that
have the required skills and technical
expertise;
2.
share
the
maintenance
and
commissioning of Customs aircraft
and naval vessels with other State
maritime
services
(Navy,
Coast
Guard, Maritime Affairs).
Recommendations
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Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
In order to maintain and restore
public order and to ensure public
safety the Government maintains two
specialist forces for which the Interior
Ministry is responsible: the mobile
gendarmerie created in 1921 and now
made up of 108 EGMs (squadrons),
and the 60 CRSs (republican security
companies) created by the Decree of
8 December 1944. In 2015 the two
forces, which together constitute the
country’s general law enforcement
reserves, included 25 786 military and
civilian personnel almost equally divided
between the mobile gendarmerie and
the CRS, and accounted for around 11%
of all gendarmerie and police personnel.
Steadily growing number
of high-risk security missions
In the last few years, and particularly
since 2015, the French security envi-
ronment has changed fast under the
combined threat of terrorism and the
increasing migrant crisis, which has
meant that these forces have had to be
continuously mobilised and adapted.
The multi-skills, technical expertise
and permanent availability of mobile
units means that they can be rapidly
deployed anywhere in the country on
a very wide range of missions. In 2002
the types of mission and deployment
of the mobile forces were set out in
a common set of «rules of use», since
mobile gendarmerie EGMs and the CRS
are basically interchangeable. The rules
were last revised in December 2015.
Over the last two decades the deploy-
ment of mobile forces has diversified to
go well beyond their original purpose of
maintaining public order. They are now
increasingly used in security missions
to back up local public safety units,
either at the decision of the directors
general to whom they report or as part
of enhanced national plans (Vigipirate,
enhanced national security plan, fight
against clandestine immigration). They
also have permanent duties, such as
overseas duties (mobile gendarmerie
only) and public order duties at sports
events, which commit a large number
of units to one specific place. However,
some of the duties currently assigned
2
Use of mobile police
and Gendarmerie Nationale
forces: capacity close
to saturation; better management
required
73
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
to the mobile forces are far from their
core purpose. In the case of the CRS
alone, the guarding of sensitive buildings
has required on average five units a day
since 2010 and beach surveillance each
year requires the deployment of over
450 lifeguards, or the equivalent
of 3.5 companies, who are removed
from their own companies for over
three months a year.
The continuing increase of the number
of duties assigned to the mobile forces
since 2010 plus their intensive use since
2015 has also coincided with a general
review of public policies. Between 2010
and 2015 mobile forces suffered the
greatest level of redundancy within the
Interior Ministry. Personnel numbers
fell 7.5% in real terms over the period
and led to the break-up of 15 mobile
gendarmerie squadrons and a material
reduction in the average size of CRS
units, although the actual number of
units remained unchanged.
The combined effect of more work
and fewer personnel resulted in
less group training and an over 8%
increase
in
overtime
2010-2015,
which
automatically
pushed
up
pay. At the operating level, the cut
in the number of civilian staff and
military personnel on the ground,
even though the actual number of
units has not changed, means that
the authorities using these units are
finding that tactics are becoming
more difficult to implement.
Forces working to full capacity
The reduction to 168 mobile squa-
drons and CRS companies in force
since 2012 means that deployed (on
the ground, on transfer or under trai-
ning) units represented 55% of total
forces in 2015 versus 52% in 2012,
since mobile units are deployed, ‘neu-
tralised’ (on R&R) after a long mission,
or on leave. R&R is a key factor in CRS
and mobile gendarmerie availability.
Since 2013 the maximum number
of mobile units that can be deployed
per day has been 108. Actual CRS and
EGM deployment has been constantly
at this level, if not slightly above it,
since 2013.
The proportion of units available at
short notice fell to 2% of total forces in
2015 (5% in 2010) even though under
their rules of use they constitute «a
national reserve at the Government’s
disposal». There is no legal definition
of «national reserve». However, at a
time of high security the Government
must at all times be able to deploy
mobile units to maintain order as le-
gally required. Since mobile forces are
now working almost to capacity, the
Government has had to abandon cer-
tain national arrangements, even in
emergencies, but has failed to review
all the missions entrusted to highly
specialised units that are more expen-
sive that the local units.
Use of mobile police and Gendarmerie Nationale
forces: capacity close to saturation;
better management required
74
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Proportion of mobile forces available
(EGMS: units on standby or not on
mission; CRS: available units)
Source: Cour des Comptes, based on DCCRS
(Win emploi) and DGGN (Magister) data
Continuing geographic
mismatch between force
location and deployment –
Paris as an example
Mobile units in big cities are located in
defence and security areas that have
changed little since the War. Cour de
Comptes mapping of all mobile forces
firstly
indicates
complementarity
and
standard
deployability
across
all metropolitan areas. However, in
areas where deployment is heaviest
(the area under the authority of the
Paris Prefect of Police and the South)
there are major problems with this
geographic organisation. The mismatch
between the places where forces are
based and where they are deployed
today leads to excessive travel that
has a heavy impact on the budget
(travel and accommodation expense,
daily temporary secondment pay for
personnel, excessive overtime) and
also socially and environmentally.
2010-2015 the mobile forces based
in the Paris defence and safety zone
represented on average 13.8% of
their distribution across the country
but 38.4% of their total deployment.
Within Paris itself the number of events
requiring law enforcement services has
grown on average 2.6% a year since
2010 but the events requiring the
deployment of mobile forces went
up three times as fast (8.8% a year
on average). 2010-2015 the main
reason for deployment in Paris was
for guard and Vigipirate duty. The
average additional cost per month in
2015 of one CRS unit on guard duty
in Paris was €1.3 million. The second
largest reason for deployment is on
various public order duties, particu-
larly security at big sports events
and festivals, where demand for mobile
units almost doubled 2010-2015.
Improvement required
to operation and budget
management
In 2016 the Government took a number
of steps to rationalise the use of mobile
forces and to refocus their operating
management by UCFM (mobile force
co-ordination unit), which was given
additional resources. Permanent guard
duty has been gradually taken over
by local services and by the military
personnel
involved
in
Operation
Sentinelle. In Paris, a quota system
for the forces available to the Prefect
of Policy (methods still to be fixed)
has been trialled. These are all steps
in the right direction. However the
national jurisdiction of mobile forces
does not yet officially override police
and gendarmerie jurisdiction where
security
missions
are
concerned,
particularly in the Paris region.
Use of mobile police and Gendarmerie Nationale
forces: capacity close to saturation;
better management required
0 %
1 %
2 %
3 %
4 %
5 %
6 %
7 %
8 %
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
CRS
All MFs
MG
75
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The Government has also to some
extent replenished the ranks of the
mobile forces, which means that by
the end of 2017 two-thirds of the
jobs lost 2010-2015 should be filled
again. Although spending on the
mobile forces (€1.81 billion in 2015)
excluding investment has seen appa-
rently moderate growth since 2012
(3.3%), it should not be forgotten that
the number of personnel went down
over the same period.
Use of mobile police and Gendarmerie Nationale
forces: capacity close to saturation;
better management required
Mobile force bases at 1
st
January 2016
Source: Cour des Comptes based on data from DGGN (General Gendarmerie Nationale Headquarters)
and central CRS headquarters
MARSEILLE
RENNES
LILLE
BORDEAUX
METZ
LYON
93
SEINE-
SAINT-
DENIS
94
VAL-DE-MARNE
92
HAUTS-
DE-
SEINE
77 - SEINE-
ET-MARNE
91 - ESSONNE
78 - YVELINES
95 - VAL-D'OISE
Île-de-France
PARIS
VÉLIZY
Local HQ
(DZCRS or
gendarmerie region)
xxx...
Group HQ
Squadron
Mobile gendarmerie
USG (general service unit)
Delegation
CRS
0 km
50
100 km
Cour des Comptes/SRPP - DL- 2016
76
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Government:
1.
ensure one set of mobile units
is on standby or redeployable at all
times based on a threshold set by
UCFM;
2.
continue to remove mobile forces
from permanent duties that have
nothing to do with their specific
duties;
3.
ensure mobile forces have na-
tional jurisdiction when they are
deployed
on
security
missions,
overriding police and gendarmerie
jurisdiction in the allocation of units;
4.
review the quota system as it
applies to the mobile forces available
to the Paris Prefect of Police and
as specified by ministerial order to
ensure that a guaranteed minimum
number of units remain available,
taking account of the Prefect’s own
intervention resources;
5.
adopt a medium-term strategy
for rationalising the geographic
bases of mobile forces to reflect
where they are actually deployed
and to reduce long-distance travel
and associated costs;
6.
maintain group and individual
training times for mobile forces
and produce a training framework
common to both forces.
Recommendations
Use of mobile police and Gendarmerie Nationale
forces: capacity close to saturation;
better management required
77
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
As defined in the Law of 13 July 1983
as amended, social policy in favour of
Government personnel is intended to
improve living standards for active
and retired personnel and their
families, particularly in the areas of
food, housing, children and leisure. It
also aims to help beneficiaries cope
with problems. The implementation
of social policy is based on several
principles: participation of personnel;
universal services; ability to delegate to
non-profit bodies.
Over-complex organisation
In 2015 Interior Ministry social policy
affected 278 313 active personnel
(863 362 including inactive personnel).
Organisation is too complex and
fragmented. Central organisation relies
on a large number of administrative
departments (five sub-departments).
Across the country, the existence of two
separate networks (one for the Ministry
and one for the gendarmerie) creates
redundancies, evidenced by the fact
that although gendarmerie milita-
ry personnel report to the Interior
Ministry, they are covered by Defence
social policy organised by the General
Secretariat of the Ministry of Defence.
Under the Law of 3 January 2001 as
amended, a number of different types
of body (foundations, associations,
mutual insurance bodies) can be
involved
in
the
implementation
of government department social
policy if they are given subsidies,
resources and personnel in exchange
for social, cultural, sports and leisure
duties. The Interior Ministry Order
of 22 June 2009 delegated to three
main
partner
bodies
(Fondation
Jean Moulin, Association nationale
d’action sociale – ANAS, Aide au
handicap du ministère de l’intérieur
– AHMI) the implementation of its
social policy. This has not prevented
the Ministry entering into long-term
partnerships with other local and
national partner organisations that
are so many in number (around 400)
that the Ministry is unable to provide a
full list of them.
Material cost
The Ministry spent €111 million on its
social policy in 2014. This includes all
services directly provided to personnel
(€58.86 million), the cost of support
staff (€33.32 million) and subsidies to
partner organisations (€19.15 million).
3
Social policy at the Interior
Ministry: complex organisation;
risks identified; questionable
effectiveness
78
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Overheads are therefore far from
negligible: remuneration accounts
for 30% of all spending on social
policy (and includes pay for social
service staff).
The average annual cost is €400 per
member of personnel, with variations
however. While the cost is €461 exclu-
ding the Gendarmerie, it is only €291.5
for each of the 100 488 members of
Gendarmerie personnel (who are
covered in part by Ministry of Defence
social policy).
Breakdown of Interior Ministry spending
on its social policy in 2014 (€M)
*Includes cost of social service personnel.
Source : Cour des Comptes based on Interior
Ministry data
Risks compromising the system
of delegating services to partner
bodies
Control of the partner bodies receiving
public funding for the services they
provide is not effective. The agreements
with these bodies are not standard and
do not always state obligations clearly.
Supervision is fragmented into many
sub-departments,
creating
different
practices and in some cases giving rise
to a laisser-faire attitude.
The management methods of some
partner bodies create financial risks that
could affect their long-term survival, but
these risks are not managed through
supervision. The operation of certain
bodies is itself tainted by irregularities:
e.g. goods and services procurement;
borrowing limits.
In the case of ANAS, despite a total
breakdown in any dialogue with its
management 2011-2015 and even
though the association had stopped
answering its questions, the Ministry
continued to increase financing to it.
The Ministry was therefore extremely
tardy in taking action after the start of a
judicial investigation of the association’s
leading directors even though ANAS’
rapid deterioration was clear from
its
accounts.
Severe
management
problems revealed particularly serious
irregularities caused by obvious deviation
from the purpose of the association. This
has endangered the association itself and
has cast doubts on the impartial nature
of its management.
In other cases the administration has
found it hard to achieve the balance
needed to ensure partner bodies have
real
independence.
Fondation
Louis
Lépine, which works for the personnel
of the Paris Prefecture of Police, was
chaired by the Prefect of Police until May
2016 (when new articles of association
were adopted). Fondation Maison de
la Gendarmerie, the only social policy
partner of the Gendarmerie Nationale is
very tightly tied to the administration
since it is still chaired by the Director
General of the Gendarmerie Nationale,
who is consequently in a position to
decide how the subsidies he himself
allocates to the Foundation should be
used.
Social policy at the Interior Ministry:
complex organisation; risks identified;
questionable effectiveness
79
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
In addition to subsidies, these bodies
also receive Interior Ministry financing
in the form of resources (premises,
equipment, maintenance costs etc.) and
personnel that is not always refunded or
recognised in their accounts.
187.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff
were provided to partner bodies in 2014,
in some cases at the end of a totally
non-transparent
procedure,
without
any legal basis or free of charge. The
Cour des Comptes has also found many
instances of undue staff provision since
it was impossible to establish whether
some jobs within partner bodies actually
exist.
In 2016 the Ministry announced that it
would be introducing measures to step
up the control of its partner bodies (the
Ministry’s General Secretariat taking
over supervision, end to personnel pro-
vision, reinstatement of management
contacts). The measures, which have yet
to be taken, have so far not been accom-
panied by any real review of the duties
assigned to partner bodies or any real
assessment of their execution of the work.
A policy with questionable
effectiveness
The Ministry’s social policy, as currently
implemented, creates inequality. Not all
personnel enjoy equal access to services,
either because of geographic inequali-
ties (in 2014, ÎIe-de-France accounted
for 67% of Ministry social action ex-
penditure) or because of differences in
personnel status. Questions also remain
as to who actually receives the services
since certain services sometimes appear
to benefit only a few categories of per-
sonnel who are better informed about
what is available.
Furthermore, services are not properly
targeted on priority social needs. Since
there are no proper tools for needs
assessment, the effectiveness and
relevance of the services provided
cannot be measured. Not enough
account is taken of the changing
needs of members, as evidenced by
the lack of interest in the expensive
and little-used family holiday centres
run by partner organisations. Some
services by their very nature seem far
from what the law defines as social
policy. Finally, other areas of social
policy, although a Ministry priority, are
organised in an unsatisfactory manner
and must be improved immediately:
for example, as the Cour des Comptes
has itself seen, emergency housing
for young police officers in the Paris
region, which has been declared a
Ministry social policy priority.
The entire policy must be reviewed, with
assessment of actions undertaken and
aims pursued.
Social policy at the Interior Ministry:
complex organisation; risks identified;
questionable effectiveness
80
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Social policy at the Interior Ministry:
complex organisation; risks identified;
questionable effectiveness
Recommendations
Government:
1.
review the organisation of the
Interior
Ministry’s
social
policy,
shutting down SDASAP-PN and
making a final decision on whether
the Interior Ministry or the Ministry
of Defence should be responsible
for Gendarmerie Nationale social
policy (and then acting accordingly
on organisation and contractual
framework);
2.
define more tightly the aims
of social policy, relying on an
assessment of identified needs
and
shortcomings
and
making
sure there is no disparity between
personnel in comparable positions;
3.
review the delegation of duties
to partner bodies and ensure
proper
controls
are
applied
through structured contact with
management based on multi-year
agreements that state means and
objectives;
4.
adjust financing to match the
actual needs of the partner bodies;
put an end to the unjustified provision
of staff and resources.
Chapter II
Project Management
1.
The National Natural History Museum: incomplete change,
an institution weakened by Vincennes Zoo
2.
Chambers of Agriculture: creating an effective network
83
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
The National Natural History Museum
is a public national institution with
many duties: research (15 laboratories),
provision of expertise to the public
authorities, training at masters and
PhD level, conservation of collections
(66 million catalogued items) and the
dissemination of scientific culture
through its numerous museums, zoos
and botanical gardens (3 million visitors
in 2015). All these duties serve the same
purpose: the natural and human sciences.
In 2015 the Museum had 1 692 staff
and a budget of €114 million, of which
€54.3 million in grants from the Higher
Education and Environment Ministries.
Museum outgoings and receipts
1
The National Natural History
Museum: incomplete change,
an institution weakened
by Vincennes Zoo
99,88
93,90
116,26
113,10
114,15
114,10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
(€M)
Outgoings Receipts
Outgoings Receipts
Outgoings Receipts
2013
2014
2015
Extraordinary grants 2015
Grants
Receipts excluding grants
Investment
Running costs
Outgoings
Receipts
Source: Cour des Comptes
An institution in an alarming
financial condition
In 2015 the Government had to
give the National Natural History
Museum
an
extraordinary
grant
to enable it to cover the deficit
caused by the low number of visitors
to the Paris Zoological Park, more
commonly known as Vincennes Zoo.
The Zoo reopened in April 2014 after
a full refurbishment lasting four years
84
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
through a public-private partnership.
According to the economic model
produced when the operation was set
up, visitor receipts were to cover the
annual payment due to the private
partner over 25 years. The Museum
expected 1.7 million visitors a year
but actually had only 912 000 in 2015.
Unless visitor numbers increase over the
next few years, it will be running at an
annual deficit of around €7.4 million.
The Museum’s finances are in an
alarming condition at a time when it
still needs major investment to refur-
bish its, often extremely old, assets.
This includes the Palaeontology and
Comparative Anatomy Gallery at the
Botanic Garden, which now requires
urgent renovation, but for which the
Museum has no money.
Imprudent strategic decisions
The critical financial situation is the
result of Museum investment decisions
since 2007 that were approved by its
supervising body, the Ministry of Higher
Education. The Museum began the
renovation of Vincennes Zoo based on
what we now see as exaggerated visitor
assumptions: 1.4 million visitors a year,
when the Zoo had never had more than
900 000 visitors a year since the 1980s.
The public’s reaction to the reopening of
the Zoo was also less than enthusiastic
for a number of reasons: animals
were hard to see, some key species
were absent, entrance fees were
considered too high.
At the same time the Museum was
involved in a second major project:
the renovation of the Museum of Man
at Palais de Chaillot (2010-2015).
The technical and museum-specific
shortcomings in the preparation for
this project led to changes at the site
stage and almost doubled its cost
from €52.3 to €92.3 million. To cover
the overrun the Museum had to use up
all its financial room for manoeuver,
including income from the sale of
assets.
An institution that is hard
to change
In addition to its financial problems,
the Museum has found it hard to
modernise the way it operates. Since
2001 its various directors have all
tried (unsuccessfully) to introduce
reforms that will deal better with the
Museum’s wide range of duties. The
restructuring of research, for example,
came up against the opposition of staff
representatives in 2012. The Museum
retains its own teaching section, whose
importance is now marginal. In 2015
it had more lecturer/researchers (237)
than students for a Masters (180).
The Museum has made significant
progress in the management of its
collections and has introduced a
number of major projects, such as
the full renovation of the National
Herbarium (5.6 million plants). Yet
it holds almost all its reserves in the
centre of Paris in conditions that are
not always satisfactory, when major
Parisian cultural institutions have
often decided to relocate outside the
city.
The National Natural History Museum:
incomplete change, an institution weakened
by Vincennes Zoo
85
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Museum sites
Source: Cour des Comptes
Although it has sold off a number of
sites in the last few years, the Museum
still retains many other sites in Paris
and the surrounding area. The cost of
operating these facilities often bears
no relationship with the number of
visitors they attract or their scientific
importance.
Finally, there has recently been an
unending debate about the Museum’s
governance
model.
Following
the
The National Natural History Museum:
incomplete change, an institution weakened
by Vincennes Zoo
Menton
Exotic
Botanical
Garden
Fabre
Sérignan
du Comtat
Museum
Concarneau
Marinarium
Marine Biology Station
Haute-touche
Obterre Animal
Reserve
Pataud
les Eyzies
de Tayac
Shelter
Museum
CRESCO
(Coastal Systems
Research and Teaching Centre)
(not open to the public)
Chèvreloup
Arboretum
Botanical
Garden
and Galleries
Museum
of Man
Brunoy General
Ecology Centre
(not open to the public)
Paris
Paris Zoological
Park
Cour des Comptes/SRPP - DL- January 2017
86
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
poor management of the 1990s, the
Government decided to appoint a CEO
with a management but no scientific
background. The new CEO was never
accepted
by
staff
representatives.
While further change to the articles of
association appeared neither urgent nor
necessary, the authorities gave in to the
demands of the staff representatives
and appointed a scientist once more to
head the institution and gave the staff
representatives themselves more say in
committees. The three-year governance
crisis (2012-2015) stopped all work on
the modernisation of the institution.
Rehabilitation required
immediately
The Museum must take immediate
action to put its finances back on a firm
footing. To do this, it must produce a
new economic model for Vincennes Zoo,
which cannot rely on the Government to
cover its entire deficit each year. This will
require significant effort to make the
Zoo more attractive.
The Museum’s budget and financial
management must also be a priority
for its new directors, who must make
use of the Museum’s own resources
and make savings. The working hours
of non-teaching staff are currently
8% below statutory hours and must
be brought back in line. The Museum
must also review its sites base on their
cost, visitor numbers and importance
to its duties, considering the possibi-
lity of selling off/closing some of them.
At a time when Museum assets require
considerable investment, relocating
some of its reserves outside Paris and
realising some of its property assets in
the Latin Quarter must be considered.
More basic reforms must also be
introduced. The Museum has no
justification
for
maintaining
its
own body of lecturers-researchers
(Museum
senior
lecturers
and
professors). It supervision by the
Ministry
of
Higher
Education
is
also not suited to the challenges
facing the institution. Supervision
should be moved to the Research
and Culture Ministries to reflect the
Museum’s true purposes of carrying
out research and managing prestigious
scientific assets.
The National Natural History Museum:
incomplete change, an institution weakened
by Vincennes Zoo
87
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Recommendations
Government:
1.
introduce formal performance
targets for Museum management in
a new multi-year contract that sets
the basis for a return to break-even;
2.
shut down the Museum’s lecturer-
researcher body;
3.
reorganise
the
administrative
and budgetary supervision of the
institution
National Natural History Museum:
4.
take steps to make Vincennes
Zoo more attractive to visitors;
5.
restructure Museum sites in
the region, disposing of them or
refocusing their work;
6.
continue refurbishment of the
Museum’s assets, based on the
refurbishment of Îlot Poliveau;
7.
continue to modernise manage-
ment to produce savings, particularly
through pooling, and to develop own
resources;
8.
use cost accounting to separate out
the management of Vincennes Zoo
so that the Museum’s management
performance in all other areas can be
measured.
The National Natural History Museum:
incomplete change, an institution weakened
by Vincennes Zoo
88
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Chambers
of
Agriculture,
which
were created at the start of the
20th century, are now undergoing a
complete change after years spent
in their traditional role of representing
farming interests and advising farmers.
The Ministry of Agriculture sees the
network as a way of implementing its
public policies. The chambers however
still do not have all the resources needed
for these new duties. Government must
therefore play its full part in completing
this change.
The Cour des Comptes has audited the
network, highlighting the areas that
vitally need reform. We have relied
on general data that gives quite an
accurate snapshot of the network
and its development.
A network with changing duties
that need to be clarified as part
of a general strategy
The many duties of the Chambers of
Agriculture fall into three main areas:
representation, costing almost €100
million a year or 15% of total spending;
agricultural
development,
which
involves
numerous
programmes,
accounts for 75% of all work and
has an annual budget of €550 million;
and public service duties, which are
now carried out by over 10% of their
workforce and cost €70 million a year.
APCA (the Permanent Assembly of
Chambers of Agriculture) is struggling
to meet its statutory duty of running
the network. These very different
duties should be clarified as part of
a set strategic framework that will
allow the Chambers to identify the
roles their work play in a competitive
environment and to put an end to
redundancies.
An insufficiently structured
network of Chambers
of Agriculture
Like
other
chamber
networks,
in
2008 the Chambers of Agriculture
began a reform that did not start to
produce any tangible fruit until 2016.
The results of the reorganisation,
which is based mainly on upgrading
the regional network and on pooling,
are still insufficient and uncertain.
There are still too many chambers in
the network (114) and they should
be encouraged to merge. There are
also too many local branches (373).
Their
governance
is
complicated
(4 200 elected representatives) and
should be streamlined and simplified
to focus on the regions, which in future
will be a driving force. Taking the lead
from the changes already made by
other chamber networks, the head of
the network (APCA) should be given
more authority, as should Government
supervision. The current reform should
therefore continue and the opportunity to
review governance offered by the network
reorganisation should be grasped.
2
Chambers of Agriculture:
creating an effective network
89
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Principal data on chamber networks
2
Annual working units (AWU) - comparable to full-time equivalents (FTE) for companies or
administrations - are the working hours of one full-time person over one year on a farm. Total
annual working units (total AWU) include all such work done on farms.
Comparison of the number of farms, total AWU
2
and human resources
of the Chambers of Agriculture
Chambers of Agriculture:
creating an effective network
* Chambers of Trade and Crafts
** Chambers of Commerce and Industry
Source: Cour des Comptes based on APCA (Chambers of Agriculture) data and an
information report from the Finance, General Economy and Budgetary Control
Committee of the National Assembly on Chambers, their Duties and Financing of 16
September 2015 (CMA and CCI)
1995
2011
2013
2015
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
0
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
200 000
400 000
600 000
800 000
1 000 000
1 200 000
Number of farms
and AWU
FTE
Chamber of Agriculture FTEs
Total AWU (active population)
Number of farms
Source: Cour des Comptes based on AGRESTE (agriculture accounts)
and APCA (Chamber of Agriculture social data) data
90
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
Network finances need
to return to balance
The
financial
position,
which
has
worsened significantly since 2012,
requires better control of spending as
network running remains expensive
(€720 million in 2014).
Reform must first improve personnel
costs, which at present represent 61%
of all network expense and are rising.
Chamber
equipment
also
needs
to be reviewed and priority given to
improving the vehicle fleet and property
management. Better control of expendi-
ture on operations, particularly subsidies
to associations, is also required. To achieve
these improvements the chambers will
have to use their management tools
better (particularly budgeting and cost
accounting) and to develop internal
control and measurement systems.
But the network’s financial position
also requires reform of its funding
method since this would give greater
meaning to its regional reorganisation.
As its tax revenue and the grants
it receives are put under extreme
pressure, the network is obtaining
revenue from the sale of services.
But the services themselves have
their limits and cannot cover the very
wide range of duties provided by the
chambers of agriculture, which are
public administrative institutions.
Given the big differences between
chambers, network members should
work
together.
The
equalisation
introduced by the FNPCA (National
Balancing Fund of the Chambers
of Agriculture) and then the FNSP
(National Solidarity and Balancing
Fund) is however insufficient. Long
of negligible importance, it was
increased to 1% of tax revenue in
2015 although the legal limit set for
the FNSP meant it could have been
much higher (5%).
As the Chambers of Agriculture
evolve and in the light of their
worsening
financial
problems,
the public authorities should also
consider introducing fiscal reform
for these public institutions to take
account of their increasing regional
importance.
Fiscal authority, which at present lies
with département chambers, should be
transferred to regional level. This would
resolve many of the disparities in the
distribution of TATFNB (supplement
to unbuilt property tax) across the
network by different départements.
The regional chambers would then
have to allocate tax revenue among
the individual chambers in their
regions, subject to any statutory
limits. This would not just create a
better national balance; it would
also improve regional solidarity.
The Cour des Comptes therefore
calls on the Government to support
the existing reform and to improve
network governance and financing by
revising the Rural and Sea Fisheries
Code.
Chambers of Agriculture:
creating an effective network
91
Summaries of the Cour des comptes 2017 Annual Public Report
1.
encourage the merger of dépar-
tement chambers;
2.
reduce the number of elected
representatives to Chambers of
Agriculture by shutting down the
colleges 4 (former farmers) and 5
(professional agricultural groups);
3.
specify in the Rural and Sea
Fisheries Code that APCA is the
head of the network and that it
has authority to set the national
strategy for the network and its
general staff management policy;
4.
transfer
fiscal
responsibility
from département to regional level.
Recommendations
Chambers of Agriculture:
creating an effective network